The global financial crisis has again shown that it is important to understand the emergence and measurement of risks in the banking sector. However, there is no consensus in the literature which risk proxy works best at the level of the individual bank. A commonly used measure in applied work is the Z-score, which might suffer from calculation issues given poor data quality. Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk.

This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.

We document for a set of Latin American emerging countries that the different nature of foreign funding accessed by foreign and local banks affected their lending performance after September 2008. We show that lending growth was weaker for shock-affected foreign banks compared to shock-affected local banks. This evidence represents valuable policy information for regulators concerned with the stability and well-functioning of banking sectors.

This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.

Using a 50 % sample of all private sector establishments in Germany, we report that spinoffs are larger, initially employ more skilled and more experienced workers, and pay higher wages than other startups. We investigate whether spinoffs are more likely to survive than other startups, and whether spinoff survival depends on the quality and size of their parent companies, as suggested in some of the theoretical and empirical literature. Our estimated survival models confirm that spinoffs are generally less likely to exit than other startups. We also distinguish between pulled spinoffs, where the parent company continues after they are founded, and pushed spinoffs, where the parent company stops operations. Our results indicate that in western and eastern Germany and in all sectors investigated, pulled spinoffs have a higher probability of survival than pushed spinoffs. Concerning the parent connection, we find that intra-industry spinoffs and spinoffs emerging from better-performing or smaller parent companies are generally less likely to exit.

Trotz beträchtlicher Schwankungen auf den Währungs-, Kapital- und Rohstoffmärkten expandiert die Weltproduktion moderat und ohne große Schwankungen. Die USA und Großbritannien sind im Aufschwung, und der Euroraum erholt sich zögerlich. In China hat sich die Konjunktur nach einer ausgeprägten Schwächephase zu Beginn des Jahres 2015 wieder stabilisiert, während die Rezessionen in Russland und Brasilien anhalten. Beide großen Schwellenländer leiden an den starken Rückgängen der Preise für ihre Rohstoffexporte. Weltweit robust ist dagegen die Konjunktur in den Dienstleistungsbereichen.

Einlagensicherungsmechanismen sind Bestandteil vieler Finanzsysteme und sollen in Krisenzeiten einen Ansturm der Sparer auf Banken und daraus resultierende Ansteckungseffekte verhindern. Jedoch bergen Sicherungssysteme zusätzliche Risikoanreize für Kreditinstitute, da eine solche Versicherung die Überwachungsanreize der Einlagengeber reduziert. Im Zuge der Finanzkrise von 2007 bis 2009 ist es in vielen Ländern zu Reformen hinsichtlich der Einlagensicherungssysteme gekommen. Dieser Artikel diskutiert die jüngste Anhebung der Einlagensicherungsgrenze in den USA von 100 000 auf 250 000 US-Dollar aus dem Jahr 2008 vor dem Hintergrund eines aktuellen Forschungsbeitrags. Dieser zeigt deutlich, dass durch die Erhöhung der Einlagensicherung in den USA das Risiko der Banken, die von der Erhöhung besonders profitierten, deutlich gestiegen ist, und gibt damit Hinweise auf den bekannten Zielkonflikt von Einlagensicherungssystemen: kurzfristige Stabilisierung während einer Krise gegenüber langfristigen Risikoanreizen für Banken.