This paper provides new causal evidence on how patent allowances affect firms and their employees based on quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Exploiting employer-employee records with newly linked German firm data and web-scraped patent documents, we show that patent-induced shocks reduce firm exit, improve productivity, and increase wages, with rent-sharing elasticities between 0.10 and 0.21. Wage gains are broadly observed across occupational tasks, with high heterogeneity: managers benefit disproportionately in publicly traded firms, whereas broader wage increases accrue to workers in non-traded firms. Our findings highlight the role of institutional features and firm organization in shaping how rents are shared.

Nach einem mehrjährigen Abschwung hat im Verlauf des vergangenen Jahres eine Erholung in Deutschland eingesetzt. Während die exportorientierte Industrie angesichts weiter abnehmender Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, hoher geopolitischer Unsicherheit und handelspolitischer Belastungen kaum Tritt fasste, wurde die Erholung maßgeblich von der Binnenwirtschaft getragen. Der Energiepreisschock, der durch den Iran-Krieg ausgelöst wurde, dämpft die Erholung, dürfte sie aber nicht vollständig zum Erliegen bringen. Dafür sorgt der erheblich expansive Kurs der Finanzpolitik, der vor allem Unternehmen der Verteidigungsindustrie und des Tiefbaus stützt. Im Großteil des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes bleibt die Lage jedoch verhalten. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte in diesem Jahr um 0,6 % und im Jahr 2027 um 0,9 % zunehmen, nachdem die Wirtschaftsleistung im Vorjahr mit einem Anstieg von 0,2 % kaum mehr als stagniert hat. Im Vergleich zum Herbstgutachten 2025 haben die an der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose beteiligten Institute damit ihre Prognose für das laufende Jahr deutlich um 0,6 Prozentpunkte und für das kommende Jahr um 0,4 Prozentpunkte nach unten korrigiert.

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.