Die mittelfristige Projektion der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage in Deutschland beinhaltet, dass das Wirtschaftswachstum mit 1% pro Jahr in den kommenden sechs Jahren in etwa genauso hoch ausfällt wie in den vergangenen sechs Jahren. Der Staatshaushalt bleibt im Defizit, aber der Schuldenstand geht relativ zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt ab dem Jahr 2024 wieder zurück. Bei diesem Tempo der wirtschaftlichen Expansion werden die Emissionen mittelfristig zwar weiter zurückgehen, aber deutlich langsamer als nötig, um die nationalen Klimaschutzziele zu erreichen.

We examine how firms adapt their organization when they go public. To conform with the requirements of public capital markets, we expect IPO firms to become more organized, making the firm more accountable and its human capital more easily replaceable. We find that IPO firms transform into a more hierarchical organization with smaller departments. Managerial oversight increases. Organizational functions dedicated to accounting, finance, information and communication, and human resources become much more prominent. Employee turnover is sizeable and directly related to changes in hierarchical layers. New hires are better educated, but younger and less experienced than incumbents, which reflects the staffing needs of a more hierarchical organization. Wage inequality increases as firms become more hierarchical. Overall, going public is associated with a comprehensive transformation of the firm's organization which becomes geared towards efficiently operating a public firm.

We study how the disclosure of corrupt practices affects the growth of firms involved in illegal interactions with the government using randomized audits of public procurement in Brazil. On average, firms exposed by the anti-corruption program grow larger after the audits, despite experiencing a decrease in procurement contracts. We manually collect new data on the details of thousands of corruption cases, through which we uncover a large heterogeneity in our firm-level effects depending on the degree of involvement in corruption. Using investment-, loan-, and worker- level data, we show that the average exposed firms adapt to the loss of government contracts by changing their investment strategy. They increase capital investment and borrow more to finance such investment, while there is no change in their internal organization. We provide qualitative support to our results by conducting new face-to-face surveys with business owners of government-dependent firms.