Ricardian Equivalence, Foreign Debt and Sovereign Default Risk
Stefan Eichler, Ju Hyun Pyun
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
May
2022
Abstract
We study the impact of sovereign solvency on the private-public savings offset. Using data on 80 economies for 1989–2018, we find robust evidence for a U-shaped pattern in the private-public savings offset in sovereign credit ratings. While the 1:1 savings offset is observed at intermediate levels of sovereign solvency, fiscal deficits are not offset by private savings at extremely low and high levels of sovereign solvency. Particularly, the U-shaped pattern is more pronounced for countries with high levels of foreign ownership of government debt. The U-shaped pattern is an emerging market phenomenon; additionally, it is confirmed when considering foreign currency rating and external public debt, but not for domestic currency rating and domestic public debt. For considerable foreign ownership of sovereign bonds, sovereign default constitutes a net wealth gain for domestic consumers.
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The Effects of Sovereign Risk: A High Frequency Identification Based on News Ticker Data
Ruben Staffa
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 8,
2022
Abstract
This paper uses novel news ticker data to evaluate the effect of sovereign risk on economic and financial outcomes. The use of intraday news enables me to derive policy events and respective timestamps that potentially alter investors’ beliefs about a sovereign’s willingness to service its debt and thereby sovereign risk. Following the high frequency identification literature, in the tradition of Kuttner (2001) and Guerkaynak et al. (2005), associated variation in sovereign risk is then obtained by capturing bond price movements within narrowly defined time windows around the event time. I conduct the outlined identification for Italy since its large bond market and its frequent coverage in the news render it a suitable candidate country. Using the identified shocks in an instrumental variable local projection setting yields a strong instrument and robust results in line with theoretical predictions. I document a dampening effect of sovereign risk on output. Also, borrowing costs for the private sector increase and inflation rises in response to higher sovereign risk.
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Quid Pro Quo? Political Ties and Sovereign Borrowing
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of International Economics,
November
2021
Abstract
Do stronger political ties with a global superpower improve sovereign borrowing conditions? We use data on voting at the United Nations General Assembly along with foreign aid flows to construct an index of political ties and find evidence that suggests stronger political ties with the US is associated with both better sovereign credit ratings and lower yields on sovereign bonds especially among lower income countries. We use official heads-of-state visits to the White House and coalition forces troop contributions as additional measures of the strength of political ties to further reinforce our findings.
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The Appropriateness of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure for Central and Eastern European Countries
Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Martina Kämpfe, Tobias Knedlik
Empirica,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
The European Commission’s Scoreboard of Macroeconomic Imbalances is a rare case of a publicly released early warning system. It was published first time in 2012 by the European Commission as a reaction to public debt crises in Europe. So far, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure takes a one-size-fits-all approach with regard to the identification of thresholds. The experience of Central and Eastern European Countries during the global financial crisis and in the resulting public debt crises has been largely different from that of other European countries. This paper looks at the appropriateness of scoreboard of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure of the European Commission for this group of catching-up countries. It is shown that while some of the indicators of the scoreboard are helpful to predict crises in the region, thresholds are in most cases set too narrow since it largely disregarded the specifics of catching-up economies, in particular higher and more volatile growth rates of various macroeconomic variables.
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Why Are Households Saving so much During the Corona Recession?
Reint E. Gropp, William McShane
IWH Policy Notes,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
Savings rates among European households have reached record levels during the Corona recession. We investigate three possible explanations for the increase in household savings: precautionary motivations induced by increased economic uncertainty, reduced consumption opportunities due to lockdown measures, and Ricardian Equivalence, i.e. increases in the expected future tax-burden of households driven by increases in government debt. To test these explanations, we compile a monthly panel of euro area countries from January 2019 to August 2020. Our findings indicate that the chief driver of the increase in household savings is supply: As governments restrict households’ opportunities to spend, households spend less. We estimate that going from no lockdown measures to that of Italy’s in March, would have resulted in the growth of Germany’s deposit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio being 0.6 percentage points higher each month. This would be equivalent to the volume of deposits increasing by roughly 14.3 billion euros or 348 euros per house monthly. Demand effects, driven by either fears of unemployment or fear of infection from COVID-19, appear to only have a weak impact on household savings, whereas changes in government debt are unrelated or even negatively related to savings rates. The analysis suggests that there is some pent-up demand for consumption that may unravel after lockdown measures are abolished and may result in a significant increase in consumption in the late spring/early summer 2021.
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25.01.2021 • 2/2021
High public deficits not only due to the pandemic – Medium-term options for fiscal policy
According to the IWH’s medium-term projection, Germany's gross domestic product will grow more slowly between 2020 and 2025 than before, not only because of the pandemic crisis, but also because the work force will decline. The resulting structural public deficits are, if the legal framework remains unchanged, likely to be higher than the debt brake allows. Consolidation measures, especially if they relate to government revenues, entail economic losses in the short term. “There is much to be said, also from a theoretical point of view, for not abolishing the debt brake, but for relaxing it to some extent,” says Oliver Holtemöller, head of the Department of Macroeconomics and vice president at Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
Oliver Holtemöller
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Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan, Esa Jokivuolle, Kim Ristolainen
Journal of Financial Stability,
October
2020
Abstract
We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.
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ekordschulden gegen Corona-Folgen sind finanzierbar – schuldenfinanzierte Konsumstimulierung aber nicht zielführend
Oliver Holtemöller
ifo Schnelldienst,
No. 8,
2020
Abstract
Auf große Wirtschaftskrisen reagiert die Finanzpolitik häufig mit einer massiven Ausweitung der öffentlichen Verschuldung, so auch in der gegenwärtigen Coronakrise. In diesem Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass die deutsche Schuldenbremse die Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen auch dann gewährleistet, wenn im Abstand von zehn Jahren Krisen auftreten, in denen die Neuverschuldungsgrenze außer Kraft gesetzt wird. Die Tragfähigkeit zusätzlicher Staatsschulden begründet jedoch nicht deren Sinnhaftigkeit. Diskretionäre Finanzpolitik zur Stimulierung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage leistet insgesamt einen eher kleinen Anteil zur Stabilisierung der realwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Corona-Epidemie, für den Ausgleich tatsächlicher sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Schäden und für die Aufrechterhaltung des Bildungsbetriebs unter den Bedingungen einer Epidemie könnten einen wichtigeren Beitrag zur Krisenbekämpfung leisten als kurzfristige Nachfragestimulierung.
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Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis
Shai B. Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Filippo Mezzanotti
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE-backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested ("dry powder"), could increase the resilience of PE-backed companies. In their study of PE-backed buyouts in the U.K. - which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S. - the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE-backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non-PE firms. Moreover, such PE-backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE-backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.
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