What if Financial Markets were inefficient?
Marian Berneburg
Globale Wirtschaft - nationale Verantwortung: Wege aus dem Druckkessel,
2005
Abstract
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How do multinationals meet investment decisions: The case study of General Motors
Diemo Dietrich, Daniel Höwer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2005
Abstract
In der öffentlichen Diskussion um die Bedeutung multinationaler Konzerne für die deutsche Wirtschaft hatten und haben die Ereignisse im Zusammenhang mit Opel, der deutschen Tochter von General Motors, ein besonderes Maß an Aufmerksamkeit erregt. Als mit der Änderung der Konzernstruktur im Juni 2004 der unternehmensinterne Wettbewerb um die Produktionskapazitäten institutionalisiert wurde, war dies von vielen Beobachtern als Schritt hin zu mehr Effizienz und höherer Profitabilität gewertet worden. Doch ein solcher interner Wettbewerb um die Ressourcen eines Unternehmens kann behindert sein und zu ineffizienter Mittelverwendung führen: Informationsund Durchsetzungsprobleme sowie Machtkämpfe innerhalb eines Konzerns schränken nämlich die Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft der Konzernleitung ein, vorhandene Ressourcen in ihre produktivsten Unternehmensteile zu lenken. Unter Rückgriff auf die institutionenökonomische Organisationslehre werden mögliche Effizienzprobleme der unternehmensinternen Allokation von Kapital aufgezeigt und deren Relevanz im Rahmen einer Fallstudie zu General Motors/Opel diskutiert.
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The integration of imperfect financial markets: Implications for business cycle volatility
Claudia M. Buch, C. Pierdzioch
Journal of Policy Modeling,
No. 7,
2005
Abstract
During the last two decades, the degree of openness of national financial systems has increased substantially. At the same time, asymmetries in information and other financial market frictions have remained prevalent. We study the implications of the opening up of national financial systems in the presence of financial market frictions for business cycle volatility. In our empirical analysis, we show that countries with more developed financial systems have lower business cycle volatility. Financial openness has no strong impact on business cycle volatility, in contrast. In our theoretical analysis, we study the implications of the opening up of national financial markets and of financial market frictions for business cycle volatility using a dynamic macroeconomic model of an open economy. We find that the implications of opening up national financial markets for business cycle volatility are largely unaffected by the presence of financial market frictions.
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Financial Openness and Business Cycle Volatility
Claudia M. Buch, Jörg Döpke, C. Pierdzioch
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
This paper discusses whether the integration of international financial markets affects business cycle volatility. In the framework of a new open economy macro-model, we show that the link between financial openness and business cycle volatility depends on the nature of the underlying shock. Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Our results also show that the link between business cycle volatility and financial openness has not been stable over time.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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Cross-border Banking and Transmission Mechanisms in Europe: Evidence from German Data
Claudia M. Buch
Applied Financial Economics,
No. 16,
2004
Abstract
International activities of commercial banks play a potential role for the transmission of shocks across countries. This paper presents stylized facts of the integration of European banking markets and analyses the potential of banks to transmit shocks across countries. Although the openness of banking systems has increased, bilateral financial linkages among EU countries are relatively small. The exceptions are claims of German banks on a number of smaller countries. These data are used for an analysis of the determinants of cross-border lending patterns.
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Investitions- und Finanzierungsverhalten Multinationaler Unternehmen
Holger Zemanek
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 197,
2004
Abstract
Seit einigen Jahren können internationale Handels- und Kapitalströme den beobachteten internationalen Konjunkturverbund – insbesondere zwischen den USA und Europa – nicht mehr hinreichend erklären. So hat sich beispielsweise der in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren bestehende enge Konjunkturzusammenhang zwischen Italien, Frankreich sowie Deutschland auf der einen und den USA auf der anderen in den 1990er Jahren aufgelöst, obwohl sich die Handelsverflechtungen zwischen diesen Ländern keinesfalls verringerten.
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Cross-border bank mergers: What lures the rare animal?
Claudia M. Buch, G. DeLong
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 9,
2004
Abstract
Although domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the financial services industry have increased steadily over the past two decades, international M&As were until recently relatively rare. Moreover, the share of cross-border mergers in the banking industry is low compared with other industries. This paper uses a novel dataset of over 3000 mergers that took place between 1985 and 2001 to analyze the determinants of international bank mergers. We test the extent to which information costs and regulations hold back merger activity. Our results suggest that information costs significantly impede cross-border bank mergers. Regulations also influence cross-border bank merger activity. Hence, policy makers can create environments that encourage cross-border activity, but information cost barriers must be overcome even in (legally) integrated markets.
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Market Indicators, Bank Fragility, and Indirect Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Economic Policy Review,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.
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Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 192,
2004
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
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