Interactions Between Regulatory and Corporate Taxes: How Is Bank Leverage Affected?
Franziska Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.
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Predicting the Rise of EU Right-Wing Populism in Response to Unbalanced Immigration
Marko Jusup, Dejan Kovač, Boris Podobnik, H. Eugene Stanley
Complexity,
August
2017
Abstract
Among the central tenets of globalization is the free migration of labor. Although much has been written about the benefits of globalization, little is known about its limitations and how antiglobalist sentiment can be strongly affected by high levels of immigration. Analyzing poll data from a group of EU countries affected by the recent migrant crisis, we find that over the last three years the percentage of right-wing (RW) populist voters in a given country depends on the prevalence of immigrants in this country’s population and the total immigration inflow into the entire EU. The latter is likely due to the perception that the EU functions as a supranational state in which a lack of inner borders means that “someone else’s problem” can easily become “my problem.” We find that the increase in the percentage of RW voters substantially surpasses the percentage of immigration inflow, implying that if this process continues, ongoing democratic processes will cause RW populism to prevail and globalization to rapidly decrease. We locate tipping points between the fraction of immigrants and the rise of RW populism, and we model our empirical findings using a complex network framework in which the success of globalization rests on a balance between immigration and immigrant integration.
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The Drivers of Revenue Productivity: a New Decomposition Analysis with Firm-level Data
Filippo di Mauro, Giordano Mion, Daniel Stöhlker
ECB Working Paper,
No. 2014,
2017
Abstract
This paper aims to derive a methodology to decompose aggregate revenue TFP changes over time into four different components – namely physical TFP, mark-ups, quality and production scale. The new methodology is applied to a panel of EU countries and manufacturing industries over the period 2006-2012. In summary, patterns of measured revenue productivity have been broadly similar across EU countries, most notably when we group them into stressed (Italy, Spain and Slovenia) and non-stressed countries (Belgium, Finland, France and Germany). In particular, measured revenue productivity drops for both groups by about 6 percent during the recent crisis. More specifically, for both stressed and non-stressed countries the drop in revenue productivity was accompanied by a substantial dip in the proxy we use for TFP in quantity terms, as well as by a strong reduction in mark-ups.
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On the Distribution of Refugees in the EU
Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Andreas Schmalzbauer, Götz Zeddies
Intereconomics,
No. 4,
2016
Abstract
The current situation regarding the migration of refugees can only be handled efficiently through closer international cooperation in the field of asylum policy. From an economic point of view, it would be reasonable to distribute incoming refugees among all EU countries according to a distribution key that reflects differences in the costs of integration in the individual countries. An efficient distribution would even out the marginal costs of integrating refugees. In order to reach a political agreement, the key for distributing refugees should be complemented by compensation payments that distribute the costs of integration among countries. The key for distributing refugees presented by the EU Commission takes account of appropriate factors in principle, but it is unclear in terms of detail. The compensation payments for countries that should take relatively high numbers of refugees for cost efficiency reasons should be financed by reallocating resources within the EU budget.
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FDI, Human Capital and Income Convergence — Evidence for European Regions
Björn Jindra, Philipp Marek, Dominik Völlmecke
Economic Systems,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
This study examines income convergence in regional GDP per capita for a sample of 269 regions within the European Union (EU) between 2003 and 2010. We use an endogenous broad capital model based on foreign direct investment (FDI) induced agglomeration economies and human capital. By applying a Markov chain approach to a new dataset that exploits micro-aggregated sub-national FDI statistics, the analysis provides insights into regional income growth dynamics within the EU. Our results indicate a weak process of overall income convergence across EU regions. This does not apply to the dynamics within Central and East European countries (CEECs), where we find indications of a poverty trap. In contrast to FDI, regional human capital seems to be associated with higher income levels. However, we identify a positive interaction of FDI and human capital in their relation with income growth dynamics.
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24.06.2016 • 26/2016
UK’s “No” to EU will be costly for both sides
On Thursday 23rd, the British people have decided to leave the European Union (EU) Their vote not to remain in the European community was surprisingly clear. UK’s exit will have both political and economic consequences which are far-reaching for the country itself as well as the rest of Europe. “The reactions of the remaining member states are the crucial key now, especially France’s and Germany’s” says Reint E. Gropp, President of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association.
Reint E. Gropp
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Brexit (Probability) and Effects on Financial Market Stability
Thomas Krause, Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
IWH Online,
No. 5,
2016
Abstract
On 23 June 2016, there will be a referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) on the stay of the country in the European Union (EU). Based on recent poll data, the share of supporters and opponents of an exit varies around 50%. Opponents of the UK breaking up with Brussels („Brexit“) refer to high costs in terms of stagnating economic growth if the UK leaves the EU. The risk of reduced trade, declining foreign direct investment, and a lower degree of financial market integration is high following an exit of the “single market”.
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20.06.2016 • 24/2016
Financial market reaction to poll data suggests strong effects of a Brexit on exchange rates and the banking system both in the UK and in the EU
On 23 June 2016, there will be a referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) on the question of whether or not the country should remain in the European Union (EU). We use the polls as a measure of the likelihood of an exit to examine the likely effect of a Brexit on financial markets. “Whenever the probability in the polls of a Brexit moves above 50%, we observe a substantial depreciation of the UK pound with respect to most major currencies (including the euro), and strong decline in bank stock prices, suggesting that markets feel the financial sector (both in the UK and the EU) will be most severely affected by a Brexit”, IWH President Reint E. Gropp says. There is little effect on the euro/US Dollar exchange rate. “A huge concern is that overall market volatility both in the UK and the EU are on record highs since last Thursday, reflecting the higher uncertainty associated with Brexit and how exactly, if it happened, it would come about.” Within the UK, we see some evidence for a flight to safety into UK government bonds, but no effects for German bonds.
Reint E. Gropp
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