The Corona Recession and Bank Stress in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
We conduct stress tests for a large sample of German banks across different recoveries from the Corona recession. We find that, depending on how quickly the economy recovers, between 6% to 28% of banks could become distressed from defaulting corporate borrowers alone. Many of these banks are likely to require regulatory intervention or may even fail. Even in our most optimistic scenario, bank capital ratios decline by nearly 24%. The sum of total loans held by distressed banks could plausibly range from 127 to 624 billion Euros and it may take years before the full extent of this stress is observable. Hence, the current recession could result in an acute contraction in lending to the real economy, thereby worsening the current recession , decelerating the recovery, or perhaps even causing a “double dip” recession. Additionally, we show that the corporate portfolio of savings and cooperative banks is more than five times as exposed to small firms as that of commercial banks and Landesbanken. The preliminary evidence indicates small firms are particularly exposed to the current crisis, which implies that cooperative and savings banks are at especially high risk of becoming distressed. Given that the financial difficulties may seriously impair the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, the pressure to bail out large parts of the banking system will be strong. Recent research suggests that the long run benefits of largely resisting these pressures may be high and could result in a more efficient economy.
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A Capital Structure Channel of Monetary Policy
Benjamin Grosse-Rueschkamp, Sascha Steffen, Daniel Streitz
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
We study the transmission channels from central banks’ quantitative easing programs via the banking sector when central banks start purchasing corporate bonds. We find evidence consistent with a “capital structure channel” of monetary policy. The announcement of central bank purchases reduces the bond yields of firms whose bonds are eligible for central bank purchases. These firms substitute bank term loans with bond debt, thereby relaxing banks’ lending constraints: banks with low tier-1 ratios and high nonperforming loans increase lending to private (and profitable) firms, which experience a growth in investment. The credit reallocation increases banks’ risk-taking in corporate credit.
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What Does Peer-to-Peer Lending Evidence Say About the Risk-taking Channel of Monetary Policy?
Yiping Huang, Xiang Li, Chu Wang
Abstract
This paper uses loan application-level data from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we are the first to provide quantitative evidence of the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking of nonbank financial institution. We find that the search-for-yield is the main workhorse of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and a greater riskiness of credit allocation, but these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.
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What Does Peer-to-Peer Lending Evidence Say About the Risk-taking Channel of Monetary Policy?
Yiping Huang, Xiang Li, Chu Wang
Abstract
This paper uses loan application-level data from a peer-to-peer lending platform to study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. By employing a direct ex-ante measure of risk-taking and estimating the simultaneous equations of loan approval and loan amount, we are the first to provide quantitative evidence of the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking of nonbank financial institution. We find that the search-for-yield is the main workhorse of the risk-taking effect, while we do not observe consistent findings of risk-shifting from the liquidity change. Monetary policy easing is associated with a higher probability of granting loans to risky borrowers and a greater riskiness of credit allocation, but these changes do not necessarily relate to a larger loan amount on average.
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National Culture and Risk-taking: Evidence from the Insurance Industry
Chrysovalantis Gaganis, Iftekhar Hasan, Panagiota Papadimitri, Menelaos Tasiou
Journal of Business Research,
April
2019
Abstract
The gravity of insurance within the financial sector is constantly increasing. Reasonably, after the events of the recent financial turmoil, the domain of research that examines the factors driving the risk-taking of this industry has been signified. The purpose of the present study is to investigate the interplay between national culture and risk of insurance firms. We quantify the cultural overtones, measuring national culture considering the dimensions outlined by the Hofstede model and risk-taking using the ‘Z-score’. In a sample consisting of 801 life and non-life insurance firms operating across 42 countries over the period 2007–2016, we find a strong and significant relationship among insurance firms' risk-taking and cultural characteristics, such as individualism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance. Results remain robust to a variety of firm and country-specific controls, alternative measures of risk, sample specifications and tests designed to alleviate endogeneity.
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Senior Debt and Market Discipline: Evidence from Bank-to-bank Loans
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu, Haizhi Wang
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2019
Abstract
We empirically investigate whether taking senior bank loans would enhance market discipline and control risk-taking among borrowing banks. Controlling for endogeneity concern arising from borrowing bank self-select into taking senior bank debt, we document that both the spreads and covenants in loan contracts are sensitive to bank risk variables. Our analysis also reveals that borrowing banks reduce their risk exposure after their first issuance of senior bank debt. We also find that lending banks significantly increase their collaboration with borrowing banks and increase their presence in the home markets of borrowing banks.
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01.11.2017 • 38/2017
IWH Policy Talk „Risk Sharing and Risk Reduction – The Challenges that Lie Ahead“
The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association is pleased to inform about its next upcoming IWH Policy Talk „Risk Sharing and Risk Reduction – The Challenges that Lie Ahead“ with Andrea Enria, first Chairperson of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The talk will take place on Tuesday, No¬vember 7, 2017, 5:00 p.m., in the IWH conference room. You are hereby cordially invited to attend.
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Do Managerial Risk-taking Incentives Influence Firms' Exchange Rate Exposure?
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Delroy M. Hunter, Yun Zhu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2017
Abstract
There is scant evidence on how risk-taking incentives impact specific firm risks. This has implications for board oversight of managerial risk taking, firms' development of comparative advantage in taking particular risks, and compensation design. We examine this question for exchange rate risk. Using multiple identification strategies, we find that vega increases exchange rate exposure for purely domestic and globally engaged firms. Vega's impact increases with international operations, declines post-SOX, and is robust to firm-level governance. Our results suggest that evidence that exposure reduces firm value can be viewed, in part, as a wealth transfer from shareholders and debt-holders to managers.
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Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
Journal of Corporate Finance,
August
2017
Abstract
We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is compensated with salary, equity and inside debt. We seek to understand the joint implications of this compensation package for managerial risk-taking incentives and credit spreads. We show that the size and seniority of inside debt not only are crucial for the relation between inside debt and credit spreads but also play an important role in shaping the relation between equity compensation and credit spreads. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions.
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