Dynamic Order Submission Strategies with Competition between a Dealer Market and a Crossing Network
Hans Degryse, Mark Van Achter, Gunther Wuyts
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
We analyze a dynamic microstructure model in which a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) interact for three informational settings. A key result is that coexistence of trading systems generates systematic patterns in order flow, which depend on the degree of transparency. Further, we study overall welfare, measured by the gains from trade of all agents, and compare it with the maximum overall welfare. The discrepancy between both measures is attributable to two inefficiencies. Due to these inefficiencies, introducing a CN next to a DM, as well as increasing the transparency level, not necessarily produces greater overall welfare.
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Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 8,
2008
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming
from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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Deeper, Wider and More Competitive? Monetary Integration, Eastern Enlargement and Competitiveness in the European Union
Gianmarco Ottaviano, Daria Taglioni, Filippo di Mauro
ECB Working Paper,
No. 847,
2008
Abstract
What determines a country’s ability to compete in international markets? What fosters the global competitiveness of its firms? And in the European context, have key elements of the EU strategy such as EMU and enlargement helped or hindered domestic firms’ competitiveness in local and global markets? We address these questions by calibrating and simulating a conceptual framework that, based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), predicts that tougher and more transparent international competition forces less productive firms out the market, thereby increasing average productivity as well as reducing average prices and mark-ups. The model also predicts a parallel reduction of price dispersion within sectors. Our conceptual framework allows us to disentangle the effects of technology and freeness of entry from those of accessibility. On the one hand, by controlling for the impact of trade frictions, we are able to construct an index of ‘revealed competitiveness’, which would drive the relative performance of countries in an ideal world in which all faced the same barriers to international transactions. On the other hand, by focusing on the role of accessibility while keeping ‘revealed competitiveness’ as given, we are able to evaluate the impacts of EMU and enlargement on the competitiveness of European firms. We find that EMU positively affects the competitiveness of firms located in participating economies. Enlargement has, instead, two contrasting effects. It improves the accessibility of EU members but it also increases substantially the relative importance of unproductive competitors from Eastern Europe. JEL Classification: F12, R13.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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Crossing Networks Competition and Design
Hans Degryse, Mark Van Achter, Gunther Wuyts
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries,
No. 4,
2006
Abstract
In the past two decades, Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) started to compete with traditional exchanges. Our paper focuses on one such system: a Crossing Network (CN). First, we discuss the distinct institutional aspects a CN offers compared to traditional markets. Next, we present an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature analyzing their success in competing with traditional markets. Finally, we offer some prospects on the potential outcome of this competition, taking into account market design issues such as the optimal degree of transparency of CNs. We also provide a market practioner’s view on the market design of CNs.
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19.06.2006 • 18/2006
Hartz IV optimieren
Wahrheiten sind oft unbequem und man möchte sie lieber verdrängen. Und so scheint es auch mit Hartz-IV zu sein. Hat Hartz-IV seit 2005 Menschen arm gemacht, die vorher nicht arm waren oder wird jetzt nur das ganze Ausmaß der relativen Armut in Deutschland transparent, das bereits seit mehreren Jahren bestand, aber der Politik und der Öffentlichkeit nicht bewußt war oder nicht bewußt sein wollte? Hartz-IV hat keine neue Armut gebracht. Sicher, einige stehen etwas schlechter als vor dem ALG-II, vorwiegend Bezieher der Arbeitslosenhilfe, während sich Bezieher der früheren Sozialhilfe, etwas besser stellen – aber für die überwiegende Mehrzahl dürfte sich die finanzielle Lage nicht dramatisch verändert haben. Was also ist neu oder dramatisch an Hartz-IV?
Herbert Buscher
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Does Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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