We estimate the wage effects of shared governance, or codetermination, in the form of a mandate of one-third of corporate board seats going to worker representatives. We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for stock corporations incorporated after August 1994, while it locked the mandate for the slightly older cohorts. Our research design compares firm cohorts incorporated before the reform and after; in a robustness check we draw on the analogous difference in unaffected firm types (LLCs). We find no effects of board-level codetermination on wages and the wage structure, even in firms with particularly flexible wages. The degree of rent sharing and the labor share are also unaffected. We reject that disinvestment could have offset wage effects through the canonical hold-up channel, as shared governance, if anything, increases capital formation.

Die „Gemeinschaftaufgabe ‚Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur‘ (GRW)“ repräsentiert das wichtigste Instrument der Regionalpolitik in Deutschland. Das Förderprogramm gewährt nicht-rückzahlbare Zuschüsse als Anteilsfinanzierung für Investitionsprojekte von Betriebsstätten (und Kommunen) im GRW-Fördergebiet. Die Festlegung des Fördergebiets erfolgt anhand eines aus verschiedenen Teilindikatoren zusammengesetzten Strukturschwächeindikators und eines von der Europäischen Union festgelegten Anteils der in Fördergebieten lebenden Bevölkerung. Verantwortlich für die Auswahl der geförderten Projekte ist das jeweilige Land, in dem das GRW-Projekt beantragt wird.

Income inequality has been a major concern of economic policy makers for several years. Can minimum wages help to mitigate inequality? In 2015, the German government introduced a nationwide statutory minimum wage to reduce income inequality by improving the labour income of low-wage employees. However, the employment effects of wage increases depend on time and region specific conditions and, hence, they cannot be known in advance. Because negative employment effects may offset the income gains for low-wage employees, it is important to evaluate minimum-wage policies empirically. We estimate the employment effects of the German minimum-wage introduction using panel regressions on the state-industry-level. We find a robust negative effect of the minimum wage on marginal and a robust positive effect on regular employment. In terms of the number of jobs, our results imply a negative overall effect. Hence, low-wage employees who are still employed are better off at the expense of those who have lost their jobs due to the minimum wage.

Ende November 2019 wurde ein neuer Tarifvertrag für die Chemische Industrie abgeschlossen. Dementsprechend steigen die tabellenwirksamen Tariflöhne zum Juli 2020 um 1,5% und ein Jahr später nochmals um 1,3%. Hinzu kommen Einmalzahlungen in Höhe von 4,0% – 6,0% eines Monatsentgelts für die Zeit bis zur ersten Tariferhöhung im Juli 2020. Zusätzlich wurde erstmalig ein tarifliches Zukunftskonto im Gegenwert von zwei Tagen im Jahr 2020, drei Tagen im Jahr 2021 und danach jeweils fünf Tagen je Jahr vereinbart, die als Freizeit genommen, angespart oder ausgezahlt werden können. Dies entspricht einem Plus von 1,8 %. Hinzu kommt eine tarifliche Pflegezusatzversicherung und die Anhebung des Weihnachtsgeldes. Durch diese Zusatzvereinbarungen werden die eher niedrigen tabellenwirksamen Tariflohnsteigerungen erheblich aufgewertet. Insgesamt umfasst der Tariflohnabschluss ein Plus von mehr als 6% für eine Laufzeit von bis zu 29 Monaten.

Labour market institutions are policy interventions aiming to improve labour market outcomes in terms of employment and wages. However, because labour markets are complex, it is not straight forward whether these policy interventions achieve their objectives. Instead, they may result in the opposite or induce side effects. In this dissertation, the impact of minimum wages and employment protection legislation on employment are studied. The first chapter discusses labour market institutions, focusing on the above mentioned polices. The second chapter analyses the effects of the German minimum-wage introduction on employment. The findings suggest that marginal employment decreased while regular employment increased. The third chapter studies the same policy with respect to a different aspect: The minimum wage attracts labour mobility from low-wage neighbouring countries (the Czech Republic and Poland) in the respective border regions. This inflow of foreign workers does not have a negative effect on native employment. The fourth chapter addresses a shortcoming of existing NK-SAM models that allow embedding employment protection legislation. A proposed extension improves the models’ empirical relevance under a restrictive assumption.

The German government provides discretionary investment grants to structurally weak regions in order to reduce regional inequality. We use a regression discontinuity design that exploits an exogenous discrete jump in the probability of regional actors to receive investment grants to identify the causal effects of the policy. We find positive effects of the programme on district-level gross value-added and productivity growth, but no effects on employment and gross wage growth.

By conducting a natural field experiment, we analyze the managerial policy of delegating the wage choice to employees. We find that this policy enhances performance significantly, which is remarkable since allocated wage premiums of the same size have no effect at all. Observed self‐imposed wage restraints and absence of negative peer effects speak in favor of wage delegation, although the chosen wage premium levels severely dampen its net value. Additional experimental and survey data provide important insights into employees' underlying motivations.

• The cyclical upswing of the world economy comes to an end, since expansionary policies in the US are expected to peter out in 2019, and the protectionist course of the US government clouds the perspectives for world trade. • However, if a major trade conflict can be avoided, chances are good that world production growth will be close to the long-run average of a bit more than 3%, with trade expanding at a similar pace. • Slowing exports, in particular to China, can partly explain the setback, while domestic conditions still appear favourable: firms continued hiring, albeit by less than before, tight labour markets in many member countries have caused wages to rise more quickly, and house prices continue to increase markedly. • Since a trend to higher inflationary dynamics is still not detectable, the ECB is likely to either keep key interest rates unchanged in 2019 or raise them very carefully at the end of the year. • All in all, we expect the euro area growth rate to come down from 1.9% in 2018 to 1.5% in 2019 and 1.8% in 2020, and inflation to slightly slow down from 1.8% in 2018 to 1.6% in 2019 and 1.5% in 2020.

Die Löhne und Gehälter der Arbeitnehmer dürften in Deutschland im nächsten Jahr kräftig zulegen. So sind in vielen Branchen wie beispielsweise dem Bauhauptgewerbe, der Metall- und Elektroindustrie oder im Öffentlichen Dienst von Bund und Kommunen recht hohe Tariflohnerhöhungen vorgesehen. Die gute Arbeitsmarktlage dürfte auch die nicht tarifgebundenen Löhne weiter steigen lassen. Zudem wird der Mindestlohn im Januar 2019 um knapp 4% angehoben. Insgesamt ist im nächsten Jahr von einem Anstieg der Bruttolöhne und -gehälter je Arbeitnehmer von etwas mehr als 3% auszugehen.

• In summer 2018 the cyclical upswing of the world economy is not over, but it appears to be fragmenting. While economic activity in the European Union has lost steam, the upswing in the US has gained pace, and growth in China appears to be robust. • Markets for commodities as well as for capital are at present strongly affected by political movements: oil prices are more than 50% higher than one year ago, as the US exit from the Iran nuclear deal puts the long run oil supply from Iran at risk, and the strongly expansionary US tax reform explains the rise in US long run interest rates. . • Uncertainties about the future international trade system cause firms to slow down or even reverse the globalization of value chains. As an early consequence, world trade in the second half of 2018 and in 2019 will expand at much slower rates than during 2017. • In the euro area growth slowed in the first quarter 2018, due to weaker investment activity in France and Italy and, more importantly, a fall in exports in all larger euro area economies except Spain. However, the drivers of the upswing such as low interest rates for credit and expanding real incomes will still be supportive in the near future, and fiscal policies will be slighly more expansionary. But a slowdown in world trade will dent export growth as well as corporate profits. All in all, we expect GDP growth in the euro area to go down from 2.4% in 2017 to 2.1% in 2018 and to 1.7% in 2019 – a forecast that will only be realized if damages to the international trade system are limited and if the European sovereign debt crisis does not come back. • While wage inflation has been slowly increasing during the past quarters to about 2%, a clear upwards trend of core consumer price inflation is still not detectable. The recent jump of the headline rate to 1.9% is due to higher oil prices. Our forecasts for 2018 and 2019 are close, although still below, 2%.