Rating als Chance: Potentiale erkennen, Risiken minimieren
Ulrich Blum
Beratende Ingenieure,
2004
Abstract
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Investment, Financial Markets, New Economy Dynamics and Growth in Transition Countries
Albrecht Kauffmann, P. J. J. Welfens
Economic Opening Up and Growth in Russia: Finance, Trade, Market Institutions, and Energy,
2004
Abstract
The transition to a market economy in the former CMEA area is more than a decade old and one can clearly distinguish a group of relatively fast growing countries — including Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia — and a majority of slowly growing economies, including Russia and the Ukraine. Initial problems of transition were natural in the sense that systemic transition to a market economy has effectively destroyed part of the existing capital stock that was no longer profitable under the new relative prices imported from world markets; and there was a transitory inflationary push as low state-administered prices were replaced by higher market equilibrium prices. Indeed, systemic transformation in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have brought serious transitory inflation problems and a massive transition recession; negative growth rates have continued over many years in some countries, including Russia and the Ukraine, where output growth was negative throughout the 1990s (except for Russia, which recorded slight growth in 1997). For political and economic reasons the economic performance of Russia is of particular relevance for the success of the overall transition process. If Russia would face stagnation and instability, this would undermine political and economic stability in the whole of Europe and prospects for integrating Russia into the world economy.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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A macroeconometric model for the Euro economy
Christian Dreger
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 181,
2003
Abstract
In this paper a structural macroeconometric model for the Eurozone is presented. In opposite to the multi country modelling approach, the model relies on aggregate data on the supra-national level. Due to nonstationarity, all equations are estimated in an error correction form. The cointegrating relations are derived jointly with the short-run dynamics, avoiding the finite sample bias of the two step Engle Granger procedure. The validity of the aggregated approach is confirmed by out-of-sample forecasts and two simulation exercises. In particular the implications of a lower economic recovery in the US and a shock in the nominal Euro area interest rate are discussed.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Are Real Interest Rates Cointegrated? Further Evidence Based on Paneleconometric Methods
Christian Dreger, Christian Schumacher
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 139,
2003
Abstract
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The Exchange Rate of the Rouble and its Impact on Stability and Growth in Russia
Hubert Gabrisch
Success and Failures of Transition – the Russian Agriculture between Fall and Resurrection,
2003
Abstract
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Pressure on the Exchange Rate: Experiences of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
Ibolya Mile
Externe Publikationen,
2003
Abstract
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Explaining Investment Trends in European Union Countries
Klaus Weyerstraß
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 174,
2003
Abstract
In the 1980s and, in particular, in the 1990s the countries of the European Union experienced divergent developments of gross fixed capital formation. Estimating an investment function for a panel of ten countries and analyzing the paths of the determinants of investment in the countries under consideration reveals that the different development of final demand is the main factor responsible for the divergences in investment. Other factors are disparities in the decline of real interest rates and of relative prices for capital goods.
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Hungarian Central Bank´s Exchange Rate Policy under Pressure - Current Trend
Thomas Linne, Johannes Stephan
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2003
Abstract
Mitte Januar senkte die ungarische Nationalbank in zwei Schritten den Refinanzierungszinssatz um jeweils 100 Basispunkte auf nunmehr 6,5%. Gleichzeitig versuchte die Nationalbank durch Devisenmarktinterventionen, den Forint-Wechselkurs innerhalb der Schwankungsbandbreiten zu halten. Anlass für die Zinssenkungen und die Interventionen war die relativ starke Aufwertung des Forint. Seit Oktober 2001 verfolgt die Nationalbank einen fixen Wechselkurs gegenüber dem Euro mit einer zulässigen Schwankungsbandbreite von ±15% um eine zentrale Parität. Damit entspricht die Wechselkurspolitik weitgehend der institutionellen Ausgestaltung des WKM II.
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