When Arm’s Length is too Far: Relationship Banking over the Credit Cycle
Thorsten Beck, Hans Degryse, Ralph De Haas, Neeltje van Horen
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
We conduct face-to-face interviews with bank CEOs to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as either relationship or transaction lenders. We then use the geographic coordinates of these banks’ branches and of 14,100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks in the vicinity of firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle. We find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom, it alleviates such constraints during a downturn. This positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn. Moreover, our evidence suggests that relationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans.
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Does It Pay to Get Connected? An Examination of Bank Alliance Network and Bond Spread
Iftekhar Hasan, Céline Meslier, Amine Tarazi, Mingming Zhou
Journal of Economics and Business,
forthcoming
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of bank alliance network on bonds issued by European banks during the period 1990–2009. We construct six measures capturing different dimensions of banks’ network characteristics. In opposition to the results obtained for non-financial firms, our findings indicate that being part of a network does not create value for bank’s bondholders, indicating a dark side effect of strategic alliances in the banking sector. While being part of a network is perceived as a risk-increasing event by market participants, this negative perception is significantly lower for the larger banks, and, to a lesser extent, for the more profitable banks. Moreover, during crisis times, the positive impact on bond spread of a bank’s higher centrality or of a bank’s higher connectedness in the network is stronger, indicating that market participants may fear spillover effects within the network during periods of banks’ heightened financial fragility.
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European versus Anglo-Saxon Credit View: Evidence from the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis
Marc Altdörfer, Carlos A. De las Salas Vega, Andre Guettler, Gunter Löffler
Abstract
We analyse whether different levels of country ties to Europe among the rating agencies Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch affect the assignment of sovereign credit ratings, using the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2012 as a natural laboratory. We find that Fitch, the rating agency among the “Big Three” with significantly stronger ties to Europe compared to its two more US-tied peers, assigned on average more favourable ratings to Eurozone issuers during the crisis. However, Fitch’s better ratings for Eurozone issuers seem to be neglected by investors as they rather follow the rating actions of Moody’s and S&P. Our results thus doubt the often proposed need for an independent European credit rating agency.
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The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence
Reint E. Gropp, Rasa Karapandza, Julian Opferkuch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2016
Abstract
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project’s potential for success. We find that if the manager’s disclosures are costly, she will never release forward-looking statements that do not convey information to external investors. Furthermore, managers of firms that are transparent and face significant disclosure-related costs will refrain from forward-looking disclosures. In contrast, managers of opaque and profitable firms will follow a policy of accurate disclosures. To test our findings empirically, we devise an index that captures the quantity of forward-looking disclosures in public firms’ 10-K reports, and relate it to multiple firm characteristics. For opaque firms, our index is positively correlated with a firm’s profitability and financing needs. For transparent firms, there is only a weak relation between our index and firm fundamentals. Furthermore, the overall level of forward-looking disclosures declined significantly between 2001 and 2009, possibly as a result of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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The Joint Dynamics of Sovereign Ratings and Government Bond Yields
Makram El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz
Abstract
Can a negative shock to sovereign ratings invoke a vicious cycle of increasing government bond yields and further downgrades, ultimately pushing a country toward default? The narratives of public and political discussions, as well as of some widely cited papers, suggest this possibility. In this paper, we will investigate the possible existence of such a vicious cycle. We find no evidence of a bad long-run equilibrium and cannot confirm a negative feedback loop leading into default as a transitory state for all but the very worst ratings.
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Legal Insider Trading and Stock Market Liquidity
Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong, Jérémie Lefebvre
De Economist,
No. 1,
2016
Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of legal trades by corporate insiders on the liquidity of the firm’s stock. For this purpose, we analyze two liquidity measures and one information asymmetry measure. The analysis allows us to study as well the effect of a change in insider trading regulation, namely the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC) on the Dutch stock market. The first set of results shows that, in accordance with theories of asymmetric information, the intensity of legal insider trading in a given company is positively related to the bid-ask spread and to the information asymmetry measure. We also find that the Market Abuse Directive did not reduce significantly this effect. Secondly, analyzing liquidity and information asymmetry around the days of legal insider trading, we find that small and large capitalization stocks see their bid-ask spread and the permanent price impact increase when insiders trade. For mid-cap stocks, only the permanent price impact increases. Finally, we could not detect a significant improvement of these results following the change in regulation.
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Agrarrohstoffpreise und Lebensmittelpreise in armen Ländern
Oliver Holtemöller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2016
Abstract
In der Politik und in den Medien wird darüber diskutiert, ob spekulativer Handel mit Agrarrohstoffen den Hunger in der Welt vermehrt. In diesem Aufsatz wird untersucht, in welchem Umfang sich Schwankungen von Agrarrohstoffpreisen auf nationale Verbraucherpreise für Lebensmittel in Indien als einem großen Land mit einem großen Anteil an armen Menschen übertragen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Agrarrohstoffpreisschwankungen mit einem Quartal Verzögerung signifikante Effekte auf die Verbraucherpreisinflation für Lebensmittel und die Verbraucherpreisinflation insgesamt in Indien haben. Quantitativ bedeutend waren diese Effekte etwa 2007/2008 und 2010/2011. Aufgrund der restriktiven Reaktion der indischen Zentralbank auf einen Anstieg der Verbraucherpreisinflation kommt es zusätzlich zu negativen Auswirkungen auf die Konjunktur. Allerdings sind andere Faktoren für die Schwankungen der Lebensmittelpreise in Indien wesentlich bedeutender.
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The Impact of Risk Attitudes on Financial Investments
Walter Hyll, Maike Irrek
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2015
Abstract
Several scholars analyze the relationship between individuals’ willingness to take risks and financial investment decisions. We add to this literature in using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel which allow ruling out that investments in risky assets itself impact on risk attitudes. We show that individuals with a higher willingness to take risks are more likely to hold bonds, stocks, and company assets. When grouping individuals into risk groups, our results reveal that high risk takers are also less likely to own a life insurance. If endogenous adaption of risk attitudes from holding assets in previous years is not taken into account, the impact of risk attitudes on holding risky assets is upward biased.
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The Impact of Dark Trading and Visible Fragmentation on Market Quality
Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong, Vincent van Kervel
Review of Finance,
No. 4,
2015
Abstract
Two important characteristics of current equity markets are the large number of competing trading venues with publicly displayed order books and the substantial fraction of dark trading, which takes place outside such visible order books. This article evaluates the impact on liquidity of dark trading and fragmentation in visible order books. Dark trading has a detrimental effect on liquidity. Visible fragmentation improves liquidity aggregated over all visible trading venues but lowers liquidity at the traditional market, meaning that the benefits of fragmentation are not enjoyed by investors who choose to send orders only to the traditional market.
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Negative Bonitätsbewertungen und Zinsen auf Staatsanleihen – Gibt es einen Teufelskreis?
Makram El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
Kann es nach einer Herabstufung der Bonität eines Staates zu einer Dynamik von steigenden Zinsen auf Staatsanleihen und weiter fallenden Ratings kommen, die unausweichlich in einem Staatsbankrott endet? Die hohe Persistenz von Ratings sowie die Beobachtung, dass Zinsen häufig negativ auf eine Herabstufung reagieren, legen die Möglichkeit einer solchen Abwärtsspirale nahe. Empirisch ist diese Dynamik allerdings nicht zu sehen. In den Daten ist im Gegenteil ausschließlich eine sehr langsame Annäherung an ein langfristiges Gleichgewicht von guten Ratings und niedrigen Zinsen zu beobachten. Gleichzeitig ist die Persistenz von Ratings allerdings hoch genug, um nach einer Herabstufung auf ein hochspekulatives Niveau (Rating von B oder schlechter) massive und langandauernde Zinsaufschläge zu erzeugen. Da eine solche Herabstufung in der Realität allerdings äußerst selten erfolgt, ist die Existenz des oben beschriebenen Teufelskreises zu verneinen. Eine negative Entwicklung wie zum Beispiel in Griechenland in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 lässt sich nicht als Ergebnis der Wechselwirkung von Ratings und Zinsen erklären.
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