This paper contributes to a better understanding of the important role that credit demand plays for credit markets and aggregate macroeconomic developments as both a source and transmitter of economic shocks. I am the first to identify a structural credit demand equation together with credit supply, aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy in a Bayesian structural VAR. The model combines informative priors on structural coefficients and multiple external instruments to achieve identification. In order to improve identification of the credit demand shocks, I construct a new granular instrument from regional mortgage origination.
I find that credit demand is quite elastic with respect to contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions, while credit supply is relatively inelastic. I show that credit supply and demand shocks matter for aggregate fluctuations, albeit at different times: credit demand shocks mostly drove the boom prior to the financial crisis, while credit supply shocks were responsible during and after the crisis itself. In an out-of-sample exercise, I find that the Covid pandemic induced a large expansion of credit demand in 2020Q2, which pushed the US economy towards a sustained recovery and helped to avoid a stagflationary scenario in 2022.

Die Weltwirtschaft verliert zum Ende des Jahres 2023 weiter an Schwung. Der durch den weltweiten Inflationsschub ausgelöste restriktive Schwenk der Geldpolitik drückt über höhere Finanzierungskosten vielerorts die Güternachfrage. Im nächsten Jahr dürfte die Weltwirtschaft wieder etwas anziehen. Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist nach Ende der Pandemie nicht wieder auf ihren alten Wachstumspfad zurückgekehrt. Das Verarbeitenden Gewerbe hat an Wettbewerbsfähigkeit eingebüßt, und die Weltnachfrage nach Industriegütern ist zurzeit schwach. Zudem ist die Inflation immer noch hoch, und die Realeinkommen sind längere Zeit über zurückgegangen. Die geldpolitische Straffung hat die Finanzierungsbedingungen verschlechtert, was besonders die Bauwirtschaft belastet. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird 2023 wohl um 0,3% sinken und im kommenden Jahr um 0,5% expandieren.

This paper assesses the progress made towards the creation of the European Banking Union (EBU) and the evolution of the banking industry in the European Union since the financial crisis of 2007. We review major regulatory changes pertaining to the three pillars of the EBU and the effects of new legislation on both banks and the real economy. Whereas farreaching reforms pertaining to the EBU pillars of supervision and resolution regimes have been implemented, the absence of a European Deposit Scheme remains a crucial deficiency. We discuss how European banks coped with recent challenges, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, a high inflation environment, and digitalization needs, followed by an outlook on selected major challenges lying ahead of this incomplete EBU, notably the transition towards a green economy.

Competition in the U.S. appears to have declined. One contributing factor may have been heterogeneity in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. I examine the impact of product market peer credit constraints on long-run competitive outcomes and behavior among non-financial firms. I use measures of lender exposure to the financial crisis to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for product market credit availability. I find that credit constraints of product market peers positively predict growth in sales, market share, profitability, and markups. This is consistent with the notion that firms gained at the expense of their credit constrained peers. The relationship is robust to accounting for other sources of inter-firm spillovers, namely credit access of technology network and supply chain peers. Further, I find evidence of strategic investment, i.e. the idea that firms increase investment in response to peer credit constraints to commit to deter entry mobility. This behavior may explain why temporary heterogeneity in the availability of credit appears to have resulted in a persistent redistribution of output across firms.

Die Weltwirtschaft verliert im Herbst 2023 weiter an Schwung. Die Produktion im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe und der globale Warenhandel stagnieren, gestiegene Leitzinsen verschlechtern das Investitionsklima. Die restriktive Wirtschaftspolitik drückt vor allem die europäische Konjunktur, welche zusätzlich von der Unsicherheit durch den russischen Angriffskrieg belastet wird. In Deutschland belasten die hohe Inflation, gestiegene Zinsen, eine schwache Auslandsnachfrage und Verunsicherung unter privaten Haushalten und Unternehmen die Wirtschaft. Die konjunkturellen Risiken sind für die Bauwirtschaft besonders hoch. Alles in allem dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt 2023 um 0,5% zurückgehen, für das kommende Jahr wird ein Zuwachs von 0,9% prognostiziert.

This paper provides new evidence of herding due to non- and fundamental information in global equity markets. Using quantile regressions applied to daily data for 33 countries, we investigate herding during the Eurozone crisis, China’s market crash in 2015–2016, in the aftermath of the Brexit vote and during the Covid-19 Pandemic. We find significant evidence of herding driven by non-fundamental information in case of negative tail market conditions for most countries. This study also investigates the relationship between herding and systemic risk, suggesting that herding due to fundamentals increases when systemic risk increases more than when driven by non-fundamentals. Granger causality tests and Johansen’s vector error-correction model provide solid empirical evidence of a strong interrelationship between herding and systemic risk, entailing that herding behavior may be an ex-ante aspect of systemic risk, with a more relevant role played by herding based on fundamental information in increasing systemic risk.