Senior Debt and Market Discipline: Evidence from Bank-to-bank Loans
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu, Haizhi Wang
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2019
Abstract
We empirically investigate whether taking senior bank loans would enhance market discipline and control risk-taking among borrowing banks. Controlling for endogeneity concern arising from borrowing bank self-select into taking senior bank debt, we document that both the spreads and covenants in loan contracts are sensitive to bank risk variables. Our analysis also reveals that borrowing banks reduce their risk exposure after their first issuance of senior bank debt. We also find that lending banks significantly increase their collaboration with borrowing banks and increase their presence in the home markets of borrowing banks.
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21.03.2018 • 5/2018
What is holding back the banking union?
The European Commission wants to better regulate and monitor the European banking sector. In many EU Member States, however, the necessary directives are being implemented extremely slowly. Surprisingly, the reasons for this do not lie in politics and banking structures, but in the institutional framework conditions and existing regulations in the Member States, as argued by Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause and Lena Tonzer from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
Michael Koetter
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Should Banks Diversify or Focus? Know Thyself: The Role of Abilities
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, A. Melih Küllü, Mingming Zhou
Economic Systems,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
The paper investigates whether diversification/focus across assets, industries and borrowers affects bank performance when banks’ abilities (screening and monitoring) are considered. The initial results show that diversification (focus) at the asset, industry and borrower levels is expected to decrease (increase) returns. However, once banks’ screening and monitoring abilities are controlled for, the effect of diversification/focus either gets weaker or disappears. Further, in some cases, these abilities enhance banks’ long-run performance, but in others they prove to be costly, at least, in the short run. Thus, the level of monitoring and screening abilities should be taken into consideration in understanding, planning and implementing diversification/focus strategies.
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Trade Growth Driven by a Cyclical Upswing of the World Economy
Klaus-Jürgen Gern, Axel Lindner, Martin Micheli
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 11,
2017
Abstract
Der Welthandel ist seit dem Herbst 2016 wieder deutlich aufwärts gerichtet, nachdem er in den Jahren zuvor nur schwach gestiegen und zeitweise sogar rückläufig gewesen war. Die Dynamik hat zwar im Frühjahr 2017 etwas nachgelassen, dennoch war das Volumen des weltweiten internationalen Güteraustauschs im Sommer nach den Daten des vom Centraal Planbureau (CPB) berechneten World Trade Monitor immer noch um knapp 5% höher als ein Jahr zuvor. Für das laufende Jahr ist mit einem Anstieg um mehr als 4% zu rechnen, nachdem die Zuwachsrate in den fünf davorliegenden Jahren lediglich bei rund 2% gelegen hatte.1 Es stellt sich die Frage, ob die jüngste Beschleunigung des Welthandels lediglich als temporäres, konjunkturbedingtes Phänomen zu werten ist, oder ob sie auch längerfristig eine Rückkehr zu dem hohen Wachstumstempo des Welthandels erwarten lässt, das in den 15 Jahren vor der globalen Finanzkrise verzeichnet worden war.
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The Impact of Venture Capital Monitoring
Shai B. Bernstein, Xavier Giroud, Richard R. Townsend
Journal of Finance,
No. 4,
2016
Abstract
We show that venture capitalists' (VCs) on-site involvement with their portfolio companies leads to an increase in both innovation and the likelihood of a successful exit. We rule out selection effects by exploiting an exogenous source of variation in VC involvement: the introduction of new airline routes that reduce VCs' travel times to their existing portfolio companies. We confirm the importance of this channel by conducting a large-scale survey of VCs, of whom almost 90% indicate that direct flights increase their interaction with their portfolio companies and management, and help them better understand companies' activities.
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The Impact of Credit Default Swap Trading on Loan Syndication
Daniel Streitz
Review of Finance,
No. 1,
2016
Abstract
We analyze the impact of credit default swap (CDS) trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the effect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risk-sharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems.
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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort Under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers increase their effort to monitor existing borrowers, reduce loan origination, and approve a higher fraction of loan applications. These loans, however, are of above-average quality. Consistent with the theoretical literature on multitasking in incomplete contracts, we show that loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. In addition, while the response by loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, their reaction to incentives appears myopic in other dimensions.
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Venture Capitalists on Boards of Mature Public Firms
Ugur Celikyurt, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
Venture capitalists (VCs) often serve on the board of mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO), even for companies that were not VC-backed at the IPO. Board appointments of VC directors are followed by increases in research and development intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Hence, in addition to providing finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms and have a broader influence in promoting innovation than has been established in the literature.
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Sächsischer Technologiebericht 2012
Studie im Auftrag des Sächsischen Staatsministeriums für Wissenschaft und Kunst, Dresden,
2013
Abstract
Der „Sächsische Technologiebericht 2012“ verfolgt das Ziel, das Innovationsgeschehen im Freistaat Sachsen umfassend darzustellen. Er beschreibt Potenziale und Rahmenbedingungen sowie Stärken und Schwächen der Innovationspraxis im Freistaat und ermöglicht als Monitoring-Instrument die Beobachtung der Entwicklung innovationsrelevanter Indikatoren im Zeitverlauf. Die Funktion des Monitorings erschöpft sich dabei nicht in der Erfassung von Ist-Zustand und Dynamik des Innovationsgeschehens, sondern soll Rückschlüsse darauf zulassen, ob durch die Politik vorgegebene Ziele erreicht wurden.
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Corporate Boards and Bank Loan Contracting
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, Qiang Wu
Journal of Financial Research,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.
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