We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank‐level data to estimate the effects of bank funding stress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of nonmortgage liabilities. This, however, only translates into lower levels of consumption for low‐income households. Hence, adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant heterogeneous effects.

Im Jahr 2020 zieht die Weltwirtschaft wieder etwas an, weil der Gegenwind von den Handelskonflikten nachlässt. Die jüngsten Produktionsdaten deuten allerdings noch nicht auf eine durchgreifende Besserung der internationalen Konjunktur hin. Auch wegen der niedrigen Preisdynamik ist die Geldpolitik im Lauf des Jahres vielerorts noch einmal expansiver geworden. Wenn weitere Zollerhebungen im Wesentlichen ausbleiben, dürfte der Abschwung im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe um die Jahreswende 2019/2020 zu Ende gehen. Allerdings bleibt die Zukunft der politischen Rahmenbedingungen für den internationalen Handel unsicher. Das ist ein wichtiger Grund, warum mit einem kräftigen weltwirtschaftlichen Aufschwung für den Prognosezeitraum nicht zu rechnen ist. Zudem dürfte die Expansion der Nachfrage aus China weiter nachlassen.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft befindet sich weiter im Abschwung. Ursache ist im Wesentlichen die schwache Auslandsnachfrage nach Produkten des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes, bedingt durch die von den USA ausgehenden protektionistischen Tendenzen und den bevorstehenden Brexit. Als weiterer Faktor kommen die Probleme im Automobilbau hinzu, denn die Branche steht mit am Beginn eines drastischen Strukturwandels. Im Jahr 2020 dürfte eine leichte Belebung der internationalen Konjunktur den deutschen Export wieder anziehen lassen. Der Anstieg wird aber nicht allzu hoch ausfallen, nicht zuletzt, weil die Lohnstückkosten seit einiger Zeit deutlich zugenommen haben. Auf der anderen Seite stabilisieren die recht deutlichen Lohnzuwächse die binnenwirtschaftliche Nachfrage. Zudem wirkt die Finanzpolitik expansiv, und die günstigen Finanzierungsbedingungen werden zusammen mit der Wohnungsknappheit in Ballungsräumen den Bauboom am Leben halten. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird im Jahr 2020 wohl um 1,1% zunehmen, auch dank einer hohen Zahl an Arbeitstagen. Der Produktionszuwachs in Ostdeutschland dürfte mit 1,3% höher ausfallen als in Gesamtdeutschland. Die Verbraucherpreisinflation bleibt moderat, die Beschäftigung nimmt nur noch wenig zu.

We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data to estimate the effects of bank funding stress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of nonmortgage liabilities. This, however, only translates into lower levels of consumption for low income households. Hence, adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant heterogeneous effects.

Using firm-level data between 2004 and 2012 for eleven countries of the European Union (EU), we document the size of product and labour market imperfections within narrowly defined sectors including services which are virtually undocumented. Our findings suggest that perfect competition in both product and labour markets is widely rejected. Levels of the price-cost margin and union bargaining power tend to be higher in some service sectors depicting however substantial heterogeneity. Dispersion within sector and across countries tends to be higher in some services sectors assuming a less tradable nature which suggests that the Single Market integration is partial particularly relaxing the assumption of perfect competition in the labour market. We report also figures for the aggregate economy and show that Eastern countries tend to depict lower product and labour market imperfections compared to other countries in the EU. Also, we provide evidence in favour of a very limited adjustment of both product and labour market imperfections following the international and financial crisis.

Does private equity (PE) contribute to financial fragility during economic crises? The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms may increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. During the 2008 crisis, PE-backed companies decreased investments less than did their peers and experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects are especially strong among financially constrained companies and those whose PE investors had more resources at the crisis onset. In a survey, PE firms report being active investors during the crisis and spending more time working with their portfolio companies.

This paper focuses on the effect of uncertainty as reflected by financial market variables on subjective well-being. The analysis is based on Eurobarometer surveys, covering 18 countries over the period 2000–2013. Individuals report lower levels of life satisfaction in times of higher uncertainty approximated by stock market volatility. This effect is heterogeneous across respondents: the probability of being unsatisfied is higher for respondents who are older, unemployed, less educated, and live in one of the GIIPS countries of the Euro area. Furthermore, higher uncertainty in combination with a financial crisis increases the probability of reporting low values of life satisfaction.

Die Berliner Mauer als das Symbol der deutschen Teilung ist mittlerweile länger verschwunden als sie gestanden hat, doch die Unterschiede innerhalb des Landes sind auch nach drei Jahrzehnten noch sichtbar. Jüngste Forschungsergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass die Bruchkante der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung nicht immer ausschließlich entlang der ehemaligen innerdeutschen Grenze verläuft, sondern neben dem West-Ost-Gefälle auch Süd-Nord- oder Stadt-Land-Unterschiede zutage treten.

• Signs of a slowing world economy are piling up: Since the beginning of the year purchasing manager indices have been declining globally, in summer higher US interest rates led investors to withdraw capital from emerging markets, and as a consequence, capital costs rose and currencies depreciated in many emerging markets economies. In October stock prices decreased markedly worldwide including the US, despite the strong upswing in this country. • As a consequence of the turmoil on financial markets, monetary conditions in many emerging economies are no longer favorable. What ultimately counts for the prospects of the global economy, is, however, the performance of the US, the Euro area, China and Japan. The upswing in the US appears stable enough to continue well into 2019. While at present the rest of the group appears to lose momentum, there is a good chance that production in each of these economies will still expand at rates that are close to their potential growth. Further protectionist rounds are the most important risk to this scenario. • In the first half of the current year the euro area economy expanded at a markedly slower rate than in 2017, about 0.4% per quarter, but still substantial. Rising risk premia on Italian assets will probably force banks in this large country to tighten credit conditions, and a slowing world trade will dent export growth. All in all, we expect GDP growth in the euro area to go down from 2.4% in 2017 to 2.0% in 2018 and to 1.7% in 2019. • Employment continues to expand and vacancy rates are at present higher than in 2017. As a consequence, wages rise more quickly: nominal compensations per employee started accelerating early in 2017, and negotiated wages followed at the beginning of 2018. Wage inflation of slightly below 2.5% and healthy growth in employment raise real labor incomes markedly. • Our forecasts are based on the assumption that rating agencies will continue as-signing investment grade to the Italian government debt, and that the Italian government and the European Commission will find a compromise about the draft budget of the country in the coming weeks. Another assumption is that the UK will not exit the EU in an unorderly way in March 2019.