We study the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and related policy support on productivity. We employ an extensive micro-distributed exercise to access otherwise unavailable individual data on firm performance and government subsidies. Our cross-country evidence for five EU countries shows that the pandemic led to a significant short-term decline in aggregate productivity and the direct support to firms had only a limited positive effect on productivity developments. A thorough comparative analysis of the distribution of employment and overall direct subsidies, considering separately also relative firm-level size of support and the probability of being supported, reveals ambiguous cross-country results related to the firm-level productivity and points to the decisive role of other firm characteristics.

The focus of this paper is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation SHO strengthens or weakens the effect of short-selling threats on banks’ risk-taking. The evidence shows that pilot banks with looser constraints on short-selling increased their risk-taking during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The reason is that short-selling threats improved the information environment and mitigated the agency problems of banks during the pilot program that led to greater risk-taking by pilot banks. Additionally, this effect is mainly driven by pilot banks with poor corporate governance, or high information asymmetry. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence that the disciplinary role of short-sellers had a positive effect on bank risk-taking during the financial crisis.

Does investors’ political ideology shape international capital allocation? We provide evidence from two settings—syndicated corporate loans and equity mutual funds—to show ideological alignment with foreign governments affects the cross-border capital allocation by U.S. institutional investors. Ideological alignment on both economic and social issues plays a role. Our empirical strategy ensures direct economic effects of foreign elections or government ties between countries are not driving the result. Ideological distance between countries also explains variation in bilateral investment. Combined, our findings imply ideological alignment is an important, omitted factor in models of international capital allocation.