This dissertation is about questions on how German institutions of industrial relations shape plant-level outcomes, and how this influences employer wage differentials. Employer wage differentials point toward imperfect labor markets in which both, employers and employees, benefit from employment rents. It puts the employer at the center of explaining wage differences and how employer characteristics influence these, over which individual employees have only limited control. Arguably, how employers and employees split these rents depend on industrial relations. The German dual model of industrial relations consists of collective bargaining at the industry level and worker co-determination through works councils at the plant level. This dissertation illuminates different aspects of industrial relations and how rent-sharing mechanisms can explain wage inequality in Germany. It does not only focus on how industrial relations shape labor market power and whether labor market power translates into the level and dispersion of employer wage premia. It also contributes to questions that explain differences in plant-level outcomes relating to industrial relations. These include the role of worker co-determination on assortative matching. It is further investigated how works councils affect plant-level reactions during economy-wide shocks. In addition, it offers new causal evidence of rent-sharing mechanisms in Germany. The insights of this dissertation are relevant for policy and economic research alike. It contributes to a better understanding of the role of organized labor in imperfect labor markets and its determinants of employer wage differentials. It approaches the role of worker co-determination from different angles that are important at times of erosion of formal organized labor but gaining interest in worker representation.

We argue that automation may make workers and firms more selective in matching their specialized skills and tasks. We call this phenomenon “core-biased technological change”, and wonder whether something similar could be relevant also for offshoring. Looking for evidence in occupational data for European industries, we find that automation increases workers’ and firms’ selectivity as captured by longer unemployment duration, less skill-task mismatch, and more concentration of specialized knowledge in specific tasks. This does not happen in the case of offshoring, though offshoring reinforces the effects of automation. We show that a labor market model with two-sided heterogeneity and search frictions can rationalize these empirical findings if automation strengthens while offshoring weakens the assortativity between workers’ skills and firms’ tasks in the production process, and automation and offshoring complement each other. Under these conditions, automation decreases employment and increases wage inequality whereas offshoring has opposite effects.

We examine how firms adapt their organization when they go public. To conform with the requirements of public capital markets, we expect IPO firms to become more organized, making the firm more accountable and its human capital more easily replaceable. We find that IPO firms transform into a more hierarchical organization with smaller departments. Managerial oversight increases. Organizational functions dedicated to accounting, finance, information and communication, and human resources become much more prominent. Employee turnover is sizeable and directly related to changes in hierarchical layers. New hires are better educated, but younger and less experienced than incumbents, which reflects the staffing needs of a more hierarchical organization. Wage inequality increases as firms become more hierarchical. Overall, going public is associated with a comprehensive transformation of the firm's organization which becomes geared towards efficiently operating a public firm.

This paper investigates the long-term relationship between conflict-related migration and individual socioeconomic inequality. Looking at the post-conflict environments of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia, the two former Yugoslav states most heavily impacted by the conflicts of the early 1990s, the paper focuses on differences in educational performance and income between four groups: migrants, internally displaced persons, refugees, and those who did not move two decades after the conflicts. For BiH, the analysis leverages a municipality-representative survey (n = 6, 021) that captured self-reported education and income outcomes as well as migration histories. For Croatia, outcomes are measured using an anonymized education registry that captured outcomes for over half a million individuals over time. This allows an assessment of convergence between different categories of migrants. In both countries, individuals with greater exposure to conflict had systematically worse educational performance. External migrants now living in BiH have better educational and economic outcomes than those who did not migrate, but these advantages are smaller for individuals who were forced to move. In Croatia, those who moved during the conflict have worse educational outcomes, but there is a steady convergence between refugees and non-migrants. This research suggests that policies intended to address migration-related discrepancies should be targeted on the basis of individual and family experiences caused by conflict.

We investigate the long-term relationship between conflict-related migration and individual socioeconomic inequality. Looking at the post-conflict environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a former Yugoslav state most heavily impacted by the conflicts of the early 1990s, the paper focuses on differences in educational performance and income between four groups: migrants, internally displaced persons, former external migrants, and those who did not move. The analysis leverages a municipality-representative survey (n≈6,000) that captured self-reported education and income outcomes as well as migration histories. We find that individuals with greater exposure to conflict had systematically worse educational performance and lower earnings two decades after the war. Former external migrants now living in BiH have better educational and economic outcomes than those who did not migrate, but these advantages are smaller for individuals who were forced to move. We recommend that policies intended to address migration-related discrepancies should be targeted on the basis of individual and family experiences caused by conflict.

We argue that the COVID epidemic disproportionately affected the economic well-being and health of poor people. To disentangle the forces that generated this outcome, we construct a model that is consistent with the heterogeneous impact of the COVID recession on low- and high-income people. According to our model, two-thirds of the inequality in COVID deaths reflect preexisting inequality in comorbidity rates and access to quality health care. The remaining third stems from the fact that low-income people work in occupations where the risk of infection is high. Our model also implies that the rise in income inequality generated by the COVID epidemic reflects the nature of the goods that low-income people produce. Finally, we assess the health-income trade-offs associated with fiscal transfers to the poor and mandatory containment policies.

Parents influence their children in many ways, but which family features actually cause the strong intergenerational linkages that we observe? This column presents the first causal evidence on cognitive skill transmission in the family. Using Dutch survey and registry data, the authors show that parents’ maths and language skills strongly affect the same skills in their children, and that skills within dynasties are not just genetically determined but are significantly affected by educational experiences. This highlights the importance of good educational environments in alleviating persistent inequalities. 

Family and social networks are widely believed to influence important life decisions, but causal identification of those effects is notoriously challenging. Using data from Chile, Croatia, Sweden, and the United States, we study within-family spillovers in college and major choice across a variety of national contexts. Exploiting college-specific admissions thresholds that directly affect older but not younger siblings’ college options, we show that in all four countries a meaningful portion of younger siblings follow their older sibling to the same college or college-major combination. Older siblings are followed regardless of whether their target and counterfactual options have large, small, or even negative differences in quality. Spillover effects disappear, however, if the older sibling drops out of college, suggesting that older siblings’ college experiences matter. That siblings influence important human capital investment decisions across such varied contexts suggests that our findings are not an artifact of particular institutional detail but a more generalizable description of human behavior. Causal links between the postsecondary paths of close peers may partly explain persistent college enrollment inequalities between social groups, and this suggests that interventions to improve college access may have multiplier effects.

Children with lower socioeconomic status (SES) tend to benefit more from early child care, but are substantially less likely to be enrolled. We study whether reducing behavioral barriers in the application process increases enrollment in child care for lower-SES children. In our RCT in Germany with highly subsidized child care (n > 600), treated families receive application information and personal assistance for applications. For lower-SES families, the treatment increases child care application rates by 21 pp and enrollment rates by 16 pp. Higher-SES families are not affected by the treatment. Thus, alleviating behavioral barriers closes half of the SES gap in early child care enrollment.

We argue that the Covid epidemic disproportionately affected the economic well-being and health of poor people. To disentangle the forces that generated this outcome, we construct a model that is consistent with the heterogeneous impact of the Covid recession on low- and high-income people. According to our model, two thirds of the inequality in Covid deaths reflect pre-existing inequality in comorbidity rates and access to quality health care. The remaining third, stems from the fact that low-income people work in occupations where the risk of infection is high. Our model also implies that the rise in income inequality generated by the Covid epidemic reflects the nature of the goods that low-income people produce. Finally, we assess the health-income trade-offs associated with fiscal transfers to the poor and mandatory containment policies.