The Roy-Borjas model predicts that international migrants are less educated than nonmigrants because the returns to education are generally higher in developing (migrant-sending) than in developed (migrant-receiving) countries. However, empirical evidence often shows the opposite. Using the case of Mexico-U.S. migration, we show that this inconsistency between predictions and empirical evidence can be resolved when the human capital of migrants is assessed using a two-dimensional measure of occupational skills rather than by educational attainment. Thus, focusing on a single skill dimension when investigating migrant selection can lead to misleading conclusions about the underlying economic incentives and behavioral models of migration.

Choosing a university and field of study is a key life decision that influences one’s lifelong earnings trajectory. Data shows that the share of individuals going to university is unequally distributed, and is lower among disadvantaged students. High-achieving students who are low income are less likely to opt for ambitious education paths, despite the high returns of education. Even among those students who decide to apply for college, the likelihood of whether they will apply to prestigious colleges or renowned study programs differs along the distribution of socioeconomic background. It does not only matter if you study, but also what and where you study, as there is a large variation in long-run outcomes, such as earnings, both between universities as well as between fields of study. Part of this mismatch can be attributed to unequal starting points for children, in terms of both institutional settings and the quality of information available within their close networks.

We investigate whether lenders employ sustainability pricing provisions to manage borrowers’ environmental risk. Using unexpected negative environmental incidents of borrowers as exogenous shocks that reveal information on environmental risk, we find that lenders manage borrowers’ environmental risk by conventional tools such as imposing higher interest rates, utilizing financial and net worth covenants, showing reluctance to refinance, and demanding increased collateral. In contrast, the inclusion of sustainability pricing provisions in loan agreements for high environmental risk borrowers is reduced by 11 percentage points. Our study suggests that sustainability pricing provisions may not primarily serve as risk management tools but rather as instruments to attract demand from institutional investors and facilitate secondary market transactions.