Kann die Bankenaufsicht den Übergang zu einer kohlenstoffneutralen Wirtschaft unterstützen, indem sie die Kreditvergabe der Banken an Unternehmen beeinflusst? Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Kreditvergabe der Banken vor und nach dem weltweit ersten Klimastresstest in Frankreich und die Reaktion der kreditnehmenden Unternehmen. Die dem Stresstest unterworfenen Banken geben kohlenstoffintensiven Unternehmen mehr Kredite. Zugleich verlangen sie ihnen aber höhere Zinssätze ab. Die kohlenstoffintensiven Kreditnehmer, deren Banken sich dem Klimastresstest unterzogen haben, verpflichten sich eher zu ehrgeizigen Emissionszielen und integrieren eher Umweltaspekte in die Bewertung von Investitionsprojekten. Jedoch reduzieren sie weder direkt ihre Kohlenstoffemissionen noch beenden sie Beziehungen zu klimaschädlichen Lieferanten. Die Studie belegt somit einen kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen Klimastresstests der Banken und der Verringerung des Transitionsrisikos der Kreditnehmer.

We investigate whether a firm’s exposure to climate change, as proxied by disclosures during quarterly earnings conference calls, provides forward-looking information to investors regarding the long-term association of stock prices with current earnings and the book values of equity. Following a key regulatory mandate around the formation of the cap-and-trade program to reduce emissions related to climate change, firms’ climate change exposure decreases the association between current earnings and stock prices while increasing the relevance of book values of equity (i.e., historical earnings). However, these relationships flip when the sentiment around climate change exposure is negative, suggesting that the risks related to climate change exposure provide forward-looking information to investors when they evaluate the ability of current earnings to predict firm values. Such a relationship is stronger for new economy firms and is sensitive to conservative accounting. We also observe that the inclusion of climate change disclosure to our models improves the joint ability of earnings and book values to predict stock prices.

We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

Considering the inherent stickiness of abnormal audit fees, our study contributes to the literature by decomposing abnormal audit fees into a jump component and long-run sticky component. We investigate whether and how changes in credit ratings asymmetrically affect the jump component of abnormal audit fees. We document a positive association between rating downgrades and the jump component. We find that heightened bankruptcy risk and misstatement risk are the mechanisms that drive this relationship. Further analysis shows that firms experiencing rating downgrades are more likely to receive a going concern opinion and experience longer audit report lags. Taken together, our findings provide direct evidence that credit ratings are significantly associated with abnormal audit fees, particularly with the jump component. Given the serial correlation of abnormal audit fees, our study sheds light on the importance of disaggregation of the abnormal audit fee residuals into the jump and long-run sticky components.

I estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the United States that incorporates oil market shocks and risk shocks working through credit market frictions. The findings of this analysis indicate that risk shocks play a crucial role during the Great Recession and the Dot-Com bubble but not during other economic downturns. Credit market frictions do not amplify persistent oil market shocks. This result holds as long as entry and exit rates of entrepreneurs are independent of the business cycle.

This paper compares macroeconomic effects of Knightian uncertainty and risk using policy shocks for the case of Italy. Drawing on the ambiguity literature, I use changes in the bid-ask spread and mid-price of government bonds as distinct measures for uncertainty and risk. The identification exploits the quasi-pessimistic behavior under ambiguity-aversion and the dealer market structure of government bond markets, where dealers must quote both sides of the market. If uncertainty increases, ambiguity-averse dealers will quasi-pessimistically quote higher ask and lower bid prices – increasing the bid-ask spread. In contrast, a pure change in risk shifts the risk-compensating discount factor which is well approximated by the change in bond mid-prices. I evaluate economic effects of the two measures within an instrumental variable local projection framework. The main findings are threefold. First, the resulting shock time series for uncertainty and risk are uncorrelated with each other at the intraday level, however, upon aggregation to monthly level the measures become correlated. Second, uncertainty is an important driver of economic aggregates. Third, macroeconomic effects of risk and uncertainty are similar, except for the response of prices. While sovereign risk raises inflation, uncertainty suppresses price growth – a result which is in line with increased price rigidity under ambiguity.

We propose a macroeconomic model with a nonlinear Phillips curve that has a flat slope when inflationary pressures are subdued and steepens when inflationary pressures are elevated. The nonlinear Phillips curve in our model arises due to a quasi-kinked demand schedule for goods produced by firms. Our model can jointly account for the modest decline in inflation during the Great Recession and the surge in inflation during the post-COVID period. Because our model implies a stronger transmission of shocks when inflation is high, it generates conditional heteroskedasticity in inflation and inflation risk. Hence, our model can generate more sizeable inflation surges due to cost-push and demand shocks than a standard linearized model. Finally, our model implies that the central bank faces a more severe trade-off between inflation and output stabilization when inflation is elevated.

Benmir, Jaccard, and Vermandel (2023, BJV) seek to answer the following set of topical and important research questions: (i) How should monetary policy be conducted during a pandemic?, (ii) How do health considerations affect the conduct of monetary policy?, and (iii) How does the presence of contagion risk affect the main building blocks of the New Keynesian model?