The last decades were characterized by large increases in world trade, not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to world GDP. This was in large parts caused by increasing exchanges of parts and components between countries as a consequence of international fragmentation of production. Apparently, greater competition especially from the Newly Industrializing and Post-Communist Economies prompted firms in ‘high-wage’ countries to exploit international factor price differences in order to increase their international competitiveness. However, theory predicts that, beside factor price differences, vertical disintegration of production should be driven by a multitude of additional factors. Against this background, the present paper reveals empirical evidence on parts and components trade as an indicator for international fragmentation of production in the European Union. On the basis of a panel data approach, the main explanatory factors for international fragmentation of production are determined. The results show that, although their influence can not be neglected, factor price differences are only one out of many causes for shifting production to or sourcing components from foreign countries.

The paper analyses vertical intra-industry trade between EU and Accession countries, and concentrates on two country-specific determinants: Differences in personal income distribution and in technology. Both determinants have a strong link to national policies and to cross-border investment flows. In contrast to most other studies, income distribution is not seen as time-invariant variable, but as changing over time. What is new is also that differences in technology are tested in comparison with cost advantages from capital/labour ratios. The study applies panel estimation techniques with GLS. Results show country-pair fixed effects to be of high relevance for explaining vertical intraindustry trade. In addition, bilateral differences in personal income distribution and their changes are positive related to vertical intra-industry trade in this special regional integration framework; hence, distributional effects of policies matter. Also, technology differences turn out to be positively correlated with vertical intra-industry trade. However, the cost variable (here: relative GDP per capita) shows no clear picture, particularly not in combination with the technology variable.

The paper elaborates on the appropriateness of a potentially enlarged Common Monetary Area in Southern Africa including Botswana and Mozambique. The theory of optimum currency areas including some extensions by accounting for costs of non-integration and considering the external relations of currency areas are presented. Various indicators such as the structure of the economies, interest rates, inflation rates, exchange rates, factor mobility and trading partners are observed empirically. The paper concludes that current changes in the exchange rate policy of Botswana are expected to lead to increasing, though already high, convergence with CMA countries. Botswana is therefore an appropriate candidate for CMA enlargement. Mozambique is converging towards South Africa but still remains on a lower level. Taking into account the costs of non-integration, however, the target of integration should be formulated for the medium term.

Der Beitrag untersucht Kernfragen des Strukturwandels und der Spezialisierungsmuster in den Volkswirtschaften der erweiterten Europäischen Union. In allen Transformationsländern wurden, gemessen an Beschäftigung und Produktivität, Verschiebungen von landwirtschaftlichen und industriellen Sektor hin zum Dienstleistungssektor beobachtet – z.T. mit späteren Reindustrialisierungsphasen. Während einige Ländern, insbesondere Tschechien, Ungarn, die Slowakei, Polen, Estland und Slowenien ihre Produktivität in mittleren technologieintensiven Bereichen verbessert haben und die Technologieleiter aufwärts steigen können, bleiben andere bei einer Struktur mit vielen arbeitsintensiven Zweigen. Im Kontext der EU-Erweiterung sind handelsschaffende Effekte – insbesondere in Verbindung mit einem Anstieg des intra-industriellen Handels – und verstärkte Direktinvestitionen zu erwarten. Alle beteiligten Länder müssen sich gemäß ihren komparativen Vorteilen spezialisieren, allerdings können staatliche F&E-Ausgaben sowie Bildungsanstrengungen auf die Entwicklung solcher Vorteile Einfluss nehmen. Die Gerschenkron-Hypothese postuliert für die Beitrittsländer einen „Vorteil der Rückständigkeit“. Da diese Länder in der ersten Transformationsphase niedrige F&E-Intensitäten in der ersten Transformationsphase aufweisen, ist die Modernisierung des Bildungs- und Forschungssektors wesentlich. Für die EU-15 als Ganzes wird ein Erweiterungsgewinn erwartet, aber die Vorteile werden sich über die Länder hinweg unterschiedlich darstellen, da die ökonomische Geografie eine Rolle spielt. Österreich, Deutschland, die skandinavischen Länder, die Niederlande, Italien und Frankreich werden voraussichtlich stärker von der Erweiterung profitieren als die anderen Mitglieder der EU-15. Deutschland und Österreich spielen zusätzlich eine wichtige Rolle als Ursprungsländer für Direktinvestitionen. Es gibt noch einen erheblichen Forschungsbedarf bezüglich Ausmaß und Richtung des Strukturwandels.

Trade between the European Union (EU) and the Transition Economies (TE) is increasingly characterised by intra-industry trade. The decomposition of intra-industry trade into horizontal and vertical shares reveals predominantly vertical structures with decisively more quality advantages for the EU and less quality advantages for TE countries whenever trade has been liberalised. Empirical research on factors determining this structure in a EU-TE framework lags behind theoretical and empirical research on horizontal and vertical trade in other regions of the world. The main objective of this paper is therefore to contribute to the ongoing debate on EU-TE trade structures by offering an explanation of vertical trade. We utilise a cross-country approach in which relative wage differences, country size and income distribution play a leading role. We find first that relative differences in wages (per capita income) and country size explain intraindustry trade when trade is vertical and completely liberalised, and second that crosscountry differences in income distribution play no explanatory role. We conclude that EU firms have been able to increase their product quality and to shift low-quality segments to TE countries. This may suggest a product-quality cycle prevalent in EU-TE trade.

Die wirtschaftliche Integration zwischen der EU und den drei GUS-Ländern Russland, Ukraine und Belarus (GUS-3) befindet sich auf einem vergleichsweise niedrigen Entwicklungsstand. Verantwortlich dafür ist ein nur enger handelspolitischer Rahmen der Liberalisierung in Form von Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsabkommen. Dieser Rahmen wurde zudem von den drei Ländern nicht ausreichend umgesetzt. Gründe dafür waren erstens die noch unzureichende institutionelle Transformation in den Ländern, zweitens der geringe Anreiz, den diese Abkommen für die Länder bieten, und drittens die mangelnde Einbettung in längerfristige strategische Ziele. Eine Intensivierung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit den GUS-Ländern ist aber erforderlich, wenn die erweiterte Union ihrem Ziel, das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen ihr und der GUS zu verringern, näherkommen möchte. Die erste Voraussetzung dazu ist die Fortführung der institutionellen und marktwirtschaftlichen Transformation in den GUS-Ländern. Aber auch unter diesen günstigeren Bedingungen würden sich die Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsabkommen als wenig effektiv erweisen. Angesichts der bereits erreichten Reformfortschritte in Russland und der Ukraine wäre zu überlegen, die bisherigen Abkommen durch einen umfassenden Zollabbau zu ergänzen.

EU-TE trade is increasingly characterised by intra-industry trade. For some countries (Czech Republic), the share of intra-industry trade in total trade with the EU approaches 60 percent. The decomposition of intra-industry trade into horizontal and vertical shares reveals overwhelming vertical structures with strong quality advantages for the EU and shrinking quality advantages for TE countries wherever trade has been liberalised. Empirical research on factors determining this structure in an EU-TE framework has lagged theoretical and empirical research on horizontal trade and vertical trade in other regions of the world. The main objective of this paper is, therefore, to contribute to the ongoing debate over EU-TE trade structures, by offering an explanation of intra-industry trade. We utilize a cross-country approach in which relative wage differences and country size play a leading role. In addition, as implied by a model of the productquality

cycle, we examine income distribution factors as determinates of the emerging

EU-TE structure of trade flows. Using OLS regressions, we find first, that relative

differences in wages (per capita income) and country size explain intra-industry trade, when trade is vertical and completely liberalized and second, that cross country differences in income distribution play no explanatory role. We conclude that if increasing wage differences resulted from an increasing productivity gap between highquality and low-quality industries, then vertical structures will, over the long-term create significant barriers for the increase in TE incomes and lowering EU-TE income differentials.

In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore, and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 percent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.