Information or Regulation: What Drives the International Activities of Commercial Banks?
Claudia M. Buch
Journal of Money Credit,
No. 6,
2003
Abstract
Information costs and regulatory barriers distinguish international financial markets from national ones. Using panel data on bilateral assets and liabilities of commercial banks, I empirically determine the impact of information, costs and regulations, and I isolate intra-EU financial linkages. I confirm that information costs and regulations are important factors influencing international asset choices of banks, but their relative importance differs among countries.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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On the stability of the banking systems in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary
Werner Gnoth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2003
Abstract
Es ist ein grundlegendes Interesse der EU-Staaten, dass die Bankensysteme der beitretenden Länder stabil sind. Denn, Instabilitäten bei der Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen Besitzstandes im Finanzsektor eines der beitretenden Länder hätten letztlich Auswirkungen auf das Finanz- und Wechselkurssystem der Gemeinschaft mit realwirtschaftlichen Folgen. Im vorliegenden Artikel wird die Stabilität der Bankensysteme in der Tschechischen Republik, Polen und Ungarn untersucht. Gegenwärtig stehen die Bankensysteme vor keinem unmittelbaren Problem: Ein schwacher Wettbewerb, eine am EU-Durchschnitt gemessen hohe Inflationsrate und der geringe Intermediationsgrad ermöglichen den Banken noch einen ausreichenden Zinsertrag. So verkraften sie einen relativ hohen Anteil an notleidenden Krediten und eine hohe Fremdwährungsverschuldung. Damit die Integration der Bankensysteme der Beitrittskandidaten in die EU erfolgreich wird, sind jedoch noch einige Bedingungen zu erfüllen: Es gilt, das Dienstleistungsangebot zu erweitern, den Anteil von notleidenden Krediten vor allem im tschechischen und polnischen Bankensystem zu verringern sowie die Fremdwährungsverschuldung im polnischen und ungarischen Banken- und Unternehmenssektor angemessen zu begrenzen. Die Erhöhung der Kapitalbasis ist ebenso eine wichtige Aufgabe.
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Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 178,
2003
Abstract
A recent strand of literature (see Morris and Shin 2001) shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information between traders. It is known that this approach works only if there is not too precise common knowledge in the market. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We present a model in which more transparency of the central bank means better private information, because each trader utilizes public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.
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Markets for Bank Subordinated Debt and Equity in Basel Committee Member Countries
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala
BCBS Working Papers, No. 12,
No. 12,
2003
Abstract
This Basel Committee working paper is a study of the markets for banks' securities in ten countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). It aims at contributing to the assessment of the potential effectiveness of direct and indirect market discipline. This is achieved through collecting a rich set of data on the detailed characteristics of the instruments used by banks to tap capital markets, the frequency and size of their issuance activity, and the share of issuing banks in national banking systems. Further, information is collected on the amounts of debt and equity outstanding and about trading volumes and liquidity. Developments over the period from 1990-2001 are evaluated.
The paper focuses on subordinated bonds among banks' debt instruments, because they are the prime class of uninsured instruments suited to generate market discipline and have been proposed by some observers as a mandatory requirement for banks.
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The Contribution of SADC Central Banks to Regional Integration
Tobias Knedlik
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook, Vol. 3,
2003
Abstract
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Poverty Alleviation via Islamic Banking Finance to Micro-Enterprises in Sudan: Some lessons for poor countries
A. Ibrahim Badr-El-Din
Sudan Economic Research Group Discussion Papers, No. 35,
No. 35,
2003
Abstract
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Money Stock, Monetary Base and Bank Behaviour in Germany
Oliver Holtemöller
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik,
2003
Abstract
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Hungarian Central Bank´s Exchange Rate Policy under Pressure - Current Trend
Thomas Linne, Johannes Stephan
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2003
Abstract
Mitte Januar senkte die ungarische Nationalbank in zwei Schritten den Refinanzierungszinssatz um jeweils 100 Basispunkte auf nunmehr 6,5%. Gleichzeitig versuchte die Nationalbank durch Devisenmarktinterventionen, den Forint-Wechselkurs innerhalb der Schwankungsbandbreiten zu halten. Anlass für die Zinssenkungen und die Interventionen war die relativ starke Aufwertung des Forint. Seit Oktober 2001 verfolgt die Nationalbank einen fixen Wechselkurs gegenüber dem Euro mit einer zulässigen Schwankungsbandbreite von ±15% um eine zentrale Parität. Damit entspricht die Wechselkurspolitik weitgehend der institutionellen Ausgestaltung des WKM II.
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Cross-border Mergers in European Banking and Bank Efficiency: Discussion
Reint E. Gropp
Foreign Direct Investment in the Real and Financial Sector of Industrial Countries,
2003
Abstract
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