Jede Organisation, die darüber nachdenkt zu restrukturieren, Löhne zu kürzen oder Angestellte zu entlassen, sollte auch über mögliche Reaktionen der persönlich nicht betroffenen Arbeitnehmer nachdenken. Dieser Beitrag präsentiert Ergebnisse eines Feldexperiments. Es offenbart, dass die als unfair wahrgenommene Handlung des Arbeitgebers – in diesem Fall die Entlassung von Arbeitskollegen – die anschließende Produktivität der nicht direkt betroffenen Arbeitskräfte mindert. Als Teil des Experiments antizipierten erfahrene Personalmanager zwar im Durchschnitt erfolgreich die Konsequenzen unfairen Arbeitgeberverhaltens auf nicht betroffene Arbeitnehmer, einzeln lagen sie jedoch oft daneben.

Failure in organisations is a very common phenomenon. Little is known about whether past failure affects workers’ subsequent performance. We conduct a field experiment in which we follow up a failed mail campaign to attract new volunteers with a phone campaign pursuing the same goal. We recruit temporary workers to carry out the phone campaign and randomly assign them to either receive or not receive information about the previous failure and measure their performance. We find that informed workers perform better – in terms of both numbers dialed (about 14% improvement) and completed interviews (about 20% improvement) – regardless of whether they had previously worked on the failed mail campaign. Evidence from a second experiment with student volunteers asked to support a campaign to reduce food waste suggests that the mechanism behind our finding relates to contextual inference: Informing workers/volunteers that they are pursuing a goal that is hard to attain seems to add meaning to the work involved, leading them to exert more effort.

This paper analyses the relationship between intermunicipal cooperation and efficiency of public service provision. Organisational arrangements of public service production, including self-provision, joint provision or contracting, affect incentives and internal transaction costs. Hence, cooperation gains from scale effects need to be balanced against technical inefficiencies. We analyse relative efficiency of wastewater disposal for German municipalities. We employ a conditional analysis in conjunction with a metafrontier approach to calculate relative efficiency measures and technology gap ratios controlling for organisational arrangements and further environmental variables. Jointly providing municipalities and contractor municipalities exhibit lower technical efficiency than self-providing and contracting municipalities. As confirmed by previous research, scale effects from cooperation and contracting apply to small municipalities primarily.

Any organisation that needs to restructure, cut wages, or make layoffs needs to know how the employees who are not affected will respond. This column presents a field experiment which revealed that the perception that employers are unfair – in this case, as a result of layoffs – reduces the performance of employees who have not been not directly affected. As part of the experiment, experienced HR managers were able to successfully anticipate the consequences of unfair employer behaviour on unaffected workers.

Recent empirical research generally finds evidence of positive economic effects of works councils, for example with regard to productivity and – with some limitations – to profits. This makes it necessary to explain why employers’ associations have reservations against works councils. On the basis of an in-depth literature analysis, we show that beyond the generally positive findings, there are important heterogeneities in the impact of works councils. We argue that those groups of employers that tend to benefit little from employee participation in terms of productivity and profits may well be important enough to shape the agenda of their employers’ organisation and even gained in importance within their organisations in recent years. We also discuss the role of deviations from profit-maximising behaviour like risk aversion, short-term profit maximisation, and other non-pecuniary motives, as possible reasons for employer resistance.

Open, transparent communication across the organisation is generally associated with improved employee motivation and organisational outcomes. For supervisors, the question arises how to deal with rather inconvenient information, such as in the case of a project failure. Informing employees after significant investments of time and effort might lead to negative effects on subsequent work motivation, one could argue. To identify a causal relationship between the meaning of previously completed work and workers’ subsequent work performance, we exploited a natural working environment in which the loss of the job’s meaning occurred as a matter of fact. At the same time, it was possible to credibly guide only part of the workforce to believe in the sudden loss of meaning by conducting a controlled experiment.

Global value chains (GVCs) - referring to the cross-border flows of goods, investment, services, know-how and people associated with international production networks - have transformed the world. Their emergence has resulted in a complete reconfiguration of world trade, bearing a strong impact on the assessment of competitiveness and economic policy. The contributions to this eBook are based on research carried out within the scope of the Eurosystem Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet), bringing together participants from EU national central banks, universities and international organisations interested in competitiveness issues. The mapping of GVCs and full awareness about their implications are essential to informed public debate and improved economic policy. 

In der politischen Diskussion wird immer wieder gefordert, die Gemeinden von ihrem Gebietszuschnitt her zu vergrößern und auf eine verwaltungsmäßige interne Untergliederung der kommunalen Einheiten zu verzichten, mithin das Modell der sogenannten Einheitsgemeinden und nicht jenes der föderativ verfassten Gemeinden zu verwirklichen. Dabei werden die „Kosten“ im Sinne von volkswirtschaftlichen Nachteilen dieses zentralistischen Modells zumeist nur am Rande erwähnt, was nicht zuletzt den Problemen der Quantifizierbarkeit dieser Kosten geschuldet ist. Der Beitrag unternimmt den Versuch einer entsprechenden Quantifizierung für einen Teilaspekt der volkswirtschaftlichen Nachteile von größeren und stärker zentralisierten kommunalen Einheiten, nämlich deren negativen Effekte auf die Höhe der Wahlbeteiligung. Im Ergebnis der empirischen Untersuchungen kann gezeigt werden, dass die theoretischen Vermutungen zutreffend sind, wonach (1.) die Wahl der Organisation kommunaler Verwaltungseinheiten Auswirkungen auf die Wahlbeteiligung hat, und (2.) der Organisationstyp der Einheitsgemeinden im Vergleich zu föderativ organisierten Gemeindetypen zu einer deutlich geringeren Wahlbeteiligung führt.