In this article, we review the nascent literature on the transmission of negative policy rates. We discuss the theory of how the transmission depends on bank balance sheets, and how this changes once policy rates become negative. We review the growing evidence that negative policy rates are special because the pass-through to banks’ retail deposit rates is hindered by a zero lower bound. We summarize existing research on the impact of negative rates on banks’ lending and securities portfolios as well as their consequences for the real economy. Finally, we discuss the role of different initial conditions when the policy rate becomes negative, and potential interactions between negative policy rates and other unconventional monetary policies.

Using data from the European Central Bank‘s Survey of Professional Forecasters, we analyse the role of ex-ante conditioning variables for macroeconomic forecasts. In particular, we test to which extent the heterogeneity, updating and ex-post performance of predictions for inflation, real GDP growth and the unemployment rate are related to assumptions about future oil prices, exchange rates, interest rates and wage growth. Our findings indicate that inflation forecasts are closely associated with oil price expectations, whereas expected interest rates are used primarily to predict output growth and unemployment. Expectations about exchange rates and wage growth also matter for macroeconomic forecasts, albeit less so than oil prices and interest rates. We show that survey participants can considerably improve forecast accuracy for macroeconomic outcomes by reducing prediction errors for external conditions. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the expectation formation process of experts.

Nach der Mittelfristprojektion des IWH wird das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Deutschland in den Jahren bis 2025 preisbereinigt um durchschnittlich ½% wachsen, und damit einen Prozentpunkt langsamer als im Zeitraum von 2013 bis 2019. Dies ist nicht nur auf den starken Einbruch im Jahr 2020 zurückzuführen, sondern auch darauf, dass die Erwerbsbevölkerung spürbar zurückgehen wird. Die Staatseinnahmen expandieren deutlich langsamer als in den vergangenen Jahren. Auch nach Überwindung der Pandemiekrise dürfte der Staatshaushalt im Fall unveränderter gesetzlicher Rahmenbedingungen ein strukturelles Defizit von etwa 2% relativ zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt aufweisen, und die Schuldenbremse würde weiter verletzt. Konsolidierungsmaßnahmen zur Rückführung dieser Defizitquote auf ½% würden die Produktion in Deutschland unter die Normalauslastung drücken. Mit Hilfe des finanzpolitischen Simulationsmodells des IWH kann gezeigt werden, dass dabei eine ausgabenseitige Konsolidierung die Produktion weniger belastet als eine einnahmenseitige. Es spricht, auch aus theoretischer Sicht, viel dafür, die Schuldenbremse zwar nicht abzuschaffen, aber ein Stück weit zu lockern.

This article traces the extant literature on the impact of social capital on economic attitudes and outcomes. Special attention is paid to clarify conceptual ambiguities, measurement techniques, channels of influence, and identification strategies. Insights derived from the literature are then used to analyze the marketplace lending industry in China, where the size of the peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market is larger than that of the rest of the world combined. Ironically, approximately two-thirds of these online P2P lending platforms have failed. Empirical evidence from the monthly operating data of 735 lending platforms and transaction level data from one prominent platform (Renrendai) shows that platforms in provinces with high social capital have low risk of failure, and borrowers in provinces with high social capital can borrow at low interest rate and are less likely to default. We also provide observations to guide future economic research on social capital.

Exploiting the heteroscedasticity of the changes in short-term and long-term interest rates and exchange rates around the FOMC announcement, we identify three structural monetary policy shocks. We eliminate the predictable part of the shocks and study their effects on financial variables and macro variables. The first shock resembles a conventional monetary policy shock, and the second resembles an unconventional monetary shock. The third shock leads to an increase in interest rates, stock prices, industrial production, consumer prices, and commodity prices. At the same time, the excess bond premium and uncertainty decrease, and the U.S. dollar depreciates. Therefore, this third shock combines all the characteristics of a central bank information shock.

This paper investigates how declines in the deposit facility rate set by the ECB affect euro area banks’ incentives to hold reserves at the central bank. We find that, in the face of lower deposit rates, banks with a more interest-sensitive business model are more likely to reduce reserve holdings and allocate freed-up liquidity to loans. The result is driven by banks in the non-GIIPS countries of the euro area. This reveals that conventional monetary policy instruments have limited effects in restoring monetary policy transmission during times of crisis.

We evaluate if lenders price or securitise mortgages to mitigate credit risk. Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk created by differences in foreclosure law along US state borders, we find that financial institutions respond to the law in heterogeneous ways. In the agency market where Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) provide implicit loan guarantees, lenders transfer credit risk using securitisation and do not price credit risk into mortgage contracts. In the non-agency market, where there is no such guarantee, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate about the design of loan guarantees, the common interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk leads to an increase in the GSEs‘ debt holdings by $79.5 billion per annum, exposing taxpayers to preventable losses in the housing market.