Es entwickelt sich ein neues Ungleichgewicht auf dem Lausitzer Arbeitsmarkt und es werden nicht Arbeitsplätze, sondern Arbeitskräfte fehlen. Die Schwierigkeiten auf dem Arbeitsmarkt betreffen nicht nur die Lausitz, sondern ganz Brandenburg und sie haben bereits eine ganze Reihe von Reaktionen hervorgerufen. Für inländische wie auch für ausländische Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitnehmerinnen sind gute Schulen, ein schneller Termin beim Arzt, eine gute Anbindung an den ÖPNV, ein leistungsstarkes Internet im öffentlichen Raum und andere Leistungen der öffentlichen Hand bedeutsame Aspekte der öffentlichen Fürsorge. Angesichts der Notwendigkeit, knappe Mittel möglichst effizient einzusetzen, und weil die vorhandenen Mittel begrenzt sind, empfiehlt die Begleitforschung Mittel für Projekte der öffentlichen Fürsorge dort komplementär einzusetzen, wo die Ansiedlung neuer Unternehmen, Behörden und Wissenschaftseinrichtungen zu Mehrbedarfen bei der Versorgung führen können.

Mehr als drei Jahre nach Verabschiedung des Strukturstärkungsgesetzes Kohleregionen gewinnt der Strukturwandel in der brandenburgischen Lausitz deutlich an Fahrt. Ziel des vorliegenden Policy Briefs ist es, die Situation auf dem regionalen Arbeitsmarkt zu analysieren, mögliche Arbeitsmarktreserven und deren Umfang zu diskutieren und Handlungsempfehlungen zu skizzieren. Ein wesentliches Resultat der Untersuchung ist, dass die aktuellen Ansiedlungserfolge und Arbeitsplatzankündigungen in Brandenburg nur dann nachhaltig sein werden, wenn es gelingt, genügend Menschen zu finden, die diese Arbeitsplätze auch besetzen.

Externalities and social preferences, such as altruism, play a key role in the choice of social interactions, which in turn affect the diffusion of a pandemic. We build a dynamic epidemiological model with endogenous social interactions in a frictional environment, also in a variant with heterogeneous agents and a network structure. Taking into account agents’ endogenous behavior and altruism generates markedly different predictions relative to a naïve epidemiological model with exogenous contact rates. Congestion and commitment inefficiencies arise, even under full altruism, and call for policy intervention. We derive the efficient allocation, and show how the Ramsey planner can mitigate the respective externalities.

This paper compares macroeconomic effects of Knightian uncertainty and risk using policy shocks for the case of Italy. Drawing on the ambiguity literature, I use changes in the bid-ask spread and mid-price of government bonds as distinct measures for uncertainty and risk. The identification exploits the quasi-pessimistic behavior under ambiguity-aversion and the dealer market structure of government bond markets, where dealers must quote both sides of the market. If uncertainty increases, ambiguity-averse dealers will quasi-pessimistically quote higher ask and lower bid prices – increasing the bid-ask spread. In contrast, a pure change in risk shifts the risk-compensating discount factor which is well approximated by the change in bond mid-prices. I evaluate economic effects of the two measures within an instrumental variable local projection framework. The main findings are threefold. First, the resulting shock time series for uncertainty and risk are uncorrelated with each other at the intraday level, however, upon aggregation to monthly level the measures become correlated. Second, uncertainty is an important driver of economic aggregates. Third, macroeconomic effects of risk and uncertainty are similar, except for the response of prices. While sovereign risk raises inflation, uncertainty suppresses price growth – a result which is in line with increased price rigidity under ambiguity.

This paper studies the interaction between fiscal policy and bondholders against the backdrop of high sovereign debt levels. For our analysis, we investigate the case of Italy, a country that has dealt with high public debt levels for a long time, using a Bayesian structural VAR model. We extend a canonical three variable macro mode to include a bond market, consisting of a fiscal rule and a bond demand schedule for long-term government bonds. To identify the model in the presence of political uncertainty and forward-looking investors, we derive an external instrument for bond demand shocks from a novel news ticker data set. Our main results are threefold. First, the interaction between fiscal policy and bondholders’ expectations is critical for the evolution of prices. Fiscal policy reinforces contractionary monetary policy through sustained increases in primary surpluses and investors provide incentives for “passive” fiscal policy. Second, investors’ expectations matter for inflation, and we document a Fisherian response of inflation across all maturities in response to a bond demand shock. Third, domestic politics is critical in the determination of bondholders’ expectations and an increase in the perceived riskiness of sovereign debt increases inflation and thus complicates the task of controlling price growth.

This paper contributes to a better understanding of the important role that credit demand plays for credit markets and aggregate macroeconomic developments as both a source and transmitter of economic shocks. I am the first to identify a structural credit demand equation together with credit supply, aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy in a Bayesian structural VAR. The model combines informative priors on structural coefficients and multiple external instruments to achieve identification. In order to improve identification of the credit demand shocks, I construct a new granular instrument from regional mortgage origination.
I find that credit demand is quite elastic with respect to contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions, while credit supply is relatively inelastic. I show that credit supply and demand shocks matter for aggregate fluctuations, albeit at different times: credit demand shocks mostly drove the boom prior to the financial crisis, while credit supply shocks were responsible during and after the crisis itself. In an out-of-sample exercise, I find that the Covid pandemic induced a large expansion of credit demand in 2020Q2, which pushed the US economy towards a sustained recovery and helped to avoid a stagflationary scenario in 2022.

Modigliani and Miller showed the market value of the company is independent of its capital structure, and suggested that dividend policy makes no difference to this law of one price. We experimentally test the Modigliani-Miller theorem in a complete market with two simultaneously traded assets, employing two experimental treatment variations. The first variation involves the dividend stream. According to this variation the dividend payment order is either identical or independent. The second variation involves the market participation, or not, of an algorithmic arbitrageur. We find that Modigliani-Miller’s law of one price can be supported on average with or without an arbitrageur when dividends are identical. The law of one price breaks down when dividend payment order is independent unless there is arbitrageur participation.

We study the firm-level and aggregate effects of government-imposed employment targets. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous productivity growth in which penalties for below-target hiring generate a polarization mechanism: low-productivity firms exit, while others expand employment beyond efficient levels, and firms invest in productivity to avoid future penalties. We test and confirm the model’s firm level predictions using unique contractual data on more than 18,000 employment commitments from the East German privatization, exploiting quasi-random variation in the assignment of privatizers to firms. Quantitatively, employment targets reduce unemployment in the short run, but these gains reverse over time as distorted labor allocations and weakened investment incentives slow aggregate productivity growth and reduce welfare. We also evaluate how alternative designs for employment-protection (e.g., the choice between mandates and subsidies, the structure of targets) impact misallocation and the resulting short- and long-run outcomes.