The German Model of Industrial Relations: Balancing Flexibility and Collective Action
Simon Jäger, Shakked Noy, Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
We give an overview of the "German model" of industrial relations. We organize our review by focusing on the two pillars of the model: sectoral collective bargaining and firm-level codetermination. Relative to the United States, Germany outsources collective bargaining to the sectoral level, resulting in higher coverage and the avoidance of firm-level distributional conflict. Relative to other European countries, Germany makes it easy for employers to avoid coverage or use flexibility provisions to deviate downwards from collective agreements. The greater flexibility of the German system may reduce unemployment, but may also erode bargaining coverage and increase inequality. Meanwhile, firm-level codetermination through worker board representation and works councils creates cooperative dialogue between employers and workers. Board representation has few direct impacts owing to worker representatives' minority vote share, but works councils, which hold a range of substantive powers, may be more impactful. Overall, the German model highlights tensions between efficiency-enhancing flexibility and equity-enhancing collective action.
Read article
Corporate Bankruptcies in Germany
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 11,
2023
Abstract
Eine Insolvenz ist nur eine von mehreren möglichen Varianten, wie Unternehmen aus dem Markt austreten können. Viele Unternehmen schließen einfach ohne Insolvenz, wieder andere werden übernommen oder fusionieren. Tatsächlich schließen sehr viel mehr Unternehmen ohne Insolvenz, als Unternehmen eine Insolvenz anmelden (Müller und Stegmaier, 2015). Der Hauptunterschied zwischen den Marktaustrittsformen besteht darin, dass ein Marktaustritt ohne Insolvenz nicht immer ein Scheitern des Unternehmens als Ursache hat und oft freiwillig geschieht.1 Der Marktaustritt über den Weg der Insolvenz ist hingegen ein deutlicher Hinweis auf ökonomisches Scheitern. Marktaustritten ohne Insolvenz geht oft eine mehrjährige geordnete Schrumpfungsphase vorweg, während insolvente Unternehmen sich bis zum Schluss gegen den Austritt stemmen (Fackler et al., 2018). Das Interesse an Insolvenzen ergibt sich zum einen daraus, dass sie ein sehr aktueller und gut messbarer Indikator für ökonomisches Scheitern und Arbeitsplatzverluste sind. Zum anderen bergen massenhafte Insolvenzen die Gefahr von Ansteckungseffekten bis hin zu Bankenkrisen.
Read article
Macroprudential Policy and Intra-Group Dynamics: The Effects of Reserve Requirements in Brazil
Chris Becker, Matias Ossandon Busch, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Corporate Finance,
December
2021
Abstract
We examine whether liquidity dynamics within banking groups matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using matched bank headquarters-branch data for identification, we find a lending channel of reserve requirements for municipal branches whose headquarters are more exposed to the policy tool. The result is driven by the 2008–2009 crisis and is stronger for state-owned branches, especially when being less profitable and liquidity constrained. These findings suggest the presence of cross-regional distributional effects of macroprudential policies operating via internal capital markets.
Read article
Physical Climate Change and the Sovereign Risk of Emerging Economies
Hannes Böhm
Journal of Economic Structures,
2022
Abstract
I show that rising temperatures can detrimentally affect the sovereign creditworthiness of emerging economies. To this end, I collect long-term monthly temperature data of 54 emerging markets. I calculate a country’s temperature deviation from its historical average, which approximates present-day climate change trends. Running regressions from 1994m1 to 2018m12, I find that higher temperature anomalies lower sovereign bond performances (i.e., increase sovereign risk) significantly for countries that are warmer on average and have lower seasonality. The estimated magnitudes suggest that affected countries likely face significant increases in their sovereign borrowing costs if temperatures continue to rise due to climate change. However, results indicate that stronger institutions can make a country more resilient towards temperature shocks, which holds independent of a country’s climate.
Read article
How Do EU Banks’ Funding Costs Respond to the CRD IV? An Assessment Based on the Banking Union Directives Database
Thomas Krause, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer, Cristina Zgherea
Abstract
The establishment of the European Banking Union constitutes a major change in the regulatory framework of the banking system. Main parts are implemented via directives that show staggered transposition timing across EU member states. Based on the newly compiled Banking Union Directives Database, we assess how banks’ funding costs responded to the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV). Our findings show an upward trend in funding costs which is driven by an increase in cost of equity and partially offset by a decline in cost of debt. The diverging trends are most present in countries with an ex-ante lower regulatory capital stringency, which is in line with banks’ short-run adjustment needs but longer-run benefits from increased financial stability.
Read article
Macroeconomic Reports
Macroeconomic Reports Local and global: IWH regularly provides current economic data - be it about the state of the East German economy, the macroeconomic development in Germany…
See page
How Do EU Banks’ Funding Costs Respond to the CRD IV? An Assessment Based on the Banking Union Directives Database
Thomas Krause, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer, Cristina Zgherea
Journal of Financial Stability,
forthcoming
Abstract
The establishment of the European Banking Union constitutes a major change in the regulatory framework of the banking system. Main parts are implemented via directives that show staggered transposition timing across EU member states. Based on the newly compiled Banking Union Directives Database, we assess how banks’ funding costs responded to the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV). Our findings show an upward trend in funding costs which is driven by an increase in cost of equity and partially offset by a decline in cost of debt. The diverging trends are most present in countries with an ex-ante lower regulatory capital stringency, which is in line with banks’ short-run adjustment needs but longer-run benefits from increased financial stability.
Read article
Lending Effects of the ECB’s Asset Purchases
Michael Koetter
Journal of Monetary Economics,
December
2020
Abstract
Between 2010 and 2012, the European Central Bank absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Detailed security holdings data at the bank level affirms an effective lending stimulus due to the SMP. Exposed banks contract household lending, but increase commercial lending substantially. Holding non-SMP securities from stressed EMU countries amplifies the commercial lending response. The SMP also improved liquidity buffers and profitability without compromising credit quality.
Read article
Carbon Transition Risk and Corporate Loan Securitization
Isabella Müller, Huyen Nguyen, Trang Nguyen
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
forthcoming
Abstract
We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.
Read article
