We find that a firm’s stock price drops when its compensation peer firm announces a severe say-on-pay voting failure. This price drop causes a reduction in the focal firm CEO’s pay in the following period. The effect on CEO pay is stronger when the board of directors is more powerful, when the proxy advisor holds a negative view of the CEO’s pay, and when the hired compensation consultant is less reputable. Directors who cut their CEO’s pay following the price drop receive more voting support from investors than other directors. Our findings show that the peer firm’s voting failure induces a market-feedback effect for focal firm directors.

Die Weltwirtschaft steht im Frühjahr 2025 im Zeichen sich tiefgreifend ändernder geopolitischer und wirtschaftspolitischer Rahmenbedingungen. Vor dem Hintergrund des Politikwechsels in den USA sind insbesondere in Europa, aber nicht nur dort, neue sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen entstanden. Sie haben zunächst zu einer Lockerung fiskalischer Restriktionen beigetragen, machen aber zumindest längerfristig auch eine Überprüfung finanzpolitischer Prioritäten erforderlich. Zudem hat die US-Regierung begonnen, neue Handelshürden aufzubauen und zusätzliche Unsicherheiten für die wirtschaftlichen Akteure zu schaffen. Dies bremst den globalen Warenhandel und die Produktion sowohl weltweit als auch in den USA selbst, wo erste Anzeichen für eine Abkühlung der Konjunktur sichtbar sind.

We study the effects of Tax Authority (IRS) attention on a firm’s financial reporting. We explore whether firms institute a higher degree of accounting conservatism in response to IRS monitoring. Using data on IRS acquisition of public firms’ 10-K financial disclosures to proxy for IRS attention, we find that when firms are under IRS attention, they tend to initiate higher levels of unconditional and, to some extent, conditional accounting conservatism. We alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns by using pre- and post-IRS attention environments between the treated group (firms with IRS attention) and a propensity score that matches the control group of firms (no IRS attention). These results withstand several robustness tests and subsample analyses.

This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.