We examine the effect of sovereign credit impairments on the pricing of syndicated loans following rating downgrades in the borrowing firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionately adverse impact on the bounded firms' borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms following their sovereign's rating downgrade. Rating-based regulatory frictions partially explain our results. On the supply-side, loans carry a higher spread when granted from low-capital banks, non-bank lenders, and banks with high market power. We further document an operating demand-side channel, contingent on borrowers' size, financial constraints, and global diversification. Our results can be attributed to the relative bargaining power between lenders and borrowers: relationship borrowers and non-bank dependent borrowers with alternative financing sources are much less affected.

We study changes in job reallocation in Europe after 2000 using novel microaggregated data that we collected for 19 European countries. In all countries, we document broad-based declines in job reallocation rates that concern most economic sectors and size classes. These declines are mainly driven by dynamics within sectors, size, and age classes rather than by compositional changes. Simultaneously, employment shares of young firms decline. Consistent with US evidence, firms’ employment has become less responsive to productivity shocks. However, the dispersion of firms’ productivity shocks has decreased too. To enhance our understanding of these patterns, we derive and apply a firm-level framework that relates changes in firms’ market power, labor market imperfections, and production technology to firms’ responsiveness and job reallocation. Using German firm-level data, we find that changes in markups and labor output elasticities, rather than adjustment costs, are key in rationalizing declining responsiveness.

Drawing upon evidence from the Chinese corporate bond market, we study how ownership structure affects the cost of debt for firms. Our results show that state, institutional and foreign ownership formats reduce the cost of debt for firms. The benefits of state ownership are accentuated when the issuer is headquartered in a province with highly developed market institutions, operates in an industry less dominated by the state or during the period after the 2012 anti-corruption reforms. Institutional ownership provides the most benefits in environments with lower levels of marketization, especially for firms with low credit quality. Our evidence sheds light on the nexus of ownership and debt cost in a political economy where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs face productivity and credit frictions. It is also illustrative of how the market environment interacts with corporate ownership in affecting the cost of bond issuance.