We explore the dependency between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies. Our focus is two-fold. First, the risk of a currency crisis rises as the foreign stake in the domestic stock market increases. Successful economies with high capital flows into their booming stock markets especially are prone to stock market-induced currency crises. Second, we apply the dividend growth model to show that stock markets crash in the run-up to a currency crisis. This new type of twin crisis is empirically tested by employing a logit framework using quarterly data for 33 emerging economies for 1994Q1–2007Q4.

In most advanced economies, strained public finances compel central banks to keep their expansive course, while interest rates in most emerging markets continue to be relatively low, if compared to their high potential growth rates. Thus, expansive monetary policies throughout the world, while giving cause for concern regarding long run macroeconomic stability, brighten the growth prospects for 2011. Developments in the group of countries that are neither booming nor in stagnation will be pivotal for the euro area economy in 2011. Economic sentiment indicators appear to suggest that important core countries are benefiting more and more from the upswing in Germany. In addition, the crisis of confidence in 2010 has weakened the common currency and thus improved the competitiveness of firms producing in the euro area.

In the early phase of transition that started with the 1990s, Central and Eastern European Countries pursued economic restructuring of the enterprise sector that involved massive injections of state support. Also foreign investment from the West and facilitation of the development of a market economy involved massive injections of state support. With their accession to the European Union (EU), levels and forms of state aid came under critical review by the European Commission. This inquiry investigates whether the integration of the new member states operates on a level playing field with respect to state aid. Quantitative and qualitative analysis is relied upon to answer this key, as well as other, related questions. Findings suggest that in recent years a level playing field across the EU has indeed emerged. State aid in the new EU member countries is rather handled more strictly than laxer compared to the ‘old’ EU countries.

This inquiry relies on an Institutionalist and Post Keynesian analysis to explore Germany's neo-liberal project, noting cumulative effects emerging as measurable economic and societal outcomes. Investments in technologies generate rising output-to-capital ratios. Increasing exports offset the Domar problem, but give rise to capital surpluses. National income redistributes in favor of capital. Novel labor market institutions emerge. Following Minsky, good times lead to bad: as seeming successes of neo-liberal policies are accompanied by financial instability, growing disparities in household incomes, and sharp declines in German exports on world markets, resulting in one of the deepest, recent contractions in the industrialized world.

The euro area economy benefits from dynamic growth of exports to the emerging markets. Exports to Asia in particular have exceeded their peak level of spring 2008 as early as at the beginning of this year. Firms reacted by restocking and investing in equipment. The growth hike of the second quarter, however, will not be repeated, as it was favored by special factors. We expect euro area GDP to grow by around 1.6% in 2010 and 2011. The upswing of world trade calms down in the second half of this year and the effects of fiscal consolidation in Europe become increasingly felt.

The world economy is recovering, largely driven by upswings in most emerging market economies. Although growth in these regions is apparently calming down at present, the euro area will still be benefiting from the momentum of a healthily expanding world trade for much of the remaining year. Rising exports will be the main driver of the recovery in the euro area during the first half of 2010. We expect euro area GDP to grow by around 1.0% in 2010 and 1.6% in 2011, respectively. Due to this increase in external demand, the growth rate of the industrial production index has also gained momentum: during 2010 the industrial production index is expected to grow around 7%, though only at about 3% in 2011.

The world economy will recover during 2010 and 2011 thanks to ultra-low key interest rates in industrial countries and to the strong growth in emerging markets economies. In the euro area, however, the phasing out of expansive fiscal policies and fiscal consolidation will drag down demand; rising exports will be the main driver of the recovery. Internal demand will have a positive (although small) contribution to growth in 2011. We expect euro area GDP to grow around 1.2% and 1.6% during 2010 and 2011, respectively. Due to rising exports, the industrial sector will resume positive growth in the short run but the intensity of the recovery will be moderate and insufficient to compensate the sharp fall of 2009: at the end of 2011, the industrial production index is expected to be still 10% below its pre-crisis levels.

Im Zuge der aktuellen Finanz- und Konjunkturkrise gewann der Internationale Währungsfonds (IWF) stark an Bedeutung. Dies zeigte sich vor allem in der erheblichen Ausweitung der verfügbaren Mittel des Fonds. Im Zuge der Krise wurden auch die Kreditlinien des IWF überarbeitet. Zwei neue Instrumente sind dabei von besonderem Interesse, die Flexible Credit Line (FCL) und die High

Access Precautionary Arrangements (HAPA). Nachdem bereits früher mit präventiven Kreditlinien experimentiert wurde, ist die FCL das erste Kreditinstrument mit vorgelagertem Qualifikationsprozess, das auch auf Nachfrage stieß. Dabei ersetzt die Ex-ante-Qualifikation die bisher bei allen IWF-Krediten übliche Ex-post-Konditionalität. Dies bedeutet, dass qualifizierte Länder im Falle einer Krise direkt auf die IWFMittel zurückgreifen können. Ein langwieriger Verhandlungsprozess ist damit ebenso obsolet wie die häufig kritisierten begleitenden Reformprogramme. Damit erfüllt der IWF nunmehr wesentliche Voraussetzungen für eine präventive Kreditvergabe. Auch die befürchtete Stigmatisierung der Länder, die Interesse an den neuen Krediten zeigten, blieb

bislang aus. Die Indikatoren für Polen, Mexiko und Kolumbien, also jener Länder, die bisher FCLVereinbarungen geschlossen haben, sind positiv. Die neuen Instrumente dürften deshalb die Stabilität in Schwellenländern erhöhen.

Kritisch zu betrachten bleibt jedoch die Gefahr erhöhter Risikobereitschaft durch die Finanzmarktakteure, solange die Kreditinstrumente nicht von einem effektiven regulatorischen Rahmen begleitet werden. Die systemische Bedeutung der neuen

Kreditinstrumente wird zudem durch die bislang geringe Nachfrage geschmälert.

Since the Asian crises it is often taken as granted that capital markets have significant functional deficits. Often these deficits are believed to be so very strong that the ability of free capital markets to guarantee a more or less correct international allocation of capital is denied. It is argued that speculation dominates capital markets so much that capital allocation is purely random. This is one of the major arguments backing the present trend to re-establish capital controls, which emerged after the capital market distortions observed during the Asian flu. In the present article it is shown that capital markets, while certainly prone to many distortions, are well capable of roughly guiding capital to the proper place. Though allocation is not model-like perfect, this steals the thunder from the idea, that closed or government-guided capital markets were able to perform better.

In 2010, the recovery of the world economy will be driven by a strong expansion of production in many emerging markets. Rising exports will be the main driver of the recovery in the euro area. We expect GDP to grow around 1.7% and 1.2% uring 2010 and 2011, respectively. What impedes the recovery is the state of labour markets. In fact, unemployment will continue to rise well into 2011, partly because firms with low capacity utilization will no longer be able to keep workers in employment. The most important reason for the recovery of the real economy appears to be renewed – although still fragile – confidence on financial markets. Official interest rates close to zero and substantial purchases of highly rated assets by important central banks have drastically increased the attractiveness of more risky assets.