The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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Poland´s entry into the Euro zone: convergence over speed
Thomas Linne
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 13,
2003
Abstract
Das polnische Wechselkurssystem eines „managed float“ entspricht nicht den Anforderungen des Wechselkursmechanismus II (WKM II) des Europäischen Währungssystems, der eine Anbindung der Währung an den Euro verlangt. Damit sieht sich die polnische Regierung dem Problem gegenüber, eine Übergangsstrategie für das Wechselkurssystem zu entwickeln. Erklärtes Ziel der Regierung ist ein schnellstmöglicher Beitritt zur Eurozone. Haupthindernis auf diesem Weg ist das Defizit der staatlichen Haushalte. In den nächsten Jahren wird die Defizitquote beständig höher ausfallen als der von der EU vorgesehene Referenzwert. Eine rigorose Konsolidierungspolitik der staatlichen Haushalte liefe jedoch Gefahr, die Wachstumsaussichten der Wirtschaft zu beschränken. Zudem wäre die Nachhaltigkeit dieser Politik fragwürdig. Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint eine Beitrittsstrategie angemessen, die die reale Konvergenz der Volkswirtschaft mit den Ländern der Eurozone in den Vordergrund stellt und nicht so sehr die Haushaltskonsolidierung. Der Beitritt zum WKM II sollte erst dann erfolgen, wenn absehbar ist, dass zwei Jahre später die Maastricht- Kriterien erfüllt werden können.
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A revised theory of contestable markets : applied on the German telecommunication sector
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 275,
2002
Abstract
Despite the scepticism raised by the German Monopoly Commission our analysis shows that the revised theory of contestable markets can be applied to the telecommunications market better than expected. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit is possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeds the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are satisfied for potential competition to exist. We applied the ‘revised’ contestable market theory to the German telecommunication market and have been able to clearly identify the value added stages in which regulation is required. Under the present conditions local loops - which can be determined as natural monopolies - are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. Local loops can be identified as monopolistic bottlenecks therefore. Regional and local connection networks should also be regulated because a high entry lag and a low price adjustment lag have to be expected as well as current competition does not exist today. The national connection network shows current competition between several network providers; hence regulation can be abolished in this field. Assumed that network access is regulated, services can be supplied by several competing firms.
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Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
International Journal of the Economics of Business,
No. 3,
2002
Abstract
This paper reviews how long-term relationships between firms and banks shape the structure and integration of banking markets worldwide. Bank relationships arise to span informational asymmetries that are endemic in financial markets. Firm-bank relationships not only entail specific benefits and costs for both the engaged firms and banks, but also directly affect the structure of banking markets. In particular, the sunk cost of screening and monitoring activities and the 'informational capital' collected by the incumbent banks may act as a barrier to entry. The intensity of the existing firm-bank relationships will determine the height of this barrier and shape the structure of international banking markets. For example, in Scandinavia where firms maintain few and strong relationships, foreign banks may only be able to enter successfully through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, Southern European firms maintain many bank relationships. Therefore, banks may consider entering Southern European banking markets through direct investment.
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Price Competition between an Expert and a Non-Expert
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 6,
2000
Abstract
This paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert's repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behavior of both sellers. For low enough probability of successful repair at the non-expert, all consumers first visit the non-expert, and a 'timid-pricing' equilibrium results. If the non-expert's repair technology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-expert a visit. They directly go to the expert's shop, and an 'aggressive-pricing' equilibrium pops up. For intermediate values of the non-expert's successful repair a 'mixed-pricing' equilibrium emerges where the expert randomizes over the monopoly price and some lower price.
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