Forecast Dispersion, Dissenting Votes, and Monetary Policy Preferences of FOMC Members: The Role of Individual Career Characteristics and Political Aspects
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Public Choice,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Using data from 1992 to 2001, we study the impact of members’ economic forecasts on the probability of casting dissenting votes in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Employing standard ordered probit techniques, we find that higher individual inflation and real GDP growth forecasts (relative to the committee’s median) significantly increase the probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy, whereas higher individual unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it. Using interaction models, we find that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation stabilization. We also find evidence that politics matters, with Republican appointees being much more focused on inflation stabilization than Democratic appointees. Moreover, during the entire Clinton administration ‘natural’ monetary policy preferences of Bank presidents and Board members for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the administrations of both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively.
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Does Central Bank Staff Beat Private Forecasters?
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen, A. Jung
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2012
Abstract
In the tradition of Romer and Romer (2000), this paper compares staff forecasts of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) for inflation and output with corresponding private forecasts. Standard tests show that the Fed and less so the ECB have a considerable information advantage about inflation and output. Using novel tests for conditional predictive ability and forecast stability for the US, we identify the driving forces of the narrowing of the information advantage of Greenbook forecasts coinciding with the Great Moderation.
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The Halle Economic Projection Model
Sebastian Giesen, Oliver Holtemöller, Juliane Scharff, Rolf Scheufele
Economic Modelling,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
In this paper we develop an open economy model explaining the joint determination of output, inflation, interest rates, unemployment and the exchange rate in a multi-country framework. Our model -- the Halle Economic Projection Model (HEPM) -- is closely related to studies published by Carabenciov et al. Our main contribution is that we model the Euro area countries separately. In doing so, we consider Germany, France, and Italy which represent together about 70 percent of Euro area GDP. The model combines core equations of the New-Keynesian standard DSGE model with empirically useful ad-hoc equations. We estimate this model using Bayesian techniques and evaluate the forecasting properties. Additionally, we provide an impulse response analysis and a historical shock decomposition.
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