The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence
Reint E. Gropp, Rasa Karapandza, Julian Opferkuch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2016
Abstract
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project’s potential for success. We find that if the manager’s disclosures are costly, she will never release forward-looking statements that do not convey information to external investors. Furthermore, managers of firms that are transparent and face significant disclosure-related costs will refrain from forward-looking disclosures. In contrast, managers of opaque and profitable firms will follow a policy of accurate disclosures. To test our findings empirically, we devise an index that captures the quantity of forward-looking disclosures in public firms’ 10-K reports, and relate it to multiple firm characteristics. For opaque firms, our index is positively correlated with a firm’s profitability and financing needs. For transparent firms, there is only a weak relation between our index and firm fundamentals. Furthermore, the overall level of forward-looking disclosures declined significantly between 2001 and 2009, possibly as a result of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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Electoral Credit Supply Cycles Among German Savings Banks
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
IWH Online,
No. 11,
2015
Abstract
In this note we document political lending cycles for German savings banks. We find that savings banks on average increase supply of commercial loans by €7.6 million in the year of a local election in their respective county or municipality (Kommunalwahl). For all savings banks combined this amounts to €3.4 billion (0.4% of total credit supply in Germany in a complete electoral cycle) more credit in election years. Credit growth at savings banks increases by 0.7 percentage points, which corresponds to a 40% increase relative to non-election years. Consistent with this result, we also find that the performance of the savings banks follows the same electoral cycle. The loans that the savings banks generate during election years perform worse in the first three years of maturity and loan losses tend to be realized in the middle of the election cycle.
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Can R&D Subsidies Counteract the Economic Crisis? – Macroeconomic Effects in Germany
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Jutta Günther, Brigitte Loose, Udo Ludwig, Nicole Nulsch
Research Policy,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
During the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, governments in Europe stabilized their economies by means of fiscal policy. After decades of absence, deficit spending was used to counteract the heavy decline in demand. In Germany, public spending went partially into R&D subsidies in favor of small and medium sized enterprises. Applying the standard open input–output model, the paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of R&D subsidies on employment and production in the business cycle. Findings in the form of backward multipliers suggest that R&D subsidies have stimulated a substantial leverage effect. Almost two thirds of the costs of R&D projects are covered by the enterprises themselves. Overall, a subsidized R&D program results in a production, value added and employment effect that amounts to at least twice the initial financing. Overall, the R&D program counteracts the decline of GDP by 0.5% in the year 2009. In the year 2010 the effects are already procyclical since the German economy recovered quickly. Compared to the strongly discussed alternative uses of subsidies for private consumption, R&D spending is more effective.
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Corporate Taxation and Firm Location in Germany
Götz Zeddies
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2015
Abstract
German Fiscal Federalism is characterized by a high degree of fiscal equalization which lowers the efficiency of local tax administration. Currently, a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme is on the political agenda. One option is to grant federal states the right to raise surtaxes on statutory tax rates set by the central government in order to reduce the equalization rate. In such an environment, especially those federal states with lower economic performance would have to raise comparatively high surtaxes. With capital mobility, this could further lower economic performance and thus tax revenues. Although statutory tax rates are so far identical across German federal states, corporate tax burden differs for several reasons. This paper tries to identify the impact of such differences on firm location. As can be shown, effective corporate taxation did seemingly not have a significant impact on firm location across German federal states.
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Corporate Governance Structures and Financial Constraints in Multinational Enterprises – An Analysis in Selected European Transition Economies on the Basis of the IWH FDI Micro Database 2013 –
Andrea Gauselmann, Felix Noth
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
In our analysis, we consider the distribution of decision power over financing and investment between MNEs’ headquarters and foreign subsidiaries and its influence on the foreign affiliates’ financial restrictions. Our research results show that headquarters of multinational enterprises have not (yet) moved much decision power to their foreign subsidiaries at all. We use data from the IWH FDI Micro Database which contains information on corporate governance structures and financial restrictions of 609 enterprises with a foreign investor in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and East Germany. We match data from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database on financial characteristics. We find that a high concentration of decision power within the MNE’s headquarter implicates high financial restrictions within the subsidiary. Square term results show, however, that the effect of financial constraints within the subsidiary decreases and finally turns insignificant when decision power moves from headquarter to subsidiary. Thus, economic policy should encourage foreign investors in the case of foreign acquisition of local enterprises to leave decision power within the enterprise and in the case of Greenfield investment to provide the newly established subsidiaries with as much power over corporate governance structures as possible.
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Coordination between Municipalities and Local Non-Municipal Public Units (NMPUs) for Supporting Urban Economic Development: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Evidence for the Example of Universities in Germany
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, J. Hinz
Koordination raumwirksamer Politik: Mehr Effizienz und Wirksamkeit von Politik durch abgestimmte Arbeitsteilung,
2015
Abstract
In zahlreichen europäischen Städten gibt es Versuche, der lokalen Wirtschaftsentwicklung eine neue Richtung zu geben, u.a. durch die Ansiedlung von Nicht-Kommunalen Öffentlichen Einrichtungen (NKOE), z.B. Bundesagenturen, Gerichte, Rechnungshöfe, Landesmuseen oder Universitäten. Allerdings liegen die Kompetenzen für solche NKOE nicht bei den Kommunen, sondern zumeist bei den höheren staatlichen Ebenen. Deshalb haben die Kommunen keinen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf die Ansiedlung von NKOE. Sobald aber eine entsprechende Entscheidung gefallen ist, können die Kommunen die weitere Entwicklung von NKOE begünstigen. Im Beitrag wird zunächst eine Kategorisierung von NKOE durchgeführt, und zwar sowohl gemäß der Bedeutung von NKOE für die lokale Wirtschaftsentwicklung als auch hinsichtlich des Einflusses lokaler Maßnahmen auf die Leistungsfähigkeit von NKOE. Es wird gezeigt, dass Universitäten zu jener Kategorie von NKOE zählen, für die eine Koordination der eigenen Aktivitäten mit jenen der Kommunen besonders wichtig sein dürfte. Die Effekte von Universitäten für die lokale Wirtschaftsentwicklung wurden bereits vielfach diskutiert. Die Fähigkeit der Universitäten, das für ihre Effektivität erforderliche Humankapital zu attrahieren, hängt von verschiedenen lokalen Faktoren ab. Folglich gibt es eine reziproke Beziehung zwischen Kommunen und Universitäten. Eine Koordinierung der jeweiligen Aktivitäten wäre deshalb für beide Seiten von Vorteil. Dies gilt z.B. für den Bereich der Informationspolitik. Eine Kommune sollte nach innen wie nach außen die Vorzüge der örtlichen Universitäten kommunizieren; umgekehrt sollte auch eine Universität die Stärken des lokalen Umfelds deutlich machen. Da für den Bereich der Informationspolitik empirische Daten leicht zugänglich sind, konzentriert sich der empirische Teil des Beitrags auf eine empirische Untersuchung der Internetpräsentationen ausgewählter Städte und Universitäten. Es zeigt sich, dass in den meisten betrachteten Städten die Koordinierung zwischen Kommunen und Universitäten zu wünschen übrig lässt. Eine Verbesserung dieser Situation ließe sich z.B. durch die Einführung
finanzieller Anreizmechanismen erreichen.
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The Impact of Local Factors on the Scope of Benefits from Public Investment: The Case of Tourism Infrastructure in Saxon Municipalities
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, Albrecht Kauffmann
Urban Research & Practice,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Following the transition from socialist central planning economies to market economies in all of the former socialist countries, many regions have had to cope with severe structural changes and economic development problems. To overcome these problems, local governments have tried to invest in new public infrastructure to support the development of new industries. This paper looks at infrastructure that supports tourist activities and argues that the impact of infrastructure generally depends on certain local factors which differ between municipalities. One important factor is whether the local population possesses the relevant complementary factors, in particular the right ‘soft skills’.
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Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy
Claudia M. Buch, Björn Hilberg, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German bank restructuring law. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are minimal, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and the head institutes of savings banks and credit unions. Third, the levy had no effect on the volume of loans or interest rates for the average German bank. For the banks affected most by the levy, we find evidence of fewer loans, higher lending rates, and lower deposit rates.
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