We study the firm-level and aggregate effects of government-imposed employment targets. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous productivity growth in which penalties for below-target hiring generate a polarization mechanism: low-productivity firms exit, while others expand employment beyond efficient levels, and firms invest in productivity to avoid future penalties. We test and confirm the model’s firm level predictions using unique contractual data on more than 18,000 employment commitments from the East German privatization, exploiting quasi-random variation in the assignment of privatizers to firms. Quantitatively, employment targets reduce unemployment in the short run, but these gains reverse over time as distorted labor allocations and weakened investment incentives slow aggregate productivity growth and reduce welfare. We also evaluate how alternative designs for employment-protection (e.g., the choice between mandates and subsidies, the structure of targets) impact misallocation and the resulting short- and long-run outcomes.

The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.

Banks play a crucial role in the transition to a low-carbon economy, but they also expose themselves to climate transition risk. This column shows that banks use corporate loan securitisation to shift climate transition risk to less-regulated shadow banking entities. This behaviour affects carbon premia in loan contracts. When banks can use securitisation to manage transition risk, their climate policies that target only activities reflected in their books may not be as effective as bank regulators hope for.

The focus of this paper is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation SHO strengthens or weakens the effect of short-selling threats on banks’ risk-taking. The evidence shows that pilot banks with looser constraints on short-selling increased their risk-taking during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The reason is that short-selling threats improved the information environment and mitigated the agency problems of banks during the pilot program that led to greater risk-taking by pilot banks. Additionally, this effect is mainly driven by pilot banks with poor corporate governance, or high information asymmetry. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence that the disciplinary role of short-sellers had a positive effect on bank risk-taking during the financial crisis.

Excessive market power has detrimental effects on the functioning of the economy, raising consumer prices, distorting the allocation of resources, and creating welfare losses. The existing literature has largely focussed on competition in product markets. This column argues that it is important to differentiate between various sources of firm market power on output and input (most notably labour) markets. European firm-level data reveals that large firms charge lower markups in product markets but exert their market power significantly in labour markets. Competition authorities can and must distinguish between the sources of market power when attempting to regulate it.

Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.

We analyze the effects of a reform of capital regulation for U.S. insurance companies in 2009. The reform eliminates capital buffers against unexpected losses associated with portfolio holdings of MBS, but not for other fixed-income assets. After the reform, insurance companies are much more likely to retain downgraded MBS compared to other downgraded assets. This pattern is more pronounced for financially constrained insurers. Exploiting discontinuities in the reform’s implementation, we can identify the relevance of the capital requirements channel. We also document that the insurance industry crowds outs other investors in the new issuance of (high-yield) MBS.

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.

In 2015, the European Commission adopted the Capital Markets Union (CMU) action plan. The plan aims to deepen financial integration and harmonize international standards for investments within the European Union (EU) and it outlines several actions to be implemented in order to address twelve key priority areas. We assemble a database of the legislative acts that implement the CMU. The dataset includes a list of directives and regulations at the EU level with information on publication, entry into force, and transposition dates as well as brief descriptions. This information might be useful in empirical analyses assessing the effectiveness of components of the CMU.