Trade Misinvoicing: The Dark Side of World Trade
A. Buehn, Stefan Eichler
World Economy,
No. 8,
2011
Abstract
We analyse the determinants of trade misinvoicing using data on 86 countries from 1980 to 2005. In a simple microeconomic framework, we derive the determinants of four different types of trade misinvoicing taking into account that only the financial incentives determine whether and how much exports/imports to underinvoice or overinvoice, whereas the deterrents only affect the extent of misinvoicing. The hypothesised determinants are tested using data on discrepancies in bilateral trade with the United States. We find that the black market premia and tariffs motivate illegal trading activities. Higher financial penalties effectively act as a deterrent to this crime.
Read article
Mergers, Spinoffs, and Employee Incentives
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 7,
2011
Abstract
This article studies mergers between competing firms and shows that while such mergers reduce the level of product market competition, they may have an adverse effect on employee incentives to innovate. In industries where value creation depends on innovation and development of new products, mergers are likely to be inefficient even though they increase the market power of the post-merger firm. In such industries, a stand-alone structure where independent firms compete both in the product market and in the market for employee human capital leads to a greater profitability. Furthermore, our analysis shows that multidivisional firms can improve employee incentives and increase firm value by reducing firm size through a spinoff transaction, although doing so eliminates the economies of scale advantage of being a larger firm and the benefits of operating an internal capital market within the firm. Finally, our article suggests that established firms can benefit from creating their own competition in the product and labor markets by accommodating new firm entry, and the desire to do so is greater at the intermediate stages of industry/product development.
Read article
Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Effects of Alternative Schemes on Bank Lending and Risk-taking
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
No. 2,
2012
Abstract
We analyse the effects of policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalise risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance without reference to new activities, like granting lump sum transfers or establishing bad banks, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
Read article
Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
Read article
Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, E. Sheshinski
Economica,
2010
Abstract
International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
Read article
Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect
Christian Growitsch, Nicole Nulsch, Margarethe Rammerstorfer
European Journal of Law and Economics,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
In 2004, European competition law had been considerable changed by the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform and its arising uncertainty on the agreements firms implement, especially on innovative agreements like vertical R&D agreements. By means of a decision theoretic approach, we show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached but innovating cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended side effect, fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased.
Read article
The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, J. T. Addison, T. Kuhn
IZA Discussion Papers, No. 5170,
No. 5170,
2010
Abstract
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.
Read article
Urban Development by Protecting Historic Buildings? An Analysis of Incentives and Regulations in Heritage Conservation
Peter Franz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2010
Abstract
Für die Stadtentwicklung in Ostdeutschland spielen die Regularien des Denkmalschutzes eine hervorgehobene Rolle. Zahlreiche Städte verfügen noch über ein stadtbildprägendes bauliches kulturelles Erbe. Als Reaktion auf den in der DDR-Zeit vorangeschrittenen Verfall dieser historischen Bausubstanz sind in den Neuen Ländern vergleichsweise rigide Denkmalschutzgesetze erlassen worden. Zusätzlich wurde im Jahr 1991 das Bund-Länder-Programm „Städtebaulicher Denkmalschutz“ speziell für die ostdeutschen Städte ins Leben gerufen. In vielen Städten haben Denkmalschutzaktivitäten zu attraktiven Stadtzentren geführt. Auf der anderen Seite mehren sich die Anzeichen, dass eine „überzogene“ Denkmalschutzpolitik einen Hemmfaktor für die Stadtentwicklung bilden kann. Zum Auftakt dieses neu in den Fokus genommenen Forschungsthemas wird in dem Beitrag das Konzept eines ökonomischen Zugangs zum Thema des Denkmalschutzes dargelegt. Darüber hinaus erfolgt eine systematisierende Analyse dieses Politikfeldes im Hinblick auf die verschiedenen involvierten politischen Ebenen, Akteure und Regulierungen. Die Finanzierung des Denkmalschutzes, seine verschiedenen Instrumente und erkennbare nicht intendierte Effekte bilden weitere Schwerpunkte der Analyse. Die Befunde zeigen, dass in den Neuen Ländern ein höherer Anteil an Gebäuden unter Denkmalschutz steht und dass pro Kopf mehr öffentliche Mittel in den Denkmalschutz fließen als in Westdeutschland. Allerdings erweist es sich als sehr schwierig, festzustellen, wann ein optimaler oder zumindest ausreichender Stand des Denkmalschutzes in einer Stadt erreicht worden ist. Die Suche nach entsprechenden Indikatoren impliziert weiteren Forschungsbedarf.
Read article
What Happened to the East German Housing Market? A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding
Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
Post-Communist Economies,
2010
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
Read article
