We study the corporate-loan pricing decisions of a major, systemic bank during the Greek financial crisis. A unique aspect of our data set is that we observe both the actual interest rate and the “break-even rate” (BE rate) of each loan, as computed by the bank’s own loan-pricing department (in effect, the loan’s marginal cost). We document that low-BE-rate (safer) borrowers are charged significant markups, whereas high-BE-rate (riskier) borrowers are charged smaller and even negative markups. We rationalize this de facto cross-subsidization through the lens of a dynamic model featuring depressed collateral values, impaired capital-market access, and limit pricing.

Zur Erinnerung: Nach Jahren von Inflationsraten nahe null war die Inflationsrate in Deutschland 2022 nach der Corona-Pandemie und dem Überfall Russlands auf die Ukraine auf knapp 7% gestiegen, ähnlich hoch wie zur Energiekrise 1973/74. Die Gründe dafür sind bekannt: expansive Geld- und Finanzpolitik sowie steigende Energiepreise und Nachholeffekte beim Konsum, verbunden mit Lieferkettenproblemen gerade im Handel mit China. Seitdem haben Zentralbanken wie die EZB eine weiche Landung hingelegt. Ohne große Verluste beim Wachstum (zumindest global gesehen) wurde die Inflationsrate auf 1,6% im September 2024 gedrückt. Ein großer Erfolg?

We use secondary corporate loan-market prices to construct a novel loan-market-based credit spread. This measure has considerable predictive power for economic activity across macroeconomic outcomes in both the U.S. and Europe and captures unique information not contained in public market credit spreads. Loan-market borrowers are compositionally different and particularly sensitive to supply-side frictions as well as financial frictions that emanate from their own balance sheets. This evidence highlights the joint role of financial intermediary and borrower balance-sheet frictions in understanding macroeconomic developments and enriches our understanding of which type of financial frictions matter for the economy.

We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.

This Technical Report documents the construction and coverage of the IWH European Real Estate Index (EREI). Since 2018, we have used machine-learning methods to collect monthly listings of residential real estate available for sale or rent in up to 20 European countries. The Technical Report documents the cleaning and selection process and describes the data regarding coverage, moments, and frequencies to construct the EREI.

We study the aggregate, distributional, and welfare effects of fiscal policy responses to Germany’s energy crisis arising in 2022 using a novel ten-agent New Keynesian (TENK) model. The crisis, compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, led to sharp price increases and significant consumption disparities. Our model, calibrated to Germany’s income and consumption distribution, evaluates key policy interventions. We find that non-targeted transfers had the largest short-term aggregate impact, while targeted transfers for lower income households were more cost-effective. The energy cost brake and reductions in gas and oil taxes have shown very little effect, but were comparatively cost-effective under the assumption of exogenous prices. Our results highlight how targeted fiscal measures can address distributional effects and stabilize consumption during crises.