Das Wahlprogramm der AfD Sachsen-Anhalt verspricht umfangreiche neue Leistungen, den Verzicht auf neue Schulden und niedrigere Steuern zugleich. Diese Policy Note beziffert, wie weit Kosten und Gegenfinanzierung auseinanderliegen. Von 136 kostenwirksamen Maßnahmen lassen sich 28 mit amtlichen Quellen belegen. Diese kosten rund 1,6 Mrd. Euro pro Jahr. Da das AfD-Programm neue Schulden ausschließt, kommen die im Landeshaushalt bereits eingeplanten 877 Mio. Euro jährlicher Neuverschuldung hinzu. Der bezifferbare Finanzierungsbedarf beträgt damit rund 2,5 Mrd. Euro pro Jahr. Dem stehen bei großzügiger Auslegung rund 243 Mio. Euro belegbare Einsparungen gegenüber. Von jedem Euro sind damit nicht einmal zehn Cent gedeckt. Es bleibt eine Lücke von mindestens 2,2 Mrd. Euro pro Jahr. Das entspricht rund einem Viertel der Steuereinnahmen des Landes, umgerechnet gut 1 000 Euro je Einwohner und Jahr. Da das Programm auch Steuererhöhungen ausschließt, ist unklar, wie die AfD diese Lücke schließen will.

We revisit the employer size wage effect (ESWE) – arguably the most basic and influential departure from the law of one price for labor. Our main result is that this canonical fact disappears completely across establishments within the same firm, even though they operate in different local labor markets. We uncover and dissect this fact by including a firm fixed effect in otherwise standard cross-sectional regressions of wages on establishment size. We implement this demanding specification in population-wide triple-linked firm-establishment-employee data in Germany. This result is new in the ESWE literature (for which our paper also provides the first systematic meta-analysis). This wage-size decoupling is hard to square with the view that employment is determined along a finitely elastic employerspecific labor supply curve – i.e., employers pay exactly the minimum needed for the quantity of labor, but no more – the foundation of the monopsony view. By contrast, large multi-establishment firms (MEF) appear to hire off their labor supply curves (or those curves are very elastic), pay wage premia above the monopsonistic minimum, and leave excess labor supply. We find some evidence for a reemergence of the ESWE within low-premium MEFs. Overall, at least for the 25% of German employment in large firms for which the ESWE disappears, wage setting and employment determination may be better accounted for by alternative models, namely accommodating above-market-clearing wage premia and rationing of labor supply, such as efficiency wage theories.

We use data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures to study the characteristics and geographic distribution of investments in robots across US manufacturing establishments. Robotics adoption and robot intensity (the number of robots per employee) cluster in "robot hubs." Establishments that report having robotics are larger and have a larger production worker share, lower pay per worker, lower labor share, and higher capital expenditures, including higher IT capital expenditures. Notably, establishments are more likely to have robots if other establishments in the same core-based statistical area and industry also report having robotics, suggestive of agglomeration and peer effects.