Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Herbst 2024: Deutsche Wirtschaft im Umbruch
Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Oliver Holtemöller, Stefan Kooths, Torsten Schmidt, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 10,
2024
Abstract
The German economy has stagnated for over two years, with a slow recovery anticipated in the coming quarters. However, growth is unlikely to reach pre-COVID-19 levels anytime soon. Decarbonisation, digitisation, demographic changes, and heightened competition from China are dampening growth prospects. GDP is projected to decline by 0.1 % in 2024, with increases of 0.8 % and 1.3 % in the subsequent years. Rising private consumption and improving foreign trade are expected to contribute positively to the economic upturn in Germany. Economic policy should prioritise reducing productivity barriers, facilitating structural changes, and lowering political uncertainty to support recovery.
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IWH-Flash-Indikator III. und IV. Quartal 2024
Katja Heinisch, Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Birgit Schultz
IWH-Flash-Indikator,
No. 3,
2024
Abstract
Die deutsche Wirtschaft ist noch immer im Abschwung. Seit nunmehr zwei Jahren folgen abwechselnd minimale Zu- und Abnahmen von einem Quartal auf das nächste. Zuletzt nahm das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) im zweiten Quartal 2024 um 0,1% ab. Zuvor war es zwar um 0,2% gestiegen (vgl. Abbildung 1), aber auch dies reicht nicht aus, um die negative Produktionslücke zu verringern. Die Produktion in der Industrie und vor allem am Bau ist im zweiten Quartal spürbar gesunken. Auch im laufenden dritten Quartal ist die Stimmung der Unternehmen schlecht. Neben einer schwachen Nachfrage für Exportgüter gibt es eine Reihe von Gründen, warum ein Aufschwung noch nicht in Gang kommt: So wirken neben hohen Zinsen und Energiepreisen auch eine richtungslose Politik sowie eine Vielzahl geopolitischer Krisenherde investitionshemmend. Auch der nach wie vor hohe Krankenstand belastet die Wirtschaft. Alles in allem dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) laut IWH-Flash-Indikator im dritten Quartal 2024 um lediglich 0,2% steigen, was erneut keine konjunkturelle Trendwende bedeutet. Eine kräftigere Belebung könnte sich aufgrund steigender Realeinkommen am Jahresende einstellen.
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Is Risk the Fuel of the Business Cycle? Financial Frictions and Oil Market Disturbances
Christoph Schult
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2024
Abstract
I estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the United States that incorporates oil market shocks and risk shocks working through credit market frictions. The findings of this analysis indicate that risk shocks play a crucial role during the Great Recession and the Dot-Com bubble but not during other economic downturns. Credit market frictions do not amplify persistent oil market shocks. This result holds as long as entry and exit rates of entrepreneurs are independent of the business cycle.
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Global Political Ties and the Global Financial Cycle
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan, Xiang Li
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 23,
2023
Abstract
We study the implications of forging stronger political ties with the US on the sensitivities of stock returns around the world to a global common factor – the global financial cycle. Using voting patterns at the United Nations as a measure of political ties with the US along with various measures of the global financial cycle, we document evidence indicating that stronger political ties with the US amplify the sensitivities of stock returns in developing countries to the global financial cycle. We explore several channels and find that a deepening of financial linkages along with a reduction in information asymmetries and an amplification of sentiment are potentially important factors behind this result.
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The Importance of Credit Demand for Business Cycle Dynamics
Gregor von Schweinitz
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 21,
2023
Abstract
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the important role that credit demand plays for credit markets and aggregate macroeconomic developments as both a source and transmitter of economic shocks. I am the first to identify a structural credit demand equation together with credit supply, aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy in a Bayesian structural VAR. The model combines informative priors on structural coefficients and multiple external instruments to achieve identification. In order to improve identification of the credit demand shocks, I construct a new granular instrument from regional mortgage origination.
I find that credit demand is quite elastic with respect to contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions, while credit supply is relatively inelastic. I show that credit supply and demand shocks matter for aggregate fluctuations, albeit at different times: credit demand shocks mostly drove the boom prior to the financial crisis, while credit supply shocks were responsible during and after the crisis itself. In an out-of-sample exercise, I find that the Covid pandemic induced a large expansion of credit demand in 2020Q2, which pushed the US economy towards a sustained recovery and helped to avoid a stagflationary scenario in 2022.
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Media Response
Media Response December 2024 IWH: Stagnation ohne Ende in: Handelsblatt, 13.12.2024 IWH: Ökonomen sehen für 2025 schwarz in: Magdeburger Volksstimme, 13.12.2024 Oliver…
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Alumni
IWH Alumni The IWH maintains contact with its former employees worldwide. We involve our alumni in our work and keep them informed, for example, with a newsletter. We also plan…
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Understanding Post-Covid Inflation Dynamics
Martín Harding, Jesper Lindé, Mathias Trabandt
Journal of Monetary Economics,
November
2023
Abstract
We propose a macroeconomic model with a nonlinear Phillips curve that has a flat slope when inflationary pressures are subdued and steepens when inflationary pressures are elevated. The nonlinear Phillips curve in our model arises due to a quasi-kinked demand schedule for goods produced by firms. Our model can jointly account for the modest decline in inflation during the Great Recession and the surge in inflation during the post-COVID period. Because our model implies a stronger transmission of shocks when inflation is high, it generates conditional heteroskedasticity in inflation and inflation risk. Hence, our model can generate more sizeable inflation surges due to cost-push and demand shocks than a standard linearized model. Finally, our model implies that the central bank faces a more severe trade-off between inflation and output stabilization when inflation is elevated.
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Green transition
In a nutshell Here: Intro-text. [Baukasten zum Thema Grüne Transformation:] Medienkooperation: Das Kohleupdate In Deutschlands Braunkohlerevieren werden bis 2038 40 Milliarden…
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