Exploiting the heteroskedasticity of the changes in short-term and long-term interest rates and exchange rates around the FOMC announcement, we identify three structural monetary policy shocks. We eliminate the predictable part of the shocks and study their effects on financial variables and macro variables. The first shock resembles a conventional monetary policy shock, and the second resembles an unconventional monetary shock. The third shock leads to an increase in interest rates, stock prices, industrial production, consumer prices, and commodity prices. At the same time, the excess bond premium and uncertainty decrease, and the U.S. dollar depreciates. Therefore, this third shock combines all the characteristics of a central bank information shock.

Exploiting the heteroscedasticity of the changes in short-term and long-term interest rates and exchange rates around the FOMC announcement, we identify three structural monetary policy shocks. We eliminate the predictable part of the shocks and study their effects on financial variables and macro variables. The first shock resembles a conventional monetary policy shock, and the second resembles an unconventional monetary shock. The third shock leads to an increase in interest rates, stock prices, industrial production, consumer prices, and commodity prices. At the same time, the excess bond premium and uncertainty decrease, and the U.S. dollar depreciates. Therefore, this third shock combines all the characteristics of a central bank information shock.

This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period 1979–2010, we find that a deterioration in a district's bank health increases the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to Governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.

We study Federal Open Market Committee members' individual forecasts of inflation and unemployment in the period 1992–2004. Our results imply that Governors and Bank presidents forecast differently, with Governors submitting lower inflation and higher unemployment rate forecasts than bank presidents. For Bank presidents we find a regional bias, with higher district unemployment rates being associated with lower inflation and higher unemployment rate forecasts. Bank presidents' regional bias is more pronounced during the year prior to their elections or for nonvoting bank presidents. Career backgrounds or political affiliations also affect individual forecast behavior.

This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district’s bank health increases the probability that this district’s representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.

We find that Federal Reserve Bank presidents’ regional bias in their dissenting interest rate votes in the Federal Open Market Committee follows an electoral cycle. Presidents put more weight on their district’s economic environment during the year prior to their (re-)election relative to nonelection years.

Using data from 1992 to 2001, we study the impact of members’ economic forecasts on the probability of casting dissenting votes in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Employing standard ordered probit techniques, we find that higher individual inflation and real GDP growth forecasts (relative to the committee’s median) significantly increase the probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy, whereas higher individual unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it. Using interaction models, we find that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation stabilization. We also find evidence that politics matters, with Republican appointees being much more focused on inflation stabilization than Democratic appointees. Moreover, during the entire Clinton administration ‘natural’ monetary policy preferences of Bank presidents and Board members for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the administrations of both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively.

This paper examines the impact of house price gaps in Federal Reserve districts on the voting behavior in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from 1978 to 2010. Applying a random effects ordered probit model, we find that a higher regional house price gap significantly increases (decreases) the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC casts interest rate votes in favor of tighter (easier) monetary policy. In addition, our results suggest that Bank presidents react more sensitively to regional house price developments than Board members do.

In jüngster Zeit sprechen Konjunkturforscher Preisentwicklungen auf Immobilienmärkten einen großen Einfluß auf die Konsumnachfrage der privaten Haushalte zu. Dagegen kann eingewandt werden, daß Preiserhöhungen die Konsummöglichkeiten einer Volkswirtschaft als Ganzes nicht erhöhen: Wer eine Immobilie teuer verkauft, profitiert vom hohen Preis genau in dem Maße, wie der Käufer verliert. Der trotzdem zu beobachtende Zusammenhang zwischen steigenden Immobilienpreisen und lebhafter Konsumnachfrage bedeutet freilich nicht, daß sich die Wirtschaftssubjekte irrational verhalten. Er erklärt sich vielmehr daraus, daß beide Größen wesentlich von den Erwartungen über die längerfristige gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung einer Volkswirtschaft getrieben werden. Im vorliegenden Artikel steht eine einfache Erklärung der Hauspreisentwicklungen der letzten 15 Jahre in ausgewählten Industrieländern im Mittelpunkt. Ansatzpunkt zur Bestimmung des Wertes von Immobilien ist eine einfache Barwertformel zur Bestimmung des Wertes eines Vermögensguts, die von national unterschiedlichen Risikoaspekten oder einer möglichen Abhängigkeit von demographischen Entwicklungen abstrahiert. In diese Rechnung gehen für die einzelnen Länder jeweils spezifische Erwartungen ein, die sich aus den Erfahrungen der vergangenen Jahre speisen. Dabei spielen mit der Zinsentwicklung und dem längerfristigen Wachstum einer Volkswirtschaft zwei Größen eine zentrale Rolle, die auch wesentlichen Einfluß auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Güternachfrage haben.

Die Expansion der Strukturfonds in der EU ist wirtschaftlich begründet, aber auch das Ergebnis eines vielschichtigen Verhandlungsprozesses. Die politische Einflussnahme der Mitgliedsländer auf die Mittelvergabe hat sich auch in den Beitrittsverhandlungen zur Osterweiterung erneut gezeigt. Wird das Förderinstrumentarium im Zuge der Erweiterung der Union möglicherweise noch ausgebaut, wird dies zu einer politisch motivierten Aufstockung der strukturpolitischen Fonds im Finanzierungszeitraum 2007 bis 2013 führen.