This article shows that when a compensation peer firm experiences a significant failure in its say-on-pay (SOP) voting, the focal firm’s stock price is adversely affected, resulting in reduced CEO pay in the subsequent period. This pay-reduction effect is amplified when the board is more powerful, when proxy advisors express concerns about CEO pay, and when the compensation consultant lacks quality. Directors who react to the price drop and cut the CEO’s pay receive higher votes in future director elections, implying a market feedback effect for directors of the focal firm triggered by their peers’ SOP voting failure.

Exploiting the executive compensation reform for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China that enforce strict pay restrictions, this study examines whether and how pay restrictions affect firms’ labor investment inefficiency. We find that SOEs experience a decrease in abnormal labor investment following the reform relative to non-SOEs, particularly in over-investment in labor. Our results show that the reform is associated with lower labor investment inefficiency through strengthened internal governance and mitigated internal social comparison. In addition, pay restrictions specifically curb firms’ tendency to over-hire. Further analysis reveals that imposing pay restrictions on executives enhances labor quality and also promotes employee well-being. This study offers novel policy insights by showing how pay restrictions to SOE executives can reduce vertical agency costs and investment inefficiency and enhance workforce quality and well-being in weak institutional environments.

In this paper, we use granular trading data from Taiwan between 2012 and 2016 to examine how local social capital influences retail investor behavior during corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR) events. Therefore, we are responding to longstanding calls in the international finance literature to explore investor behavior in non-US markets with distinct institutional and cultural characteristics. We find that investors residing in cities with higher social capital are less likely to purchase underpriced stocks following the announcements of negative events despite the potential for positive abnormal returns. This norm-driven restraint reflects a form of socially responsible investing motivated by community-based values rather than economic rationality. By documenting this behavior in an East Asian market, we extend the external validity of social norm theories developed in Western settings and contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how localized social preferences can influence asset pricing and capital allocation in a global context.

This study examines the institutional demand for mispriced stocks with incongruent expectations implied by the book-to-market (BM) ratio and financial strength. Institutional trading (or institutional demand) is calculated by both changes in institutional ownership (percentage of shares held) and the number of institutional investors from the previous to the current quarter. Market mispricing and expectation errors in value/glamour stocks can be identified by analysing firms’ recent financial strength (measured by FSCORE). Firms are sorted into value stocks (top 30%), middle stocks (between 30% and 70%) and glamour stocks (bottom 30%) by distribution of BM ratios at the end of the previous fiscal year. Firms in the sample are then double sorted by FSCORE and BM: in each BM portfolio, firms are further classified into high-, mid- and low-FSCORE groups. Consistent with the argument of expectation errors in value/glamour stocks (Piotroski and So, 2012), institutional investors buy value stocks with strong fundamentals (underpriced) and sell glamour stocks with weak fundamentals (overpriced). Independent institutions are more likely to take advantage of the mispricing in value/glamour firms than passive institutions. Institutional trading on expectation errors could reduce the abnormal returns to mispriced stocks. Institutional trading patterns on mispriced value/glamour stocks are also documented in global markets. Our research provides new evidence that the institutional investors do exploit the BM anomalies if the mispricing can be identified by both the BM and the recent financial strength. Our study differs from Caglayan, Celiker and Sonaer (2018) as we emphasise that financial institutions, in addition to relying on only the BM values, process information from financial statements to infer firms’ financial strength. This study is also the first to document that institutional demand on mispricing could attenuate the BM anomaly.

The effects of private equity buyouts on employment, productivity, and job reallocation vary tremendously with macroeconomic and credit conditions, across private equity groups, and by type of buyout. We reach this conclusion by examining the most extensive database of U.S. buyouts ever compiled, encompassing thousands of buyout targets from 1980 to 2013 and millions of control firms. Employment shrinks 12% over two years after buyouts of publicly listed firms—on average, and relative to control firms—but expands 15% after buyouts of privately held firms. Postbuyout productivity gains at target firms are large on average and much larger yet for deals executed amid tight credit conditions. A postbuyout tightening of credit conditions or slowing of gross domestic product growth curtails employment growth and intrafirm job reallocation at target firms. We also show that buyout effects differ across the private equity groups that sponsor buyouts, and these differences persist over time at the group level. Rapid upscaling in deal flow at the group level brings lower employment growth at target firms. We relate these findings to theories of private equity that highlight agency problems at portfolio firms and within the private equity industry itself.

Das Klimaschutzgesetz (KSG) sieht eine Reduktion der deutschen Treibhausgasemissionen bis zum Jahr 2030 um 65% gegenüber den Emissionen im Jahr 1990 vor. Der Ausstieg aus der thermischen Verwertung der Kohle (vor allem der Braunkohle) leistet einen substanziellen Beitrag zum Erreichen dieser Ziele. Der Kohleausstieg stellt die Braunkohlereviere (und die Standorte der Steinkohlekraftwerke) jedoch vor strukturpolitische Herausforderungen. Um den Strukturwandel in diesen Regionen aktiv zu gestalten, hat der Bundestag im August 2020 mit Zustimmung des Bundesrats das Strukturstärkungsgesetz Kohleregionen (StStG) beschlossen. Über dieses Gesetz stellt der Bund bis zum Jahr 2038 Finanzhilfen in Höhe von 41,09 Mrd. Euro zur Verfügung. Im Fokus der Politikmaßnahmen stehen verschiedene Ziele, vor allem gesamtwirtschaftliche (Wertschöpfung, Wachstum, Steueraufkommen), wettbewerbliche (Produktivität), arbeitsmarktpolitische (Beschäftigung, Beschäftigungsstrukturen), verteilungspolitische (regionale Disparitäten) sowie klimapolitische (Treibhausgasreduzierung, Nachhaltigkeit). 

Die im StStG vorgesehenen strukturpolitischen Interventionen umfassen ein breites Maßnahmenbündel. Das Gesetz fordert eine begleitende wissenschaftliche Evaluierung des Gesetzes. Bei dem vorliegenden Bericht handelt es sich um das dritte Dokument in diesem Evaluierungszyklus. Der erste Bericht (Brachert u.a., 2023) präsentierte ein erstes Lagebild nach dem Start der im Rahmen des Investitionsgesetzes Kohleregionen (InvKG) und des STARK-Bundesprogramms geplanten Maßnahmen. Der zweite Bericht (Brachert u.a., 2025) enthielt eine Aktualisierung und erweiterte Aussagen zu den möglichen Effekten der Maßnahmen aus dem InvKG. An diesem Punkt setzt der vorliegende Zwischenbericht 2025 an. Es gehen immer mehr Maßnahmen in die Umsetzung, wodurch der Strukturwandel an Fahrt aufnimmt. Jedoch bleibt auch für diesen Bericht zu berücksichtigen, dass viele der geplanten Maßnahmen noch nicht oder gerade erst begonnen haben, was bei einer fast zwanzigjährigen Laufzeit des Programms naheliegend ist. Die in diesem Bericht vorgelegten empirischen Analysen basieren auf dem Datenstand vom 31.12.2024, also rund viereinhalb Jahre nachdem das InvKG in Kraft getreten ist.

This paper analyses whether Christian moralities and rules formed differently by Catholics and Protestants impact the likelihood of households to become overindebted. We find that over-indebtedness is lower in regions in which Catholics outweigh Protestants, indicating that Catholics‘ forgiveness culture and a stricter enforcement of rules by Protestants serve as explanations for our results. Our results provide evidence that religion affects the financial situations of individuals and show that even 500 years after the split between Catholics and Protestants, the differences in the mind-sets of both denominations play an important role for situations of severe financial conditions.