Intergenerational justice is a core principle of sustainability, yet empirical metrics on the impact of business on future generations remain scarce. Moreover, evidence suggests that different ESG scores capture distinct dimensions of corporate responsibility, highlighting the need for more targeted assessments. This study examines the relationship between corporate engagement with children’s rights and financial performance using a dataset of 1672 firm-year observations, combining a novel children’s rights benchmark with Refinitiv’s financial and sustainability metrics. Results indicate a negative association between marketplace ratings, assessing firms’ child welfare considerations in marketing, and accounting-based profitability, even when controlling for ESG subscores. However, no similar relationship emerges in stock market performance. These findings highlight potential tensions between corporate responsibility and short-term financial outcomes, emphasizing the role of regulatory frameworks and stakeholder engagement in balancing financial and social objectives.

We investigate the relationship between county-level social capital in the U.S. and asymmetric earnings timeliness (accounting conservatism). We measure social capital by the strength of civic norms and the density of social networks in a community. We find that firms headquartered in regions with higher social capital have earnings that reflect bad news more quickly than good news. Two potential mechanisms driving this connection are evident in our findings. First, the positive link between social capital and asymmetric earnings timeliness is more pronounced in firms with weaker external oversight, suggesting that social capital compensates for weaknesses in these mechanisms by discouraging managers from delaying the recognition of bad news. Second, we illustrate that firms in high social capital regions are more likely to recruit senior executives with higher asymmetric earnings timeliness coefficients. This result implies a preference for managers who adopt more conservative accounting practices. We find similar results using an international sample of firms from 21 countries. Our findings offer new insights into how local social norms influence corporate financial reporting.

We study the procurement patterns of non-listed firms and examine how these often-overlooked, yet pivotal players in global supply chains adjust their sourcing when they anticipate accountability for externalities beyond their organizational boundaries. Using granular customs data and a surprise information release about the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act, product-level regressions reveal that importing firms are 3.5 percentage points less likely to source a product from countries where the relevant production sector exhibits elevated ESG-related risks, suggesting that firms tend to cut ties with higher-risk suppliers. The effects are concentrated among firms with well-diversified supplier networks for a product and higher profitability, suggesting they have the necessary flexibility to respond quickly to anticipated regulatory pressure. Our findings suggest that mandates requiring firms to incorporate broad sustainability considerations into their operational decisions may have limits, particularly for non-listed firms.

This study examines the institutional demand for mispriced stocks with incongruent expectations implied by the book-to-market (BM) ratio and financial strength. Institutional trading (or institutional demand) is calculated by both changes in institutional ownership (percentage of shares held) and the number of institutional investors from the previous to the current quarter. Market mispricing and expectation errors in value/glamour stocks can be identified by analysing firms’ recent financial strength (measured by FSCORE). Firms are sorted into value stocks (top 30%), middle stocks (between 30% and 70%) and glamour stocks (bottom 30%) by distribution of BM ratios at the end of the previous fiscal year. Firms in the sample are then double sorted by FSCORE and BM: in each BM portfolio, firms are further classified into high-, mid- and low-FSCORE groups. Consistent with the argument of expectation errors in value/glamour stocks (Piotroski and So, 2012), institutional investors buy value stocks with strong fundamentals (underpriced) and sell glamour stocks with weak fundamentals (overpriced). Independent institutions are more likely to take advantage of the mispricing in value/glamour firms than passive institutions. Institutional trading on expectation errors could reduce the abnormal returns to mispriced stocks. Institutional trading patterns on mispriced value/glamour stocks are also documented in global markets. Our research provides new evidence that the institutional investors do exploit the BM anomalies if the mispricing can be identified by both the BM and the recent financial strength. Our study differs from Caglayan, Celiker and Sonaer (2018) as we emphasise that financial institutions, in addition to relying on only the BM values, process information from financial statements to infer firms’ financial strength. This study is also the first to document that institutional demand on mispricing could attenuate the BM anomaly.

This paper introduces a novel measure to quantify firms’ sensitivity to shifts in bilateral trade flows between the United States and its trading partners. We exploit the 2016 U.S. presidential election as an exogenous shock to trade policy expectations and assess the stock market reactions of firms across 52 countries. Our findings indicate that firms with higher trade policy sensitivity experienced significantly more negative stock returns surrounding the election. These results are robust to variations in event windows, return model specifications, and alternative estimations of trade policy sensitivity.

We exploit an information shock related to the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act and use detailed customs data to analyze how smaller, non-listed firms respond when expecting accountability for externalities beyond their organizational boundaries. Product-level regressions reveal a substantial reduction in imports from high ESG-risk production sectors. Adjustments occur mainly at the extensive margin, indicating that firms cut ties with high-risk suppliers. The product-level results translate into meaningful changes in overall international procurement for firms with Big Four auditors. Our findings suggest potential limits to mandates requiring firms to integrate broad sustainability considerations into operational decisions.

We provide evidence for a psychological component of inflation concerns. Higher inflation concerns relate in a positive and significant way to respondents’ reported levels of concerns about their financial situation. Results hold when controlling for income and financial constraints.

This paper examines the impact of complex yet precise language, particularly financial jargon, on information dissemination and ultimately market efficiency. As a natural laboratory, we analyze the information exchanged during earnings conference calls, where we instrument jargon with the Plain Writing Act of 2010. Our findings suggest that the Act‘s promotion of plain language usage results in a reduction in complex financial jargon for US firms. However, in contrast to the presumed benefits of accessible language, this reduction in jargon is associated with a decrease in market efficiency, implying that the Act may inadvertently hinder information flow. This finding is particularly important at the juncture where human-generated information is received by machines, which are known to be vunerable to ambiguous inputs.

Does information leakage in a target's social networks increase its stock price prior to a merger announcement? Evidence reveals that a target with more social connections indeed experiences a higher pre-announcement price run-up. This effect does not exist during or after the merger announcement, or in windows ending two months before the announcement. It is more pronounced among targets with severe asymmetric information, and weaker when the information about the upcoming merger is publicly available prior to the announcement. It is also weaker in expedited deals such as tender offers.