Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm’s CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms’ performance.

This paper examines how firms’ exposure to supply chain disruptions (SCD) affects firm outcomes in the European Union (EU). Exploiting heterogeneous responses to workplace closures imposed by sourcing countries during the pandemic as a shock to SCD, we provide empirical evidence that firms in industries relying more heavily on foreign inputs experience a significant decline in sales compared to other firms. We document that external finance, particularly bank financing, plays a critical role in mitigating the effects of SCD. Furthermore, we highlight the unique importance of bank loans for small and solvent firms. Our findings also indicate that highly diversified firms and those sourcing inputs from less distant partners are less vulnerable to SCD.

Competition in the U.S. appears to have declined. One contributing factor may have been heterogeneity in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. I examine the impact of product market peer credit constraints on long-run competitive outcomes and behavior among non-financial firms. I use measures of lender exposure to the financial crisis to create a plausibly exogenous instrument for product market credit availability. I find that credit constraints of product market peers positively predict growth in sales, market share, profitability, and markups. This is consistent with the notion that firms gained at the expense of their credit constrained peers. The relationship is robust to accounting for other sources of inter-firm spillovers, namely credit access of technology network and supply chain peers. Further, I find evidence of strategic investment, i.e. the idea that firms increase investment in response to peer credit constraints to commit to deter entry mobility. This behavior may explain why temporary heterogeneity in the availability of credit appears to have resulted in a persistent redistribution of output across firms.

This paper provides new evidence of herding due to non- and fundamental information in global equity markets. Using quantile regressions applied to daily data for 33 countries, we investigate herding during the Eurozone crisis, China’s market crash in 2015–2016, in the aftermath of the Brexit vote and during the Covid-19 Pandemic. We find significant evidence of herding driven by non-fundamental information in case of negative tail market conditions for most countries. This study also investigates the relationship between herding and systemic risk, suggesting that herding due to fundamentals increases when systemic risk increases more than when driven by non-fundamentals. Granger causality tests and Johansen’s vector error-correction model provide solid empirical evidence of a strong interrelationship between herding and systemic risk, entailing that herding behavior may be an ex-ante aspect of systemic risk, with a more relevant role played by herding based on fundamental information in increasing systemic risk.