Using an extensive global sample, this paper investigates the impact of the term structure of interest rates on bank equity returns. Decomposing the yield curve to its three constituents (level, slope and curvature), the paper evaluates the time-varying sensitivity of the bank’s equity returns to these constituents by using a diagonal dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH framework. Evidence reveals that the empirical proxies for the three factors explain the variations in equity returns above and beyond the market-wide effect. More specifically, shocks to the long-term (level) and short-term (slope) factors have a statistically significant impact on equity returns, while those on the medium-term (curvature) factor are less clear-cut. Bank size plays an important role in the sense that exposures are higher for SIFIs and large banks compared to medium and small banks. Moreover, banks exhibit greater sensitivities to all risk factors during the crisis and postcrisis periods compared to the pre-crisis period; though these sensitivities do not differ for market-oriented and bank-oriented financial systems.

Starting from well-known empirical stylized facts of financial time series, we develop dynamic portfolio protection trading strategies based on econometric methods. As a criterion for riskiness, we consider the evolution of the value-at-risk spread from a GARCH model with normal innovations relative to a GARCH model with generalized innovations. These generalized innovations may for example follow a Student t, a generalized hyperbolic, an alpha-stable or a Generalized Pareto distribution (GPD). Our results indicate that the GPD distribution provides the strongest signals for avoiding tail risks. This is not surprising as the GPD distribution arises as a limit of tail behaviour in extreme value theory and therefore is especially suited to deal with tail risks. Out-of-sample backtests on 11 years of DAX futures data, indicate that the dynamic tail-risk protection strategy effectively reduces the tail risk while outperforming traditional portfolio protection strategies. The results are further validated by calculating the statistical significance of the results obtained using bootstrap methods. A number of robustness tests including application to other assets further underline the effectiveness of the strategy. Finally, by empirically testing for second-order stochastic dominance, we find that risk averse investors would be willing to pay a positive premium to move from a static buy-and-hold investment in the DAX future to the tail-risk protection strategy.

This study deals with the question whether the central banks of Sweden, Denmark and the UK can really influence short-term money markets and thus, would lose this influence in case of Euro adoption. We use a GARCH-M-GED model with daily money market rates. The model reveals the co-movement between the Euribor and the shortterm interest rates in these three countries. A high degree of co-movement might be seen as an argument for a weak impact of the central bank on its money markets. But this argument might only hold for tranquil times. Our approach reveals, in addition, whether there is a specific reaction of the money markets in turbulent times. Our finding is that the policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has indeed a significant impact on the three money market rates, and there is no specific benefit for these countries to stay outside the Euro area. However, the GARCH-M-GED model further reveals risk divergence and unstable volatilities of risk in the case of adverse monetary shocks to the economy for Sweden and Denmark, compared to the Euro area. We conclude that the danger of adverse monetary developments cannot be addressed by a common monetary

policy for these both countries, and this can be seen as an argument to stay outside the Euro area.

Der Vorschlag des Chefvolkswirts des Internationalen Währungsfonds, Olivier Blanchard, das Inflationsziel auf vier Prozent anzuheben, hat eine lebhafte Debatte über die angemessene Höhe der Zielinflationsrate entfacht. Dabei ist keineswegs offensichtlich, dass der durch höhere Inflationsraten größere Spielraum in Bezug auf Leitzinssenkungen in Krisenzeiten auch zu einem volkswirtschaftlichen Mehrwert führt. Insbesondere sind die mit einer höheren Inflationsrate einhergehenden volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten nicht zu vernachlässigen. So ist zum Beispiel die Variabilität der relativen Preise tendenziell umso größer, je höher die Inflationsrate ist. Dadurch wird die Signal-und Lenkungsfunktion relativer Preisänderungen beeinträchtigt, und dies hat negative Folgen für die effiziente Allokation von Ressourcen. Diese Studie untersucht im Rahmen einer empirischen Analyse den Einfluss der Inflation auf die Schwankungen der relativen Preise für den Euroraum. Sie kann einen signifikanten positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Inflation und Variabilität der relativen Preise feststellen. Damit liefert sie empirische Evidenz für einen störenden Einfluss von Inflation auf die relativen Preise und folglich für negative realwirtschaftliche Effekte von Inflation. Die Ergebnisse sprechen für eine Geldpolitik moderater Inflationsraten.

We argue that a “static“ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not conducive to assessing stability of financial systems in euro-candidate countries. Instead, we advocate a dynamic approach to assessing interest rate convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001-January 22, 2009, sample period. Our results show a varied degree of the relationship between domestic and eurozone sovereign bond yields, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. We find some divergence of relative bond yields since the EU accession.

We advocate a dynamic approach to monetary convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001 untill January 22, 2009 sample period. Our results show a varied degree of bond yield co-movements, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. However, since the EU accession, we find some divergence of relative bond yields. We argue that a ‘static’ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not fully conducive for advancing stability of financial systems in the euro-candidate countries.

Die vorliegende Studie schlägt einen neuen analytischen Ansatz zur Beurteilung nominaler Konvergenzprozesse in der EU vor. Dieser Ansatz wird auf eines der Maastricht-Kriterien für die Aufnahme eines neuen EU-Mitglieds in die Eurozone angewendet, nämlich die Zinssätze auf langfristige Staatspapiere, gemessen hier als deren Renditen. Das Argument lautet, dass die Dynamik der Renditen Informationen über versteckte Risiken der Zinskonvergenz enthält, die sich durch angemessene ökonometrische Methoden aufdecken lassen. Diese Risiken können selbst dann zutage treten, wenn ein Land das eigentliche Konvergenzkriterium erfüllt hat und dem Euroraum beigetreten ist. Die Risiken der Zinsentwicklung werden von Schwächen der Finanzsysteme der Länder und ihrer makroökonomischen Fundamentaldaten bestimmt. Daraus ist zu schließen, dass eine Betrachtung lediglich der politisch gesetzten Konvergenzkriterien das Risiko von Fehleinschätzungen beinhaltet. Schließlich erlaubt die hier verwendete Methode auch eine Beurteilung der potenziellen Ansteckungseffekte für die Finanz- und Fiskalsysteme durch die gegenwärtige globale Finanzkrise. Die Analyse verdeutlicht, dass bis auf die Slowakei alle untersuchten Länder auf dem Weg zur Euro-Übernahme keine wichtigen Fortschritte hinsichtlich der Reduzierung systemischer Risiken gezeigt haben, sodass nach einer Übernahme des Euro (Slowenien und die Slowakei haben ihn bereits übernommen) eine große Instabilität der Risikoaufschläge zu erwarten ist.