On September 25th, financial economists from all over the world travelled for the 11th time to Halle (Saale) to attend the annual FIN-FIRE Workshop at IWH. During two days, authors of ten papers covered a comprehensive overview of contemporary issues that pose potential challenges to the financial system, including data privacy in mortgage markets, climate risks in bond markets, synthetic risk transfers, the effects of geopolitical risks for lending, as well as granular perspectives on the transmission of monetary policy. An intense exchange of thoughts between authors, discussants, and the audience yielded genuinely new insights into the resilience and fragility of financial systems. 

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.

We study real estate lending responses to tighter macroprudential policy (MPP) in the form of lower required loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. Contract details of 2.4 million mortgage loans originated between 2008 and 2020 reveal significantly fewer new loan issuances in response to contractionary MPP, commensurate with an average reduction in aggregate lending of 21 percent. Loan-level analyses reveal, however, that banks comply with lower LTVs by systematically more benevolent valuations of residential real estate pledged as collateral instead of reducing loan size. Exploiting earthquakes as plausible exogenous shocks to property values corroborates these risk-shifting patterns by banks in the form of inflated property valuations after LTV shocks.

This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.

Our results reveal that higher lending spreads between foreign and home markets redirect real estate backed lending towards foreign markets offering a higher interest rate, which provides evidence for "search for yield" behavior. This re-allocation is found especially for banks with more expertise on the foreign market due to a higher local activity and holds for commercial and residential real estate backed loans. Furthermore, "search for yield" behavior and a resulting increase in foreign real estate backed lending is found when macroprudential regulation is missing or misaligned between a bank’s country of residence and the destination country. When turning to the question of whether the detected search for yield behavior results in more risk, we find that especially better capitalized banks report higher forbearance ratios as they might face less stigma effects compared to low capitalized banks.