We study the impact of stricter and more harmonized banking regulation along the income distribution using household survey data for 25 EU countries. Exploiting country-level heterogeneity in the implementation of European Banking Union directives allows us to control for confounders and identify effects. Our results show that these regulatory reforms aimed at increasing financial system resilience affect households heterogeneously and result in a widening of the income distribution. These results are dependent on a country’s ex-ante regulatory stringency, and more pronounced in countries with stronger bank dependence. Furthermore, we find that more stringent regulation reduces income growth for low-income households primarily due to exits from employment, whereas affluent households tend to experience increased growth rates for employee and self-employed income.

On September 25th, financial economists from all over the world travelled for the 11th time to Halle (Saale) to attend the annual FIN-FIRE Workshop at IWH. During two days, authors of ten papers covered a comprehensive overview of contemporary issues that pose potential challenges to the financial system, including data privacy in mortgage markets, climate risks in bond markets, synthetic risk transfers, the effects of geopolitical risks for lending, as well as granular perspectives on the transmission of monetary policy. An intense exchange of thoughts between authors, discussants, and the audience yielded genuinely new insights into the resilience and fragility of financial systems. 

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon transition risk, we find that banks engage in regulatory arbitrage and use brown loan securitization to manage their exposure to carbon transition risk. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon transition risk is high but keep these loans on their balance sheets when the risk is reduced. In addition, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among banks with low levels of capitalization, domestic banks, and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies.

We investigate how a state's political corruption affects a resident firm's debt contracting and how a change in anti-corruption regulation alters the relation between corruption and loan contracting. Firms in more corrupt states are associated with significantly higher loan spreads and tighter loan covenants than firms in less corrupt states. Furthermore, the passage of the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing provision amplifies the conhcerns of banks about the detrimental impact of corruption due to the increased exposure of firms to whistleblowing threats. The detrimental impact of corruption is further amplified when a state has a higher level of whistleblowing involvement, when firms are located in more corrupt states or closer to the SEC office, and when the bank's state is less corrupt than the firm's state. In general, we document the externality of corruption in the debt financing of firms and the response of banks to changes in regulation.