We study how idiosyncratic income risk shapes the aggregate and distributional effects of labor and capital income taxation in dynamic general equilibrium models. To this end, we compare a heterogeneous-agent (HA) model with uninsurable idiosyncratic labor productivity risk and a ten-representative-agent (TE) model in which households correspond to fixed wealth deciles without such risk. At the aggregate level, both models generate qualitatively similar responses; however, the HA model exhibits a smaller recessionary impact driven by precautionary savings behavior, which stabilizes investment. At the distributional level, the models differ sharply. In the HA framework, tax shocks trigger endogenous mobility across wealth deciles. These inter-decile transition dynamics tend to benefit lower deciles. In contrast, the TA model features fixed household positions. Our findings highlight that while simpler multi-representative-agent models can approximate aggregate dynamics well, they may miss important distributional adjustment channels. The relevance of these mechanisms ultimately depends on the empirical importance of mobility across the wealth distribution, pointing to a key trade-off between model simplicity and accuracy.

This study provides new evidence on the impact of the EU Cohesion Policy on income growth in less developed regions. Our panel includes data from all European regions for the years 1989-2020. Using a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design, we model treatment dynamics by applying a random effects estimator. Based on digitized historical data, we precisely replicate the policy rule and correctly classify the regions’ eligibility status. Results show that the policy has a moderate positive effect on GDP per capita growth in the targeted regions.

This paper examines the macroeconomic and distributional effects of the European Union’s transition to Net Zero emissions through a gradually increasing carbon tax. I develop a New Keynesian Environmental DSGE model with two household types and distinct energy and non-energy sectors. Five alternative uses of carbon tax revenues are considered: equal transfers to households, targeted transfers to Hand-to-Mouth households, subsidies to green energy firms, and reductions in labor and capital income taxes. In the absence of technological progress, the carbon tax policy induces a persistent increase in energy prices and a reduction in GDP, investment, and consumption. Headline inflation falls below zero in the medium run, reflecting weaker aggregate demand. Distributional outcomes vary significantly depending on the implemented revenue recycling scheme: targeted transfers are the most progressive but entail larger macroeconomic costs, while subsidies and tax cuts mitigate output and investment losses but are less effective in narrowing the consumption gap. A limited foresight scenario, in which agents learn about policy targets sequentially, generates more volatile adjustment paths and temporary inflationary spikes around announcements, but long-run outcomes remain close to the baseline.

Vietnam, a lower-middle-income economy, faces severe climate risks from heat waves, sea-level rise, and tropical cyclones, which are expected to intensify under ongoing global warming. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we analyze economic transition dynamics from 2015 to 2100, incorporating heat-induced labor productivity losses, agricultural land loss, and cyclone-related property damage. We compare a Paris-compatible scenario limiting warming to below 2 °C with a high-emission scenario reaching 4–5 °C. While output and investment impacts remain highly uncertain and statistically indistinguishable across scenarios until 2100, consumption losses are significantly larger under high emissions, mainly driven by heat-related productivity declines, with cyclones contributing most to uncertainty. These findings underscore the importance of considering multiple impact channels beyond output damages in climate-development research.

We study the corporate-loan pricing decisions of a major, systemic bank during the Greek financial crisis. A unique aspect of our data set is that we observe both the actual interest rate and the “break-even rate” (BE rate) of each loan, as computed by the bank’s own loan-pricing department (in effect, the loan’s marginal cost). We document that low-BE-rate (safer) borrowers are charged significant markups, whereas high-BE-rate (riskier) borrowers are charged smaller and even negative markups. We rationalize this de facto cross-subsidization through the lens of a dynamic model featuring depressed collateral values, impaired capital-market access, and limit pricing.