We examine the effects of the big five personalities of CEOs (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) on their annual compensation. We hand-collect the tweets of S&P 1500 CEOs and use IBM's Watson Personality Insights to measure their personalities. CEOs with high ratings of agreeableness and conscientiousness get more compensation. We further find that the firms with these CEOs outperform their peers due to better investment efficiency. Firms are willing to pay higher compensation for talent, especially for firms with better operations, located in states with higher labor unionization, or facing higher competition in the product market. Overall, CEO personality is a valid predictor of CEOs' compensation.

This paper examines the impact of complex yet precise language, particularly financial jargon, on information dissemination and ultimately market efficiency. As a natural laboratory, we analyze the information exchanged during earnings conference calls, where we instrument jargon with the Plain Writing Act of 2010. Our findings suggest that the Act‘s promotion of plain language usage results in a reduction in complex financial jargon for US firms. However, in contrast to the presumed benefits of accessible language, this reduction in jargon is associated with a decrease in market efficiency, implying that the Act may inadvertently hinder information flow. This finding is particularly important at the juncture where human-generated information is received by machines, which are known to be vunerable to ambiguous inputs.

We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.

Die grüne Transformation, verstanden als ein Prozess, Energie zunehmend treibhausgasneutral zu erzeugen, kann mit marktwirtschaftlichen Instrumenten und dafür erforderlichen Rahmenbedingungen kostengünstiger umgesetzt werden als mit staatlicher Steuerung des Energieverbrauchs und der Energieerzeugung. Kosteneffizienz ist von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Bereitschaft und Fähigkeit der Bevölkerung, die Lasten der Transformation zu tragen, und für eine gerechte Verteilung der Lasten.

Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.