Regional economic conditions are well-established determinants of the geography of political resentment. However, regions are not homogeneous, and the mechanisms through which local economies affect individual political attitudes are unclear. We argue that feelings of relative deprivation are shaped by how personal prospects are tied to regional conditions, and that the interaction between subjective individual and regional deprivation affects perceptions of shared struggle and systemic unfairness. Through a large-scale survey experiment in Britain addressing geographical self-selection, we provide causal evidence that poor individuals in poor regions express political resentment, whereas in affluent regions the political attitudes of poor and wealthy individuals are indistinguishable. Our findings stress 1) the importance of egocentric mechanisms whereby local economies shape individual prospects; 2) the significance of subjective beliefs over objective information on deprivation; 3) the mobilization potential of highlighting regional deprivation by political entrepreneurs; 4) the relevance of place-based policies to mitigate political discontent.

How does immigration affect support for redistribution? While most research focuses on overall tax and spending levels, we investigate how immigration influences preferences conditional on tax structures. Using two original survey experiments in the UK, we find that low- and middle-income respondents are more likely to support redistribution to immigrants under progressive systems shielding them from fiscal costs, but oppose redistribution when immigrants are identified as beneficiaries and the tax structure increases their fiscal burden. In contrast, high-income respondents' preferences are largely unaffected by either tax structure or immigrant inclusion. These findings suggest that progressive taxation (1) is a viable revenue-generating strategy without provoking major political backlash; (2) reduces native resistance to immigrant welfare inclusion; (3) helps explain puzzling variation in immigration's effects on welfare attitudes; and (4) clarifies why low- and middle-income groups sometimes reject generous welfare programs despite standing to benefit. Our results highlight the importance of institutional design in shaping how economic self-interest and immigration concerns interact.

Using the adoption of Zombie Property Laws (ZL) across several US states, we show that requiring lenders to maintain properties in the foreclosure process affects mortgage lending decisions and standards. Difference-in-differences estimations using a state border design show that ZL incentivizes lenders to screen mortgage applications more carefully: they deny more applications and impose higher interest rates on originated loans, especially risky loans. In turn, these loans exhibit higher ex post performance. ZL also affects lender behavior after borrowers become distressed, causing them to strategically keep delinquent mortgages alive. Our findings inform the debate on policy responses to foreclosure crises.

We study the interaction of expansionary rate-based monetary policy and quantitative easing, despite their concurrent implementation, by exploiting heterogeneous banks and the introduction of negative monetary-policy rates in a fragmented euro area. Quantitative easing increases credit supply less, translating into weaker employment growth, when banks’ funding costs do not decrease. Using administrative data from Germany, we uncover that among banks selling their securities, central-bank reserves remain disproportionately with high-deposit banks that are constrained due to sticky customer deposits at the zero lower bound. Affected German banks lend relatively less to firms while increasing their interbank exposure in the euro area.

Exploiting the heteroskedasticity of the changes in short-term and long-term interest rates and exchange rates around the FOMC announcement, we identify three structural monetary policy shocks. We eliminate the predictable part of the shocks and study their effects on financial variables and macro variables. The first shock resembles a conventional monetary policy shock, and the second resembles an unconventional monetary shock. The third shock leads to an increase in interest rates, stock prices, industrial production, consumer prices, and commodity prices. At the same time, the excess bond premium and uncertainty decrease, and the U.S. dollar depreciates. Therefore, this third shock combines all the characteristics of a central bank information shock.

Get access Abstract This study examines how changes in state corporate tax rates affect corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance among U.S. firms. Using staggered state-level tax reforms and a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, we identify an asymmetric causal effect: tax cuts significantly enhance CSR performance by reducing concerns, whereas tax increases only marginally weaken CSR strengths. Drawing primarily on signaling theory, complemented by slack resource and stakeholder perspectives, we argue that tax cuts expand financial slack, enabling firms to use CSR as a positive signal of financial strength, long-term orientation, and responsible use of tax savings. In contrast, firms avoid cutting CSR significantly after tax hikes to prevent negative signaling. In support of the theories, our heterogeneity analyses show that these effects are stronger among financially constrained firms and are concentrated in material CSR issues that are financially relevant to investors. A domain-level analysis further reveals that tax increases reduce environmental strengths, while tax cuts lower concerns related to employee relations, diversity, and environmental practices. These findings highlight how tax policy shapes CSR through its impact on financial flexibility and stakeholder expectation, offering implications for corporate strategy and public policy.

We study how individuals' perceptions of current and future levels of income inequality change during periods of expansionary fiscal policy. In a randomized controlled trial (RCT), we provide information on fiscal expansion to a representative sample of the German population. Our findings reveal that combining a fact-based (numerical) information treatment with a narrative treatment about fiscal expansion plans reduces inequality expectations among respondents who are ex-ante dissatisfied with the government's economic policy. These effects are more pronounced among respondents without a college degree or with low political interest, highlighting the importance of narrative information for individuals who are likely to benefit most from it. We explore potential mechanisms by examining revisions in macro- and micro-level assessments of future economic conditions and find that respondents primarily update their expectations regarding economic growth and individual layoff risk.