Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat mit dem Securities Markets Programme (SMP) im Mai 2010 ein Instrument unkonventioneller Geldpolitik eingeführt. Im Rahmen des SMP erwarb sie im Wert von 218 Mrd. Euro Staatsanleihen ausgewählter Länder, welche erhöhten Risikoaufschlägen am Kapitalmarkt ausgesetzt waren. Eine mögliche Nebenwirkung solcher Ankaufprogramme ist es, auch jene Banken zu stützen, die nicht zum direkten Adressatenkreis gehören, aber Anleihen betroffener Länder in ihren Portfolios hielten. Möglicherweise resultierende Refinanzierungs-, Ertrags-, und Liquiditätsvorteile für bevorteilte Banken könnten zu Wettbewerbsverzerrungen führen. Dieser Beitrag betrachtet deshalb die Wertpapierportfolios regionaler deutscher Banken, um den kausalen Effekt des SMP auf das Wettbewerbsverhalten zu identifizieren. Die empirischen Befunde belegen in der Tat eine statistisch nachweisbare Zunahme der lokalen Marktanteile jener regionalen Banken, welche Anleihen in ihren Portfolios hielten, die Teil des SMP waren. Während dieses Ergebnis somit einen Beleg für die Existenz unbeabsichtigter Nebenwirkungen unkonventioneller Geldpolitik darstellt, so ist auch festzuhalten dass diese Wettbewerbseffekte ausgesprochen klein sind. Somit ist zumindest für den regionalen Bankenmarkt in Deutschland keine nennenswerte Verwerfung aufgrund dieses Ankaufprogramms festzustellen.

We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is compensated with salary, equity and inside debt. We seek to understand the joint implications of this compensation package for managerial risk-taking incentives and credit spreads. We show that the size and seniority of inside debt not only are crucial for the relation between inside debt and credit spreads but also play an important role in shaping the relation between equity compensation and credit spreads. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions.

We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and dif-ferent compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt. We show that credit spreads are increasing in equity incentives. This relation becomes stronger as the seniority of inside debt increases. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap (CDS) contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model’s predictions.

Membership in a currency union is not irreversible. Exit expectations may emerge during sovereign debt crises, because exit allows countries to reduce their liabilities through a currency redenomination. As market participants anticipate this possibility, sovereign debt crises intensify. We establish this formally within a small open economy model of changing policy regimes. The model permits explosive dynamics of debt and sovereign yields inside currency unions and allows us to distinguish between exit expectations and those of an outright default. By estimating the model on Greek data, we quantify the contribution of exit expectations to the crisis dynamics during 2009 to 2012.

We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.