We study the effects of Tax Authority (IRS) attention on a firm’s financial reporting. We explore whether firms institute a higher degree of accounting conservatism in response to IRS monitoring. Using data on IRS acquisition of public firms’ 10-K financial disclosures to proxy for IRS attention, we find that when firms are under IRS attention, they tend to initiate higher levels of unconditional and, to some extent, conditional accounting conservatism. We alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns by using pre- and post-IRS attention environments between the treated group (firms with IRS attention) and a propensity score that matches the control group of firms (no IRS attention). These results withstand several robustness tests and subsample analyses.

This study investigates the impact of inaccurate assumptions on economic forecast precision. We construct a new dataset comprising an unbalanced panel of annual German GDP forecasts from various institutions, taking into account their underlying assumptions. We explicitly control for different forecast horizons to reflect the information available at the time of release. Our analysis reveals that approximately 75% of the variation in squared forecast errors can be attributed to the variation in squared errors of the initial assumptions. This finding emphasizes the importance of accurate assumptions in economic forecasting and suggests that forecasters should transparently disclose their assumptions to enhance the usefulness of their forecasts in shaping effective policy recommendations.

Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm’s CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms’ performance.