We study real estate lending responses to tighter macroprudential policy (MPP) in the form of lower required loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. Contract details of 2.4 million mortgage loans originated between 2008 and 2020 reveal significantly fewer new loan issuances in response to contractionary MPP, commensurate with an average reduction in aggregate lending of 21 percent. Loan-level analyses reveal, however, that banks comply with lower LTVs by systematically more benevolent valuations of residential real estate pledged as collateral instead of reducing loan size. Exploiting earthquakes as plausible exogenous shocks to property values corroborates these risk-shifting patterns by banks in the form of inflated property valuations after LTV shocks.

Banks have been operating in a low interest rate environment paired with booming housing markets. For the largest banks in the euro area and the period 2015-2022, we assess whether banks reallocate their foreign loan portfolio backed by real estate as a response to differences in local lending spreads across the home and destination country and conditional on reduced information frictions due to borrowing-country exposures. The main result is that the relative share of foreign real estate backed lending increases in case of return opportunities, and this sensitivity depends on local exposures towards the borrowing country. The result is driven by subsamples for which neither the home nor the borrowing country have implemented macroprudential regulation targeting real estate lending, or for which there is a misalignment in macroprudential policies. Nevertheless, we find limited evidence that the riskiness of real estate backed loans goes up during our sample period, and we discuss potential reasons for this result including the possibility of hidden losses.

We examine whether liquidity dynamics within banking groups matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using matched bank headquarters-branch data for identification, we find a lending channel of reserve requirements for municipal branches whose headquarters are more exposed to the policy tool. The result is driven by the 2008–2009 crisis and is stronger for state-owned branches, especially when being less profitable and liquidity constrained. These findings suggest the presence of cross-regional distributional effects of macroprudential policies operating via internal capital markets.

The unexpected shock represented by the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the importance of building robust macroprudential frameworks to increase countries’ resilience against sudden disruptions in financial markets. By now, a widespread opinion among commentators and policy makers is that the macroprudential frameworks that were implemented over the past decades were effective in moderating market stress, a view supported by ample evidence on the effectiveness of macroprudential policies.

Finance has seen a spectacular growth in innovation and internationalization during the 20th century (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Shiller, 2013), resulting in a complex and highly interconnected network of financial entities spanning across jurisdictions (Allen and Gale, 1994; Popov and Udell, 2012). Meanwhile the challenges grow for policymakers to provide a framework which allows for the operation of a stable finan- cial system within their jurisdiction (Merton, 1995; Allen and Gale, 2000; Morrison and White, 2009; Ongena et al., 2013). The global financial crisis highlights that se- vere disruptions in the financial sector spread across jurisdictions (Wiggins and Met- rick, 2015) and can have large negative effects on the real economy (Chodorow-Reich, 2013). To contain systemic risk and contagion in the globalized financial system, sev- eral changes have been applied to the regulatory framework of international financial markets (G20, 2009). Regulatory efforts encompass among others the implementa- tion of macroprudential policies and the introduction of mandatory central clearing of derivatives. This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of differential effects of financial policy reforms depending on the characteristics of the regulated financial entities and networks.

The global financial crisis in 2007-2009 exposed the absence of adequate regulation within the banking sector which had built up an excessive amount of on- and off-balance sheet leverage and had neglected basic principles of liquidity risk management (Acharya and Richardson, 2009, Adrian and Shin, 2010, Goodhart, 2008). As a response, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision presented a revised and augmented regulatory framework. Since the financial crisis had demonstrated that microprudential regulation is not sufficient in safeguarding financial stability, the regulators put an emphasizes on macroprudential policies to improve the resilience of the financial sector. Key reforms in this respect are the tightening of capital requirements and the introduction of uniform liquidity requirements (BCBS, 2010).

Reserve requirements, as a tool of macroprudential policy, have been increasingly employed since the outbreak of the great financial crisis. We conduct an analysis of the effect of reserve requirements in tranquil and crisis times on long-run growth rates of GDP per capita and credit (%GDP) making use of Bayesian model averaging methods. Regulation has on average a negative effect on GDP in tranquil times, which is only partly offset by a positive (but not robust effect) in crisis times. Credit over GDP is positively affected by higher requirements in the longer run.