I estimate management opposition to unions in terms of hiring discrimination in the German labor market. By sending 13,000 fictitious job applications, revealing union membership in the CV and pro-union sentiment via social media accounts, I provide evidence for hiring discrimination against union supporters. Callback rates are on average 15% lower for union members. Discrimination is strongest in the presence of a high sectoral share of union members and large firm size. I further explore variation in regional and sectoral strike intensity over time and find suggestive evidence that discrimination increases if a sector is exposed to an intense strike. Discrimination is positively associated with the sectoral share of firms that voluntarily orientate wages to collective agreements. These results indicate that hiring discrimination can be explained by union threat effects.

We estimate the effects of worker voice on productivity, job quality, and separations. We study the 1991 introduction of a right to worker representation on boards or advisory councils in Finnish firms with at least 150 employees, designed primarily to facilitate workforce-management communication. Consistent with information sharing theories, our difference-in-differences design reveals that worker voice slightly raised labor productivity, firm survival, and capital intensity. In contrast to the exit-voice theory, we find no effects on voluntary job separations, and at most small positive effects on other measures of job quality. A 2008 introduction of shop-floor representation had similarly limited effects.

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are sensitive to borrowers’ carbon footprints. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon risk is high but swiftly change to keep these loans on their balance sheets when carbon risk is reduced after Trump’s election. Importantly, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among domestic banks and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies through reducing banks’ incentives to price carbon risk.

Der Einsatz von Robotern verändert die Arbeitswelt grundlegend – doch welche spezifischen Effekte hat dies auf die Beschäftigungsstruktur? Unsere Analyse untersucht die Folgen des Robotereinsatzes anhand neuartiger Mikrodaten aus deutschen Industriebetrieben. Diese Daten verknüpfen Informationen zum Robotereinsatz mit Sozialversicherungsdaten und detaillierten Angaben zu Arbeitsaufgaben. Auf Basis eines theoretischen Modells leiten wir insbesondere positive Beschäftigungseffekte für Berufe mit wenig repetitiven, programmierbaren Aufgaben ab, sowie für jüngere Arbeitskräfte, weil diese sich besser an technologische Veränderungen anpassen können. Die empirische, mikroökonomische Analyse des Robotereinsatzes auf Betriebsebene bestätigt diese Vorhersagen: Die Beschäftigung steigt für Techniker, Ingenieure und Manager und junge Beschäftigte, während sie bei geringqualifizierten Routineberufen sowie bei Älteren stagniert. Zudem steigt die Fluktuation bei geringqualifizierten Arbeitskräften signifikant an. Unsere Ergebnisse verdeutlichen, dass der Verdrängungseffekt von Robotern berufsabhängig ist, während junge Arbeitskräfte neue Tätigkeiten übernehmen.

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

This paper examines the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and tax–motivated income shifting. Using a profit–shifting measure estimated from multinational enterprises (MNEs) data, we find that parent firms with higher CSR scores shift significantly more profits to their low-tax foreign subsidiaries. Overall, our evidence suggests that MNEs engaging in CSR activities acquire legitimacy and moral capital that temper negative responses by stakeholders and thus have greater scope and chance to engage in unethical profit-shifting activities, consistent with the legitimacy theory.