How does immigration affect support for redistribution? While most research focuses on overall tax and spending levels, we investigate how immigration influences preferences conditional on tax structures. Using two original survey experiments in the UK, we find that low- and middle-income respondents are more likely to support redistribution to immigrants under progressive systems shielding them from fiscal costs, but oppose redistribution when immigrants are identified as beneficiaries and the tax structure increases their fiscal burden. In contrast, high-income respondents' preferences are largely unaffected by either tax structure or immigrant inclusion. These findings suggest that progressive taxation (1) is a viable revenue-generating strategy without provoking major political backlash; (2) reduces native resistance to immigrant welfare inclusion; (3) helps explain puzzling variation in immigration's effects on welfare attitudes; and (4) clarifies why low- and middle-income groups sometimes reject generous welfare programs despite standing to benefit. Our results highlight the importance of institutional design in shaping how economic self-interest and immigration concerns interact.

Vietnam, a low middle-income economy, grapples with considerable climate impacts, primarily driven by heat waves, sea level rise, and tropical cyclones. Under ongoing global warming, these extreme weather events are projected to further intensify. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to study economic transition dynamics from 2015 to 2100, accounting for heat-induced labor productivity losses, agricultural land loss from sea level rise, and residential property damage from tropical cyclones. We compare a Paris-compatible strong mitigation scenario where global warming is limited to well below 2 °C above preindustrial levels to a strong emission scenario where warming reaches 4–5 °C. We find that the impacts of climate change on output and investment are highly uncertain, with differences between the two emission scenarios remaining statistically insignificant until the end of the century, despite substantially higher climate forcing in the latter. By contrast, consumption losses are significantly larger under the high emission scenario. These negative impacts are primarily driven by heat-induced labor productivity losses, while TCs are the main source of uncertainty. Our findings highlight the need for analytical frameworks to capture the different channels through which climate and climate change affect economic development, rather than focusing mainly on output-related damage, as done in many existing studies.

More individualistic countries experience higher economic growth. We provide evidence for a human-capital-based explanation of the growth effects of individualism. Using data from the largest international adult skill assessment, we establish that individualism shapes human capital formation. We identify the effects of individualism by exploiting variation between migrants at the origin-country, origin-language, and person level. Migrants from more individualistic cultures have higher cognitive skills and larger skill gains over time. They also invest more in their skills over the life cycle, as they acquire more years of schooling and are more likely to participate in adult education activities. Individualism is more important in explaining adult skill formation than any other cultural trait that previous literature has emphasized. In the labor market, more individualistic migrants earn higher wages and are less often unemployed. We show that our results cannot be explained by selective migration or omitted origin-country variables.

Many countries and regions remain below the level of economic activity of the world’s most advanced economies. Some countries form growth clubs, some are stuck in the middle-income trap, and some stay on a very low level of economic activity. Although this situation is well documented on the country level, there is less evidence at the sub-national level within countries. We estimate county-level capital stocks and price indices and provide a comprehensive county-level data set for Germany. We find no evidence of convergence across all counties even if we condition on important drivers of long-term growth such as physical and human capital accumulation. Instead, we identify five convergence clubs, using endogenous clustering. We analyze differences in growth paths and describe the identified clusters based on variations in contributions of capital, labor, and total factor productivity to economic growth. Additionally, we examine the role of migration for regional development and find that net migration has in particular contributed to growth in richer regions.

The Roy-Borjas model predicts that international migrants are less educated than nonmigrants because the returns to education are generally higher in developing (migrant-sending) than in developed (migrant-receiving) countries. However, empirical evidence often shows the opposite. Using the case of Mexico-U.S. migration, we show that this inconsistency between predictions and empirical evidence can be resolved when the human capital of migrants is assessed using a two-dimensional measure of occupational skills rather than by educational attainment. Thus, focusing on a single skill dimension when investigating migrant selection can lead to misleading conclusions about the underlying economic incentives and behavioral models of migration.